14 resultados para Armed and Police forces
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
It is almost as if engaging in war is easier than thinking about war. In the year of the commemoration of the First World War, Europe is facing several wars on its borders, and European forces are actively engaged in Iraq and Mali. But is anyone thinking about the strategic objectives?
Resumo:
Executive Summary. An “arc of instability” stretching from the European Union’s (EU) eastern borders down to the Mediterranean basin has undermined its flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This policy was designed to deliver prosperity, stability and democracy to countries surrounding the EU. It has manifestly failed and needs to be radically rethought. Starting with a tabula rasa, the EU should abandon the very concept of a heterogeneous “neighbourhood” in the face of glaring differences among the 16 countries affected, not least because some are uninterested in reform; others may even be failed states. EU member states are themselves pursuing divergent interests and goals. A fundamental review of the ENP should lead to more differentiated, targeted measures to promote “transformational change” within neighbouring states ready to accept it. The EU should offer revised incentives such as participation within the proposed “energy union” or freer trade designed to aid local economic development. It should embrace a wider range of actors, including civil society, promote entrepreneurship and help reform countries’ police and military forces. The review should reassert common EU institutions in negotiating and working with neighbours and give them a central role in preventing and resolving conflicts as well as promoting democratic reform and economic stability. This revised ENP should help underpin the EU’s efforts to forge a genuine Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Resumo:
Since the Muslim Brotherhood rule was toppled in July 2013, the regime of President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has strived to consolidate his one-man rule; he painted the political opposition and civil society as traitors and foreign agents and exploited the fight against terrorism to suppress freedom of expression, justify a crackdown on the press, eclipse justice in courtrooms, throw thousands in prison, and tighten his grip on police forces. The regime has postponed parliamentary elections for some time, while it marginalised and weakened the non-Islamist political parties that helped Sisi take power. He did so by promoting electoral lists with candidates who are loyal to the president, to ensure control over the new assembly and by obstructing any political alliance that could form an opposition. At the same time, the security apparatus has been given free rein to control the public sphere and engineer the electoral process. This may ultimately lead to a parliament that includes no advocates for rights and liberties, which is particularly significant since the incoming assembly will review the huge amount of legislation that President Sisi has issued in the absence of a parliament. In addition, shortly before elections, President Sisi raised questions about the constitution, calling for it to be amended to reduce the powers of the parliament and increase those of the president. It is thus clear that Sisi seeks not only to consolidate his regime, without political opposition, but to free his rule of any effective oversight from society or parliament.
Resumo:
The assassination of the opposition leader in Tunisia exposed the underlying divisions between members of the ruling classes, between those in and outside of government, between religious groupings and secularists, and between the coastal areas and the hinterland of Tunisia. Since the revolution, tackling social inclusion has become a pressing problem: men versus women, young versus old, opponents versus supporters of the old regime and political forces inside Tunisia versus those in exile. The National Constituent Assembly (NCA)’s inability to address these fault lines and approve the second draft of the constitution has hampered the transition of the country towards the next elections, while all of the above have undermined trust in the political process. Although Tunisians are primarily responsible for the political processes in their country, argue authors Hrant Kostanyan and Elitsa Garnizova, the EU should step up its efforts to deliver on its commitments in the areas of money, market and mobility.
Resumo:
With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon came the possibility for Member States to launch an initiative under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. This came into being as the scope of co-decision was expanded to cover the more sensitive issues of the third pillar (such as judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation). It was considered necessary that Member States have a shared right of initiative with the European Commission. One case in which the right of initiative was invoked was the Initiative for a European Protection Order (EPO). This dossier is one of the first and few cases in which the Member States’ Initiative after the Treaty of Lisbon was used. It resulted in a turf war between the Presidency and the Commission regarding the scope of the Member States’ Initiatives. This article looks into the Member States’ Initiative as it was introduced after the Treaty of Lisbon and the debate that took place on the EPO.
Resumo:
With Ukraine disintegrating before our eyes, Michael Emerson calls for the EU to convene again the Geneva Quad with the utmost urgency, and proposes a peacekeeping operation by a jointly flagged tripartite brigade of Ukrainian, EU and Russian troops and police to clean up the Maidan in Kyiv, moving on into Donetsk and Lugansk. This short-term action should also have long-term consequences for the European order, if it initiated a switch by the EU and Russia into a cooperative mode over their common neighbourhood.
Resumo:
This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions.The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. It analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. It also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military.
Resumo:
The structure of the Russian army’s personnel has undergone a major transformation in recent years. The Armed Forces are no longer a downsized continuation of the Soviet-era mass army, but are gradually becoming a de facto professional army in which conscription, now employed on a diminishing scale, will primarily constitute a first step towards a continued professional military career. The cornerstone for the process of professionalisation has been laid by a personnel reform which cut the number of officer posts by nearly half and considerably restricted the recruitment of new officers, thus restoring traditional proportions to the structure of the officer corps. The plans to ultimately implement a manning system based predominantly on contract service are a natural consequence of these changes. The ongoing professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces should be treated as a conscious effort which is mainly necessitated by global trends: despite the demographic changes taking place, Russia could still maintain an army with a declared strength of one million soldiers, most of them conscripts.
Resumo:
The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
Strategic Insurance: The Future of the Belgian Armed Forces. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/04/May 2014
Resumo:
Summary. Belgium is on the cusp of its next defence reform. While the security landscape throughout Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond deteriorates, the armed forces face numerous challenges. Most importantly, the next defence plan needs to recalibrate the force structure in function of political ambitions and budgetary realities. This Policy Brief argues that Belgium must embrace a nimble but broad-spectrum force. Any future structure must encompass agile land forces as well as a modern combat air force, without neglecting the need to safeguard a sizeable navy and invest in cyber capabilities. European cooperation should be pursued wherever possible while recognising that this necessitates budgetary convergence. For Belgium this means the investment budget needs to grow significantly in order to acquire interoperable but self-owned assets. Such a choice can be justified on the recognition that defence is not just about expeditionary operations, but also economic stimulus, intergenerational solidarity and strategic insurance: maintaining the ability to respond to whatever the future may bring.
Resumo:
In this Security Policy Brief Jo Coelmont examines the challenges Belgium is facing at present. On the one hand there is the declared political objective to henceforth provide its defence forces with the means of achieving all of its tasks and, furthermore, to develop a new Strategic Plan, while taking decisions on replacing its current fleet of F16 fighter aircraft and determine strategic orientations on the replacement of frigates, mine hunter vessels and other major equipment programmes. On the other hand, the already taken austerity measures impose severe structural cuts on its defence budget for the upcoming five years. In this context the author is proposing some « dos and don’ts«.