The New EU Climate and Energy Package: Passing the test? CEPS Commentary, 6 January 2014

On 22 January 2014, the European Commission is expected to publish the proposals for the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies, which will be discussed and possibly – or maybe, partly – agreed during the 20-21 March 2014 European Council. This is the first comprehensive review of the 2007-09 Climate and Energy Package, which resulted in the so-called ‘20-20-20’ targets by 2020. The principal intention is to define the EU’s climate change and energy policy framework for the next decade and beyond to give investors an adequate amount of predictability if not certainty. This Commentary argues, however, that the ‘2030 Framework’ is not just about predictability; it is also about making the proper adjustments based on the lessons learned and also in response to new issues that have emerged in the interim. The authors ask what the main lessons are and how they should influence the 2030 Framework. Or put differently, what are the conditions that the “2030 Framework” will need to meet in order to offer a viable package for discussion?

The eurozone in bad need of a psychiatrist. EuropEos Commentary No. 6, 9 December 2010

Stefano Micossi, Director General of Assonime and member of the CEPS Board of Directors, observes in a new EuropEos Commentary that there is something surreal to the unfolding financial crisis of the eurozone, as the leaders grudgingly do what is needed to prevent disaster just minutes before it’s too late, and then in the next minute revert to the same behaviour that had brought them against the wall in the first place. He cites rising sovereign spreads within the area as the visible result of this strategy: they signal investors’ expectation that the future can only bring more of the same, a series of ever-larger sovereign debt crises, under Damocles’ sword that at some stage Germany, the paymaster of last resort, will close its purse and let Armageddon start.

The Goldkrieg: Revaluing the Bundesbank's Reserves and the Politics of EMU. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.6, 1998

In May and June 1997, Germany's commitment to Economic and Monetaty Union (EMU) underwent its most serious test ever when the Bundesbank and the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl dashed openly over the government's plans to revalue the country's gold reserves. Faced with a budget short-fall and strong political opposition to either tax increases or spending cuts, Finance Minister Waigel attempted to introduce a modest change in the Bundesbank's bookkeeping procedures to bring them in line with the standard practices at other European central banks. The Bundesbank resisted, arguing that the changes would infringe upon its closely guarded independence. This paper analyzes how the politics of coalition interacted with Germany's political institutions to cause this conflict.