Political economy of the Agenda 2010 reforms: How Gerhard Schröder overcame the "blocked republic". ACES Cases No. 2008.3

This essay will show that the Schröder-led government managed to break the political gridlock and introduce the Agenda 2010 because key institutional structures of Germany‟s political economy had lost their obstructive powers. In other words, the formerly semi-sovereign state had reclaimed its sovereignty. To understand how this happened, Peter Katzenstein's concept of the semi-sovereign state is first explored as a framework through which to analyze economic policy continuity and change. Within this framework, the causes for constant reform inertia between 1982 and 2002, in spite of varying political constellations and changes in the country‟s economic structure, are then discussed. This analysis will demonstrate that the Agenda 2010 reforms are predominantly a result of underlying incremental change in the political economy and its effect on the political decision-making process. Finally, the findings of this analysis are summarized and discussed with the aim of better understanding the economic policies of the current grand coalition government of the CDU/CSU and the SPD government under Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The 2010 OSCE Kazakhstan Chairmanship: Carrot Devoured, Results Missing. EUCAM Policy Brief No. 15, April 2011

This brief looks at Kazakhstan’s chairmanship through the prism of the EU’s relations with Central Asian states and examines what lessons the EU can draw from the Kazakhstan chairmanship. The OSCE Chairmanship and the agreement to hold the 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana, despite it not having a Summit-like agenda were significant ‘carrots’ given to Kazakhstan. Did these carrots bring any results, and is there any reason to offer more such carrots to Kazakhstan or to other Central Asian states?