Why the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is bad for you: a letter to the EU. Research Papers in Law, 5/2006

From the Introduction. The aim of the present “letter” is to provoke, rather than to prove. It is intended to further stimulate the – already well engaged – scientific dialogue on the open method of coordination (OMC).1 This explains why some of the arguments put forward are not entirely new, while others are overstretched. This contribution, belated as it is entering into the debate, has the benefit of some hindsight. This hindsight is based on three factors (in chronological order): a) the fact that the author has participated himself as a member of a national delegation in one of the OMC-induced benchmarking exercises (only to see the final evaluation report getting lost in the Labyrinth of the national bureaucracy, despite the fact that it contained an overall favorable assessment), as well as in a OECD led exercise of coordination, concerning regulatory reform; b) the extremely rich and knowledgeable academic input, offering a very promising theoretical background for the OMC; and c) some recent empirical research as to the efficiency of the OMC, the accounts of which are, to say the least, ambiguous. This recent empirical research grounds the basic assumption of the present paper: that the OMC has only restricted, if not negligible, direct effects in the short term, while it may have some indirect effects in the medium-long term (2). On the basis of this assumption a series of arguments against the current “spread” of the OMC will be put forward (3). Some proposals on how to neutralize some of the shortfalls of the OMC will follow (4).

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

The 'Yukos affair', its motives and implications. OSW Study 25/2006

When interpreting the "Yukos affair", it is hard to focus on any single particular motive or explanation that would easily rationalise the government's actions against the company. The "Yukos affair" is a multi-layered process with a number of different reasons for its cause. When one scrutinises the events around the company, the impression may be obtained that the Kremlin seemed at first not to have had any ultimate strategy; the authorities' position evolved as time went by. At first, the conflict was mainly of a political nature; economic factors did not arise until later, when the oil sector was undergoing changes in ownership.