Meeting Competition: Why it is not an Abuse under Article 82. Research Papers in Law, 3/2004.

Introduction. Meeting competition occurs when an undertaking lowers its prices in response to the entry of a competitor. Despite accepting that meeting competition can be compatible with Article 82, the Commission2 and the Court of justice3 have repeatedly condemned the practice due to the modalities of implementation or ���particular circumstances���.4 However, existing precedent on the subject remains obscurely reasoned and contradictory, such that it is at the present time impossible to give clear advice to undertakings on the circumstances in which meeting competition is compatible with Article 82. Not only is such legal uncertainty in itself damaging but, in so far as it discourages meeting competition, it appears to us to be harmful to competition. As concerns the latter point, it will be seen that some of the most powerful arguments against prohibiting meeting competition are based on the counterproductive nature of the remedies. The present article does not, however, aim to propose a simple solution to distinguish abusive and non-abusive meeting competition.5 Nor does the article aim to give a comprehensive overview of the existing case law in this area.6 Instead, it takes a more economic approach and aims to lay out in a (brief but) systematic fashion the competitive concerns that might potentially be raised by the practice of meeting competition and in doing so to try to identify the main flaws in the Court and Commission���s approach.

Unemployment is the scourge, not youth unemployment per se. The misguided policy preoccupation with youth. CEPS Policy Brief No. 294, 26 June 2013

This Policy Brief argues that too much effort and political capital is being spent by the Commission and member states on being seen to be doing something quickly about youth unemployment when, in fact, the structural measures proposed will only have long-term effects. Expectations of immediate relief are running well above what can be delivered, especially at the EU level. Given the macroeconomic situation, no policy option will deliver a significant dent in either youth unemployment or unemployment in general. The EU policies on the table that are supposed to have an immediate effect, such as increased lending from the European Investment Bank to SMEs for the hiring of young people, will only have a very marginal impact on youth unemployment. Moreover, this impact will come mostly to the detriment of older unemployed persons excluded from such a scheme. Given the perceived need to ���be seen to be doing something���, we fear that policies subsidising young workers de facto at the expense of older workers or, even worse, policies that subsidise older workers for not taking young people���s jobs, will proliferate. In fact, it is not at all clear that young people suffer more from being unemployed than older people, or even disproportionately more than older unemployed individuals. In particular, it is not clear that the much-publicised notion of a ���lost generation��� with permanent ���scars��� is relevant only to the young generation. The paper ends by highlighting the much-neglected policy option of encouraging labour mobility within the internal market. Although the Commission is ���upgrading and modernising��� its tools, much more could be done in this area ��� to the benefit of the individuals concerned, the member states, and European integration in general.

Why Schumpeter's Creative Destruction? Everything has changed, so it is the same: Towards "Mode 3". ACES Working Paper (Report) No. 5, 2007

Of what value is examining creative destruction and diffusion theories that Schumpeter introduced to the world? A variety of factors causes economic changes, but he argued that entrepreneurial innovation was central. Today, even those who create new products and processes hardly know who Schumpeter was, or what he did. It is difficult to believe that his contributions are not more popularly recognized today. Schumpeter's theories are as valuable and important within the contemporary environment as they were when he wrote about them over four score or seventy years ago.

The European Union and global security: is the EU becoming the indispensable partner? EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 11, April 2014

The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ���crisis cycle���, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ���comprehensive approach���). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU���s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU���s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU���s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.

Yes, it���s the economy, stupid, but is it demand or supply? CEPS Commentary, 24 January 2014

Paul De Grauwe writes in this new CEPS Commentary that the recent and surprising conversion of Fran��ois Hollande to supply-side economics completes the victory of the northern European policy-makers who believe that insufficient aggregate demand should be fought exclusively by supply-side measures. In his view, however, it is not the first time in post-war history that economists and policy-makers apply the wrong medicine; or to put it differently, it's akin to some generals who fight a new war by applying the strategies developed for the previous war.

Euro-area governance: what to reform and how to do it. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/01 February 2015

The Issue Reform of the governance of the euro area is being held back by disagreement on what is at the root of the euro area���s woes. Pre-crisis, the euro area suffered from the built-up of financial imbalances, price and wage divergence and an insufficient focus on debt sustainability. During the crisis, the main problems were slow resolution of banking problems, an inadequate fiscal policy stance in 2011-13 for the area as a whole, insufficient domestic demand in surplus countries and slow progress with structural reforms to overcome past divergences. Policy Challenge Euro-area governance needs to move beyond the improvements brought about by banking union and should establish institutions to prevent divergences of wages from productivity. We propose the creation of a European Competitiveness Council composed of national competitiveness councils, and the creation of a Eurosystem of Fiscal Policy (EFP) with two goals: fiscal debt sustainability and an adequate area-wide fiscal position. The EFP should have the right in exceptional circumstances to declare national deficits unlawful and to be able to force parliaments to borrow more so that the euro-area fiscal stance is appropriate. A euro-area chamber of the European Parliament would have to approve such decisions. No additional risk-sharing would be introduced. In the short term, domestic demand needs to be increased in surplus countries, while in deficit countries, structural reform needs to reduce past divergences.

