Russia's position on the events in Kyrgyzstan (April-June 2010). OSW Commentary No. 38, 2010-07-27

Russia was the first state in the world to de facto recognise the regime change in Kyrgyzstan that took place on 7 April 2010. This recognition, along with a previous campaign by the Russian media against the then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has given rise to suspicion that the events of April were provoked by Russia. However, it seems no more than reasonable to say that Russia provided some inspiration and lobbying in that direction. Russia offered support to the new Kyrgyz government almost immediately, albeit conditionally. Russia’s relations with Roza Otunbayeva’s government have been changing in nature; they are currently much cooler than they had been immediately after the coup. There are many indications that this change was a reaction to the extension of the lease agreement for the American military base in the Manas airport. At the same time, Moscow remains in contact with the political rivals to the current regime, which suggests that the Kremlin is preparing for different developments, and does not regard the current crisis as having been fully resolved. Despite the interim government’s plea for help, Russia refused to undertake military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan, which plunged into ethnic unrest in June. This shows that Russia is wary of being dragged into a long-standing and bloody conflict in the region, which could entail considerable expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. It should be expected that after the October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, Russia will return to its plans to establish a second military base in this country (in addition to the Kant base) to reinforce its dominant position in the region. This is the first time that Russia has had a real chance to play a stabilising role in the CIS area. How Russia copes with this challenge may decide its position in post-Soviet Central Asia – and in a wider context, its relations with NATO, the USA and China.

The Western Borderlands: The place of eastern Galicia and Volhynia in the Ukrainian State. OSW Study 43/2013

The regions of Ukraine are strongly diversified. These differences are subject to historical conditions and attempts at unification which have been made over the past seventy years have proven that these differences will be impossible to reduce in the foreseeable future and will continue to bear an impact on Ukraine’s domestic policy. Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia and Volhynia) is a peripheral region in economic, political and cultural terms. Although it accounts for approximately 14% of Ukraine’s territory and 15% of the country’s population live there, the region generates only around 10% of the country’s GDP. Its metropolis, Lviv, Ukraine’s seventh largest city, was traditionally among the key centres in the nation’s history. However, its role in an independent Ukraine has been marginalised partly due to the fact that a significant part of its elite moved to Kyiv. This is also the most ethnically homogeneous region, where Russian speakers make up rather a small part of the population.

What prospects for transport infrastructure and impacts on growth in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries? MEDPRO Report No. 3, February 2013

Lack of adequate infrastructure is a significant inhibitor to increased trade of the countries of the Mediterranean region. Bringing their transport infrastructure to standards comparable with countries of a similar per capita GDP will be costly but worthwhile. We compare the current quantities of six types of transport infrastructure with international benchmarks, and estimate the additional quantities needed to reach the benchmarks. We also estimate the cost of that infrastructure and express it as a percentage of GDP. Finally we make tentative estimates of how much trade might be generated and how this might impact on GDP. All the estimates are made for 11 southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) under four scenarios. The greatest need for additional infrastructure is for airport passenger terminals (between 52% and 56%), whereas the least is for more unpaved roads (between 7% and 13%). The investment (including maintenance) cost would be between 0.9% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP, although the investments in some countries would be between 1.4% and 4.5% of GDP. The impact on non-oil international trade would be substantial, but with differences between imports and exports. The overall trade balance of the 11 countries would be an improvement of between 5.4% and 17.2%, although some countries would continue to have a negative balance. A final assessment is made of the benefit ratio between the increase in GDP and the cost of transport investment. This varies between about 3 and 8, an indication of the high return to be expected from increased investment in transport infrastructure.

Still together, but apart? Kyiv’s policy towards the Donbas. OSW Commentary No. 160, February 6 2015

From the Introduction. The peace deal agreed on 5 September 2014 concerning the ceasefire in the region covered by the conflict in the Donbas brought about a significant reduction in the scale of military clashes. However, in mid-January the separatist forces, supported by the Russian military, started an offensive along the entire front line. For example, they seized the airport in Donetsk and the village of Krasnyi Partyzan. About a third of the Donetsk and the Lugansk oblasts currently remain outside Kyiv’s control (see Map). Before the war, these areas were inhabited by 6.6 million residents, 15% of Ukraine’s total population. The process launched in September 2014 in Minsk, which was intended to regulate the conflict within the so-called trilateral contact group (Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE and representatives of the separatists), resulted in an exchange of some prisoners of war, although it failed to have any political effects. Attempts at regulating the political situation were additionally complicated by the illegal ‘elections’ of leaders of the two separatist regions, the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (the DPR and LPR).

The fall-out from the Brussels terrorist attacks. EPC Commentary, 16 June 2016

On 22 March, Belgium got a brutal wake-up call. In a coordinated attack, two nail bombs exploded in the departure hall of the Brussels National Airport. A little over an hour later, a third bomb exploded inside a metro train passing through Maelbeek station. 32 civilians lost their lives, while more than 300 people were injured. The Islamic State (IS) network, which was responsible for the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015, claimed responsibility. The arrest of Salah Abdeslam, the sole survivor of the Paris attacks, on 18 March, seems to have made IS expedite the Brussels attacks following a claim from the Paris prosecutor that Abdeslam would cooperate with the French Justice Department over the Paris attacks.