Institutions and Structural Unemployment: Do Capital-Market Imperfections Matter? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.8, December 2000

This paper analyzes whether differences in institutional structures on capital markets contribute to explaining why some DECO-countries, in particular the Anglo-Saxon countries, have been much more successful over the last two decades in producing employment growth and in reducing unem­ployment than most continental-European DECO-countries. It is argued that the often-blamed labor market rigidities alone, while important, do not provide a satisfactory explanation for these differ­ences across countries and over time. Financial constraints are potentially important obstacles against creating new firms and jobs and thus against coping well with structural change and against moving successfully toward the "new economy". Highly developed venture capital markets should help to alleviate such financial constraints. This view that labor-market institutions should be sup­plemented by capital market imperfections for explaining differences in employment performances is supported by our panel data analysis, in which venture capital turns out to be a significant insti­tutional variable.

The case for a European unemployment benefit scheme. CEPS Commentary, 19 May 2015

In this CEPS Commentary, Ilaria Maselli and Miroslav Beblavý argue that the European economic governance system needs to be equipped with a supranational automatic stabiliser that would kick-in automatically in the event of an economic downturn, to avoid unduly burdening national public finances. In their view, the option of creating an unemployment benefit system for the euro area should be given serious consideration. The possible variations of such a system and their implications will be the subject of in-depth study at CEPS over the coming year.

Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance. CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, 3 December 2015

It is generally agreed that a Banking Union should have common or ‘single’ institutions responsible for carrying out three basic functions: supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. So far, however, agreement has been reached in the EU on only the first two of these functions. The Commission has now presented its proposal on how to complete the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is an innovative and courageous proposal. It is courageous because it will clearly be very controversial in a number of member states (especially Germany) and it is innovative because it proposes a three-stage process, starting with re-insurance, then switching to co-insurance and finally to full direct insurance of deposits via a ‘single’ Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This final stage should be reached in 2024, which is also the date at which the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will become the only source of financing for bank resolution. The Commission’s proposal calls for integrating the decision-making for EDIS into the decision-making entity for the SRF, namely the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). This makes sense if one views resolution and deposit insurance as two highly interlinked dimensions of dealing with banks in trouble. In this view the two dimensions should be bundled into one institution – and one suspects that over time the two funds (the SRF and the DIF) could be merged into one. This Policy Brief argues that re-insurance should not be considered as a transitory phase, but could also provide a solution for the long run. ‘Experience rating’ could be used to ensure a proper pricing of risk and to protect the interests of the depositors in countries with safer banking systems. Moreover, EDIS should have a decision-making structure separate from and independent of the SRM, since it has mainly a macroeconomic function.