Comparison of PRC and Vietnam's Responses to the Elimination of U.S. Textile and Apparel Quotas: Economic and Cultural Perspectives. ACES Working Paper No. 1, 2007

International trade in textiles and apparel has, as of January 1, 2005, been set free from the very intricate Multi-Fiber textile and apparel quota Arrangement (MFA). This event has raised many uncertainties about the new international trade climate and has placed enormous pressure on China as the expected clear cut beneficiary of this liberalization.' Other countries considered to be major contenders include Vietnam which also has a large population employed in the textile and apparel (T&A) sector. Since the old quota system had provided a certain degree of market certainty to competing T&A producers, will the new free trade environment lead to a shake out where mass producers with large economies of scale dominate the new reality? The removal of T&A quotas will create opportunities for Vietnam and China along with other developing countries, but it will also expose them to additional competition from each other. The outcome of this competition will depend on the demand in the US, the ability of the exporting countries to differentiate their exports and on their ability to transfer additional resources to expand domestic output in the direction of the new 'free market signals' and away from rent seeking objectives. Obviously, exporting countries that adjust to this new environment quickly will improve their competitiveness, and will be the new beneficiaries of a quota free international trade in textiles and apparel. This paper attempts to shed some light on the differences and similarities in the responses of Chinese and Vietnamese T&A sectors to this new environment. It first focuses on the demand side attempting to determine whether or not Chinese and Vietnamese T&A items, formally under quota control, are substitutes or compliments. On the supply side, the paper focuses on institutional differences between each country's T&A sectors, the different domestic government policies that have contributed to their growth and the unique cultural differences which will determine the future progress in each country's T&A sectors.

Designing a Genuine EMU: Which "Unions" for EU and Eurozone? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 34/2014

The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’ for the wider public suggested to design an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking unions as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews. What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union, social union and political union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a ‘political union’ is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, at best, it is a highly elastic notion: it might be thought necessary for reasons of domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis. Taking each one of these arguments separately, a range of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as ‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with a modest common Fund and carefully confined but centralised powers, the author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort function of the ECB. Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought to be pursued. Yet, political legitimacy matters, both with national parliaments and the grassroots. National parliaments will have to play a larger role.