Social Investment and State Capacity. CEPS Working Document No. 419/February 2016

This paper looks at the difference between the levels and nature of social policy expenditure in northern and northwest European countries and the countries of southern, central, and eastern Europe, and examines the relationship between social investment and state capacity in these country groupings. The authors show that southern and eastern countries have a much greater preference for ‘compensating’ rather than ‘capacitating’ social policy spending. Furthermore, the state capacity in these countries is lower, which generates less state revenue. Based on these observations they conclude that low state capacity and low state revenue go hand in hand with the preference for capacitating social policies, as these policies involve less delegation and discretion than social investment policies. This paper shows that high state capacity is probably a necessary precondition for effective social investment policies, although some limited alternative paths do exist.

The end of globalisation? CEPS Commentary, 10 March 2016

China has just announced that its exports declined on an annual basis last year, for the first time since the country began opening up its economy to the world at the end of the 1970s. And that is not all; in value terms, global trade declined in 2015. The obvious question is why?

Facing the fourth foreign fighters wave. What drives Europeans to Syria, and to Islamic state? Insights from the Belgian case. Egmont Paper 81, March 2016

‘A bizarre phenomenon,’ Der Spiegel concluded, after trying to figure out why young people left Germany to become foreign fighters in Syria. The magazine painted a portrait of two thirty-somethings with similar backgrounds and the same hobby – martial arts. One became director of a martial arts school in Hamburg, the other became a terrorist poster boy in Syria.2

Geopolitics with European characteristics: An essay on pragmatic idealism, equality, and strategy. Egmont Paper 82, March 2016

‘A bizarre phenomenon,’ Der Spiegel concluded, after trying to figure out why young people left Germany to become foreign fighters in Syria. The magazine painted a portrait of two thirty-somethings with similar backgrounds and the same hobby – martial arts. One became director of a martial arts school in Hamburg, the other became a terrorist poster boy in Syria.2

How to get out of the crisis without reforms? The Belarusian authorities confront growing economic problems. OSW Commentary NUMBER 202/21.03.2016

2015 saw a drop in Belarus’s GDP for the first time in almost 20 years, which is primarily the result of a significant reduction in levels of production and export. As a consequence, there was also a serious depletion of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, as well as a progressive weakening of the Belarusian rouble. The macroeconomic figures from January and February 2016 show that these trends are not only continuing, but they are also becoming even more severe, which confirms that Belarus now finds itself in a prolonged economic crisis. On one hand, the reason for this state of affairs is the protracted economic recession in Russia, which is Belarus’s main economic partner, together with the drastic global decline in prices for fuel, which is a key Belarusian export. On the other hand, meanwhile, an equally important reason for the current crisis is the failure of the Belarusian economic model. President Aleksandr Lukashenko, out of fear that his authoritarian system of government will be dismantled and that public discontent will rise, has categorically rejected the proposals for even partial reforms put forward by some of his entourage, who are aware of the need for the immediate transformation of the country’s anachronistic and very costly economic model, based as it still is on quasi-Soviet management policies.

A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/07 MARCH 2016

Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives: public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.

Is there a need for additional monetary stimulus? Insights from the original Taylor Rule. CEPS Policy Brief No. 342, April 2016

Central banks in the developed world are being misled into fighting the perceived dangers of a ‘deflationary spiral’ because they are looking at only one indicator: consumer prices. This Policy Brief finds that while consumer prices are flat, broader price indices do not show any sign of impending deflation: the GDP deflator is increasing in the US, Japan and the euro area by about 1.2-1.5%. Nor is the real economy sending any deflationary signals either: unemployment is at record lows in the US and Japan, and is declining in the euro area while GDP growth is at, or above potential. Thus, the overall macroeconomic situation does not give any indication of an imminent deflationary spiral. In today’s high-debt environment, the authors argue that central banks should be looking at the GDP deflator and the growth of nominal GDP, instead of CPI inflation. Nominal GDP growth, as forecasted by the major official institutions, remains robust and is in excess of nominal interest rates. They conclude that if the ECB were to set the interest rate according to the standard rules of thumb for monetary policy, which take into account both the real economy and price developments of broader price indicators, it would start normalising its policy now, instead of pondering over additional measures to fight deflation, which does not exist. In short, economic conditions are slowly normalising; so should monetary policy.

