The Theoretical Framework and Methodology to Estimate the Farm Labour and Other Factor-Derived Demand and Output Supply Systems. Factor Markets Working Document No. 44, May 2013

This paper provides a conceptual framework for the estimation of the farm labour and other factor-derived demand and output supply systems. In order to analyse the drivers of labour demand in agriculture and account for the impact of policies on those decisions, it is necessary to acknowledge the interaction between the different factor markets. For this purpose, we present a review of the theoretical background to primal and dual representations of production and some empirical literature that has made use of derived demand systems. The main focus of the empirical work is to study the effect of market distortions in one market, through inefficient pricing, on the demand for other inputs. Therefore, own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand become key variables in the analysis. The dual cost function is selected as the most appropriate approach, where input prices are assumed to be exogenous. A commonly employed specification – and one that is particularly convenient due to its flexible form – is the translog cost function. The analysis consists of estimating the system of cost-share equations, in order to obtain the derived demand functions for inputs. Thus, the elasticities of factor substitution can be used to examine the complementarity/substitutability between inputs.

An Investigation of Career Tenure in the European Parliament: Electoral, Party and Individual Considerations. ACES Working Papers, 2012

What explains the length of a Member of the European Parliament’s career? Little evidence of careerism has been uncovered in the European Parliament, particularly when compared to studies of legislator tenure in the U.S. Congress. Due to the different historical contexts in which these two legislatures developed, it seems reasonable to rule out many of the explanations used to account for increasing careerism in Congress in searching for the influences on legislator tenure in the European Parliament. This paper therefore proposes three potential models of careerism in the European Parliament: an electoral systems model, a party model, and an individual model. While the data necessary to test these models has not been fully compiled, this paper outlines the major hypotheses of each model and details plans for the operationalization of all independent and control variables. These models are not intended to be mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather each explanation is expected to influence each MEP in varying degrees.