146 resultados para 1 Corinthians 13:1-13
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
From the Introduction. On October 12th the Nobel Committee announced that the annual Nobel Peace Prize would be awarded to the European Union for, “promoting peace, democracy and human rights over six decades”.1 This was a bit of good news for the EU who had produced nothing but bad press with the Euro Crisis, the bailouts of struggling countries like Greece, and protests in the southern member states of Spain, Portugal, and Italy. At such a momentous occasion the EU’s next challenge was to figure out who would be the rightful head of the EU to accept the award. The EU has made their decision by opting to send its top three officials Jose Manuel Barroso the President of the European Commission, Herman Van Rompuy the President of the European Council, and Martin Schulz the President of the European Parliament2 as a sign that the EU is not headed by one person but instead is an supranational economic and political bloc that seeks to unify the European continent. Their symbolic acceptance of the award is in response to what Geir Lundestad, the Secretary of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, called, “an accumulated record.”3 This record has ushered the EU into the international spotlight as a beacon for countries in the EU’s periphery to want to join the bloc.
Resumo:
During the crisis the European Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended beyond its price stability mandate. In addition to the primary objective of price stability and the secondary objective of supporting EU economic policies, we identify ten new tasks related to monetary policy and financial stability. We argue that there are three main constraints on monetary policy: fiscal dominance, financial repercussions and regional divergences. By assessing the ECB’s tasks in light of these constraints, we highlight a number of synergies between these tasks and the ECB’s primary mandate of price stability. But we highlight major conflicts of interest related to the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes. We also underline that the ECB’s government bond purchasing programmes have introduced the concept of ‘monetary policy under conditionality’, which involves major dilemmas. A solution would be a major change towards a US-style system, in which state public debts are small, there are no federal bail-outs for states, the central bank does not purchase state debt and banks do not hold state debt. Such a change is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.