The EU cannot remain a passive observer of the Karabakh conflict. EPC Commentary, 7 April 2016

When Federica Mogherini visited the South Caucasus in March, she was quoted as saying that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a top priority for the EU. Facts, however, do not seem to match the words of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. As violent clashes in the conflict zone unfolded over the past week, the EU was a passive observer, with few visible signs of engagement apart from a cursory phone call urging Armenia and Azerbaijan to show restraint. The escalation has shown how quickly and dangerously the situation can develop, and the unassailable nature of the Line of Contact (LoC). If the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict show no progress, a repetition is very probable. Furthermore, it is likely the next incident will be more devastating in human and material costs than this recent one, and may not be contained so quickly. The EU needs to be part of the renewed diplomatic effort.

The role of Central Europe in the German economy. The political consequences. OSW Report June 2016

Recent publications allow us to conclude that the economic relations between Germany and Central Europe have come to the ‘end of history’, and nothing new will happen. However, a deeper analysis of these relationships reveals interesting new trends. Since joining the European Union the states of Central Europe have not settled for maintaining the average level of economic development, but have continued to narrow the distance between them and Western Europe, something which the global financial crisis did not prevent. Their improved economic situation also affected their relations with Germany. The latest results from the Visegrád Group states show them to be Germany’s most important trading partner, and their balance of trade in goods is in a state of equilibrium, while many euro area countries have recorded high trade deficits with Germany. The aim of this report is to display the trends in trade and investment between Germany and Central Europe, based on the example of the Visegrád Group. The author will also attempt to answer the question of whether the advancing economic cooperation between Germany and the V4 countries will lead to the further modernisation of those countries’ economies, or whether it will run the risk of leaving them in the ‘middle income trap’.

Estrangement Day: The implications of Brexit for the EU. CEPS Commentary, 27 June 2016

In a post-imperial burst to define the boundaries of its sovereignty, Britannia is ruling the waves again, albeit in the form of air time devoted to the fallout from its referendum vote rather than in a show of force from its flotilla. It was with disbelief and sorrow that the UK’s partners in Europe and the rest of the world woke up to the news of the British Leave vote in the referendum on its EU membership. The prospect of a Brexit has sent shock waves throughout the international financial and political system and is set to occupy media debate for months to come.

The Effects of Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions on EU-Russian Trade Flows. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2016

After Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014 and then intervened, manu militari, in the Eastern part of Ukraine, the European Union wanted to show its disapproval and put pressure on Russia to change its behaviour. A wide variety of measures were taken, including the imposition of individual restrictions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, but also the suspension of development loans from the EBRD. But the EU (together with the United States) also took, in July and September 2014, a set of broader measures: limited access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for targeted Russian financial institutions and energy and defence companies; export and import bans on trade in arms; an export ban for dual-use goods and reduction of Russia’s access to sensitive technologies and services linked to oil production.

The China-Russia trade relationship and its impact on Europe. Breugel Working Paper Issue 4, 2016

This paper analyses empirically how increasingly close trade relations between China and Russia might affect the European Union (EU). We show that EU countries are complementary to Russia on the Chinese market. However, Chinese exports are increasingly relevant substitutes for EU exports on the Russian market. This means that an increase in China-Russia economic cooperation should have a negative impact on European exports. We simulate a scenario in which trade tariffs between Russia and China are eliminated, which is found to reduce EU exports to Russia. Finally, a more granular approach to the question analyses which sectors in Europe will be more affected by the increasing economic links between China and Russia, and finds that electronic machinery, equipment and machinery, and nuclear reactors will be particularly affected. Such findings obviously show quickly China is moving up the ladder in terms of export structure and how strategically important it is for Europe to continue upgrading its industry to compete at the highest level of that ladder.