Migration and asylum: The movement of people in the Mediterranean Region - Future scenarios and the EU response. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 11/2014

Introduction. In recent years, the global discussion on migration and asylum has evolved from polarization of perspectives and mistrust, to improving partnerships and fostering cooperation between countries and regions. The paradigm has shifted from control and security exclusively to an increased awareness of the ramifications of migration in development and labour markets, the increasing demographic gap1 and the dangers of exclusion faced by migrant workers (regular or irregular). Eastern Europe will suffer the biggest population decline in the coming years, and Nigeria’s population will reach one billion by 2100. In Europe, the work replacement ratio will be two pensioners for one active worker. It has become clear that these facts cannot be ignored and that there is a need for greater convergence of policies (migration/mobility, fundamental rights, and economic growth), with a migrant-centred approach.2. The assumption that Europe will remain a geopolitical and economic hub that attracts immigrants at all skill levels might not hold water in the long run. The evolving demographic and economic changes have made it evident that the competitiveness of the EU (Europe 2020 Strategy) is also at stake, particularly if an adaptable workforce with the necessary skills is not secured in view of shortfalls in skill levels and because of serious labour mismatches. Therefore, it is the right moment to develop more strategic and long-term migration policies that take into account the evolving position of Europe and its neighbours in the world. By the same token, labour market strategies that meet needs and promote integration of regular migrants are still a pending task for the Member States (MS) in terms of the free movement of people, but also in relation with neighbouring and partner countries.

Population Scenarios and Policy Implications for Southern Mediterranean Countries, 2010-2050. MEDPRO Policy Paper No. 5, March 2013

Four population scenarios were derived that describe indicators of demographic behaviour for people living in different future political-economic contexts. This policy paper explores future trends in i) population growth at regional and national levels, ii) working age populations, in view of demographic dividend potential, and iii) elderly populations, in view of the financial burden they place on economies. Results show that different scenarios do not have large effects on population growth, at least up to 2030. This is due to the in-built ‘population momentum’ effect in the relatively young age-structures of most southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs). In the short term, up to 2030, and depending on which economic-political scenario unfolds, SEMCs are expected to grow from 280 million people to a figure of between 362 and 349 million people. Thus, in a period of about 20 years SEMCs are expected to grow by between 69 and 83 million people. In the same period, EU27 populations will grow by 21 million; only from about 500 to 521 million people. Between 2030 and 2050, additional population growth is foreseen in SEMCs, between 48 and 62 million people, while EU27 populations are expected to grow by 4 million only. SEMCs vary widely regarding demographic transition profiles so that demographic dividend potentials also vary. Old-age dependency ratios – the share of elderly people in relation to the working age population – are still low compared to EU27 ratios, but will increase after 2035. Should SEMCs’ economies remain politically, economically and environmentally precarious in the coming decades, their relatively low dependency ratios may impose an even higher social and financial burden on economies than the EU countries’ high dependency ratios impose on their economies.

Flashlight Europe N°7–09 July 2015. Greece After the Referendum: Three Possible Scenarios for the Euro Area

About ten days ago Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, announced that there was going to be a referendum, and thus terminated the negotiations on a new rescue package unilaterally. Since then the euro area has been plunged into a wholly unprecedented political crisis. Whether or not Greece can re-main in the monetary union is more uncertain than ever, and decisions that can give a new twist to the political and financial situation are being made almost every day. The Greek banks have been closed for over a week. The economic data are deteriorating rapidly. And yet a solution is nowhere to be seen. The No vote in the Greek referendum has not exactly improved the chances of reaching an agree-ment. For the time being the positions seem to have become uncompromising. At the summit of the heads of state and government on 7 July the Greek government was given five days and a “final deadline” in order to come up with viable proposals for reform. Thus the next few days are of crucial im-portance. At the weekend the heads of state and government of all 28 EU member states are going to meet in order to decide the future of Greece. This flashlight europe provides an overview of the events of the last few days, outlines possible scenarios for what may happen in the near future, and identifies factors which may exert an influence in the short term. We are not trying to give an exact forecast or to formulate action recommendations. But we are trying to shed some light on a confusing situation by identifying important patterns and some of the salient factors.