An Investigation of Career Tenure in the European Parliament: Electoral, Party and Individual Considerations. ACES Working Papers, 2012

What explains the length of a Member of the European Parliament’s career? Little evidence of careerism has been uncovered in the European Parliament, particularly when compared to studies of legislator tenure in the U.S. Congress. Due to the different historical contexts in which these two legislatures developed, it seems reasonable to rule out many of the explanations used to account for increasing careerism in Congress in searching for the influences on legislator tenure in the European Parliament. This paper therefore proposes three potential models of careerism in the European Parliament: an electoral systems model, a party model, and an individual model. While the data necessary to test these models has not been fully compiled, this paper outlines the major hypotheses of each model and details plans for the operationalization of all independent and control variables. These models are not intended to be mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather each explanation is expected to influence each MEP in varying degrees.

Case sequence segments for EMU, ECB and Eurozone: A Eurozone country profile and related Euro matters. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

No European country employs a U.S.-style electoral college in presidential elections. Presidents with largely ceremonial functions are elected in some countries by the national parliament or a special assembly (Germany, Italy, Estonia, Turkey and others) or by the people in other countries (Greece, Poland, Slovakia and others). The presidents of Cyprus, Finland, France, Russia and Ukraine -- who have real decision-making power -- are elected directly by the voters. Keep in mind that no two countries are exactly alike in their institutional and electoral arrangements; all of these institutions and electoral systems are capable of being modified and adapted to suit national peculiarities and preferences.

Strategic Voting in Proportional Systems: The Case of Finland. IHS Political Science Series No. 138, September 2014

Voters try to avoid wasting their votes even in PR systems. In this paper we make a case that this type of strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives constrain an individual’s decision-making process. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation process driven by institutional and dispositional incentives. All well-known institutional incentives to vote strategically that get channelled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing data from Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence for observable implications of our theory.