Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers in Law, 7/2006

From the Introduction. The Media Sector has experienced a technological revolution in the last 15 years. Digital encoding of television signals made possible a more efficient use of the radiospectrum. Digital terrestrial television (hereinafter, “DTT”) allows now for the reception of a significant number of free-to-air channels.1 Moreover, the use of new transmission platforms (hereinafter,“platforms”), namely cable and direct-to-home satellite (hereinafter, “DTH”) paved the way for the arrival in Europe of pay-TV operators, which finance their activities mainly via subscription fees. This changing technological landscape is subject to further evolution in the near future, as incumbent telecommunications operators become increasingly interested in making available broadcasting content2 as part of their broadband offer and 3G mobile handsets can be used for the reception of TV signals....The present paper seeks to ascertain whether the Commission “regulatory approach” towards the exclusive sale of premium content is a sound one, in particular in view of the constant technological evolution outlined above. The assumptions underlying landmark Commission decisions will be compared with recent developments of the media sector in Italy. In the NewsCorp./Telepiù case, decided in 2003, the Commission imposed very strict conditions to allow the merger giving birth to Sky Italia, on the assumption that the operation created a lasting near-monopsony in the different upstream markets for the acquisition of premium intervened against the media conglomerate Mediaset (which controls, inter alia, the main three private free-to-air channels in Italy) for an alleged abuse of dominant position.17 In fact, and contrary to the forecasts made by the Commission, Mediaset was in a position to acquire the broadcasting rights of the main Italian football teams, thereby excluding the incumbent (and near-monopolist) pay-TV operator, Sky Italia. This may go to show that the reality of the sector is more complex and evolves faster than one may infer from the Commission practice, thus putting into question its stance regarding exclusivity. The experience of the evolution of the Italian media sector will be used as the starting point for the evaluation of alternative regulatory options.

Políticas europeas para la competitividad, salarios mìnimos y tutela del poder adquisitivo de las retribuciones en Italia tras el acuerdo de noviembre de 2012 [European Policies for competitiveness, minimum wages and purchasing power protection in Italy after the November 2012 agreement]. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 99/2013

On the floor of the Global Wage Report 2012/2013 by ILO, entitled Wages and equitable growth, the A. thinks that the wage regulation has to take into account competitiveness without compressing global aggregate demand. Therefore, International and European rules are necessary to avoid the spiral towards the wages dampen, which is bad for the economic development. The rules in action at the different levels are inadequate. The A. proposes an interpretation of Article 153 and Article 155 TFEU that is more suitable for a European regulation promoting better minimum wages and more coherent with the current legal framework of the right to pay, which can be considered, even if partially, as a social right.

The EU’s comprehensive approach towards security: the Lisbon Treaty and “smart power”. EU Centre Singpore Policy Brief No. 6, May 2013

The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a comprehensive security actor. With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a reaction to the failure of the EU to act during the wars in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU has a wide range of instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management as well as post-crisis intervention at its disposal. Observers typically agree that “hard power” is no longer sufficient to address the complex security challenges of today’s world while the EU, often criticised for only utilising “soft power”, is now able to exercise “smart power”. Through a comprehensive approach, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can now use the various instruments at its disposal, such as diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities in a joined-up manner. This mix of tools and instruments is helping the EU to achieve the aim set out in its European Security Strategy: “a secure Europe in a better world”.