Europe is still standing. CEPS Commentary, 6 June 2014

Despite the fact that anti-establishment, mostly euro-sceptic parties won about one-fifth of the vote in the European Parliament elections last month, Daniel Gros insists that it is not quite accurate (or fair) to characterise the result as a rejection of Europe. He argues that the deeper roots of the surge of euro-sceptic and other protest parties originate with the general dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and dysfunctional national political systems. Tinkering with austerity or the fundamental right of free movement within the EU will not make much of a difference and, in his view, only reform at home, in national capitals, will stem the tide of euro-scepticism.

The growth challenge for Europe and the EMU. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22- Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

The European economy is slowly and painfully striving to reemerge from the last six years of crisis. It was a crisis of enormous intensity and contagiousness, given the unprecedented depth of global financial integration combined with the systemic flaws in the EMU architecture. And it is not over, as the high levels of unemployment and the growing divergence between Member States testify. The threat of fragmentation is imminent as ever: fragmentation between euro-ins and euro-outs; fragmentation between North and South; fragmentation within societies, with increasing income inequality and a growing number of, what used to be, the middle class population slipping through the social safety net and below poverty lines. Policies of front-loaded fiscal consolidation have left welfare states in economically weaker countries severely underfunded. According to OECD data, the number of people living in households without any income from work has doubled in Greece, Ireland and Spain, and has risen by 20% or more in Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, and Slovenia. Fertility rates have dropped further since the crisis, deepening the demographic and fiscal challenges of ageing. There are long-term implications from these deteriorating trends, regarding people's long-term health, education and upward mobility from low-income families. It is also highly likely that many of the people unemployed for a long period of time will never again be able to gain proper access to the job market and build a normal career track. The enduring effects of the crisis risk creating vicious cycles of low growth, high debt levels, austerity, declining productivity, and stagnation. These developments carry heavy implications for the future growth prospects of the European economies, for future prosperity, and for the sustainability of pension systems and welfare states. They must be urgently reversed.

Social Content of the International Sphere: Symbols and Meaning in Franco-German Relations, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.2, 2002

���The Franco-German friendship is rich in memories and gestures that are at once important and symbolic, and that characterize the exceptional nature of the relationship between our two countries,��� reflects former French economics minister and European Commission President Jacques Delors. Such symbolic acts and joint memories are not primarily about cooperation in specific instances. Rather, more generally, they denote what it means to act together. They lend significance to a relationship; they signify what is ���at stake,��� or what it is ���all about.��� They are about a deeper and more general social purpose underlying specific instances of cooperation. They are about the value and intrinsic importance that social relations incorporate. Symbols contribute to the institutionalization of social meaning and social purpose in dealing with one another. In this paper I clarify the concept of ���predominantly symbolic acts and practices among states,��� systematically explore such acts for the bilateral Franco-German relationship between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s, and scrutinize the specific meaning and effects that these practices have helped to generate and perpetuate.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine. OSW Point of View 50, May 2015

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

The Dangers and Inanity of (Euro-) Nationalism: From Communitarianism to Cosmopolitanism. Egmont Paper No. 77, April 2015

INTRODUCTION In the current times of multifaceted crisis, nationalism looks, more than ever, like a positive and necessary feeling. It seems both natural and indispensable if we are to have viable political and social institutions that meet the needs and preferences of all citizens. The following paper contests this vision. Its criticism of nationalism is directed not only at its national forms, but also at any defence of collective identity based on the same model, such as the various forms of European nationalism. Furthermore, the same overriding criticism can be made of different kinds of nationalism, regardless of their more or less open and progressive political content. In order to ground our argument theoretically and practically, we will try to show that nationalism is always potentially harmful to individual rights, and unnecessary for the maintenance of a just social and political system. We will thus oppose any acritical defence of the intrinsic value of a specific community and the belief in its artificial homogeneity. The historical construction of a supposedly homogeneous community, and the insistence on its values, which are perceived as superior and binding, facilitate the absorption of the individual into the collective. As we will explain further in more details, this holistic approach is typical of communitarian approaches. In that respect, it does not really matter whether they appeal to passion or to reason, to some irrational binding features of the community or to more rational political aspects of a common identity. The main problem in nationalism is not the emotion it can trigger, it is not even its reliance on particular values. What makes nationalism problematic is, firstly, that it tends to overlook the intrinsically divisive and contradictory nature of individual and collective interests in unjust societies; secondly, that it attributes an intrinsic superiority to a particular community over others; and thirdly, that it sees politics as a means to promote the interests, values or identity of that community. As an alternative, we will very briefly advocate a cosmopolitan approach that grounds political legitimacy in a demanding approach to individual freedom, rather than in a shared collective identity. However, even if only briefly, we will also carefully distinguish our own vision of cosmopolitanism from those commonly put forward. Frequently, cosmopolitan perspectives entangle their identity frameworks with concrete political projects, without clearly explaining how the latter derive from the former. Our approach to cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is, first and foremost, a critical vision of all communitarian postulates according to which politics should be based on some form of collective identity. Thus, we insist on the conceptual distinction between a general stance on identity issues and the more practical political ideology one stands for. In a subsequent step, we link this cosmopolitan framework with a progressive approach to individual rights. Because of our demanding approach to individual freedom, our cosmopolitanism goes hand in hand with a revival of identity-free sovereignty. It is therefore distinct from the severe condemnation of sovereignty often found in most mainstream cosmopolitan positions. Finally, instead of the frequent confusion found in public discourses and in the literature between ideals and reality, our position acknowledges the deep gulf separating these two dimensions. It therefore sketches out very general strategic principles to bring normative ideals closer to political reality.