Russia's position on the events in Kyrgyzstan (April-June 2010). OSW Commentary No. 38, 2010-07-27

Russia was the first state in the world to de facto recognise the regime change in Kyrgyzstan that took place on 7 April 2010. This recognition, along with a previous campaign by the Russian media against the then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has given rise to suspicion that the events of April were provoked by Russia. However, it seems no more than reasonable to say that Russia provided some inspiration and lobbying in that direction. Russia offered support to the new Kyrgyz government almost immediately, albeit conditionally. Russia’s relations with Roza Otunbayeva’s government have been changing in nature; they are currently much cooler than they had been immediately after the coup. There are many indications that this change was a reaction to the extension of the lease agreement for the American military base in the Manas airport. At the same time, Moscow remains in contact with the political rivals to the current regime, which suggests that the Kremlin is preparing for different developments, and does not regard the current crisis as having been fully resolved. Despite the interim government’s plea for help, Russia refused to undertake military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan, which plunged into ethnic unrest in June. This shows that Russia is wary of being dragged into a long-standing and bloody conflict in the region, which could entail considerable expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. It should be expected that after the October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, Russia will return to its plans to establish a second military base in this country (in addition to the Kant base) to reinforce its dominant position in the region. This is the first time that Russia has had a real chance to play a stabilising role in the CIS area. How Russia copes with this challenge may decide its position in post-Soviet Central Asia – and in a wider context, its relations with NATO, the USA and China.

What prospects for transport infrastructure and impacts on growth in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries? MEDPRO Report No. 3, February 2013

Lack of adequate infrastructure is a significant inhibitor to increased trade of the countries of the Mediterranean region. Bringing their transport infrastructure to standards comparable with countries of a similar per capita GDP will be costly but worthwhile. We compare the current quantities of six types of transport infrastructure with international benchmarks, and estimate the additional quantities needed to reach the benchmarks. We also estimate the cost of that infrastructure and express it as a percentage of GDP. Finally we make tentative estimates of how much trade might be generated and how this might impact on GDP. All the estimates are made for 11 southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) under four scenarios. The greatest need for additional infrastructure is for airport passenger terminals (between 52% and 56%), whereas the least is for more unpaved roads (between 7% and 13%). The investment (including maintenance) cost would be between 0.9% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP, although the investments in some countries would be between 1.4% and 4.5% of GDP. The impact on non-oil international trade would be substantial, but with differences between imports and exports. The overall trade balance of the 11 countries would be an improvement of between 5.4% and 17.2%, although some countries would continue to have a negative balance. A final assessment is made of the benefit ratio between the increase in GDP and the cost of transport investment. This varies between about 3 and 8, an indication of the high return to be expected from increased investment in transport infrastructure.

Sales Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 14, February 2012

All agricultural markets are subjected to institutional regulations that – in one way or another –affect the functioning of these markets, and this is no different for the agricultural land market in the EU. In this paper, we describe the existing regulations in the sales markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on three types of sales market regulations and institutions: quantity regulations, price regulations and transaction costs. The differences in the regulatory framework between land acquisition and ownership by domestic and foreign investors are analysed, as well as the taxes associated with land sales and ownership, zoning regulations and market imperfections.

Influence of Agricultural Support on Sale Prices of French Farmland: A comparison of different subsidies, accounting for the role of environmental and land regulations. Factor Markets Working Document No. 51, June 2013

This paper investigates the determinants of agricultural land price in several regions in France over the period 1994-2011, using individual plot transaction data, with a particular emphasis on agricultural subsidies and nitrate zoning regulations. It found a positive but relatively small capitalisation effect of the total subsidies per hectare. The data revealed that agricultural subsidies capitalised, at least to some extent, but the magnitude of such a capitalisation depends on the region considered, on the type of subsidy considered, and on the location of the plot in a nitrate surplus zone or not. Only land set-aside premiums significantly capitalise into land price, while single farm payments have a significant positive capitalisation impact only for plots located in a nitrate-surplus zone.

The Role of Environmental and Land Transaction Regulations on Agricultural Land Price: The example of Brittany. Factor Markets Working Document No. 52, June 2013

Using data from individual transactions for the period 1994-2010 in the French NUTS2 region Brittany, the authors investigated how environmental regulations and transaction land regulations influence the price of sold plots. Regressions on three sub-samples of buyers were performed in order to assess whether different buyers have different attitudes or plans regarding the farmland purchased: a sub-sample including only farmer-buyers, a sub-sample including non-farmer individual buyers, and a sub-sample including non-farmer non-individual buyers. Estimations were performed ignoring and accounting for spatial interactions (model SARAR). Results indicate that the price of land decreases when buyers are farmers, that the nitrate surplus area zoning increases the price of land, even more so for farmer-buyers. Regarding land transaction regulations, there is a negative effect, on land price, of the purchaser being the current tenant or being the land regulating public body SAFER. Estimating the model on different sub-samples depending on the buyers’ type shed light on the factors that are more important for each buyer.

Still together, but apart? Kyiv’s policy towards the Donbas. OSW Commentary No. 160, February 6 2015

From the Introduction. The peace deal agreed on 5 September 2014 concerning the ceasefire in the region covered by the conflict in the Donbas brought about a significant reduction in the scale of military clashes. However, in mid-January the separatist forces, supported by the Russian military, started an offensive along the entire front line. For example, they seized the airport in Donetsk and the village of Krasnyi Partyzan. About a third of the Donetsk and the Lugansk oblasts currently remain outside Kyiv’s control (see Map). Before the war, these areas were inhabited by 6.6 million residents, 15% of Ukraine’s total population. The process launched in September 2014 in Minsk, which was intended to regulate the conflict within the so-called trilateral contact group (Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE and representatives of the separatists), resulted in an exchange of some prisoners of war, although it failed to have any political effects. Attempts at regulating the political situation were additionally complicated by the illegal ‘elections’ of leaders of the two separatist regions, the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (the DPR and LPR).

The fall-out from the Brussels terrorist attacks. EPC Commentary, 16 June 2016

On 22 March, Belgium got a brutal wake-up call. In a coordinated attack, two nail bombs exploded in the departure hall of the Brussels National Airport. A little over an hour later, a third bomb exploded inside a metro train passing through Maelbeek station. 32 civilians lost their lives, while more than 300 people were injured. The Islamic State (IS) network, which was responsible for the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015, claimed responsibility. The arrest of Salah Abdeslam, the sole survivor of the Paris attacks, on 18 March, seems to have made IS expedite the Brussels attacks following a claim from the Paris prosecutor that Abdeslam would cooperate with the French Justice Department over the Paris attacks.