Who remembers Turkey's pre-accession? CEPS Special Report No. 74/December 2012

In 2005 the EU and Turkey officially started accession negotiations that were intended to lead to Turkey’s full membership of the EU. Yet today, the Turkish accession process has virtually ground to a halt and lost all credibility. Talk of alternatives to full membership can be heard from various sides; we highlight four instances of what we call ‘parallelism’, namely the elusive concept of a ‘privileged partnership’, the EU-Turkey customs union, the recently launched ‘Positive Agenda’ and Turkish participation in the Energy Community Treaty. While a privileged partnership represents a more comprehensive but still remote framework for EU-Turkish relations, the latter three are merely an escape route from preaccession. We conclude our analysis with a discussion on Turkey’s possible membership of the European Economic Area, which in effect would serve none of the parties involved. We conclude that both partners, the EU and Turkey, would be well advised to remember their pre-accession commitments of 13 years ago – for their mutual benefit.

Syria and the red lines of international law. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2013

As the US and its allies France and Turkey dither over whether or not to punish Assad for having used sarin gas to kill his own people, the crucial question is: What response might the outside world legally take without the authority of the UN Security Council, which remains blocked by two veto-wielding members, Russia and China? Sadly, international law provides no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. To respond to what US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly called a “moral obscenity”, this commentary explores ways in which formal interpretations of international law might give way to a more pragmatic approach to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons.

EU-Turkey Relations: Turning vicious circles into virtuous ones. CEPS Policy Brief No. 317, 26 March 2014

The coming weeks and months will be decisive for the general tenor of politics in Turkey. The country faces local elections this March, presidential elections in August and general elections next June, while top-level political scandals compound the deterioration in the state of democracy and rule of law. At the same time, stagnation in Turkey’s accession process continues to sour relations with the EU. In this new Policy Brief, Steven Blockmans puts forward a number of recommendations to help drive the EU accession process forward, namely the early opening of negotiation chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security), in line with the EU’s so-called New Approach. In that way reform could not just be assured on paper, but a track record in implementation could be established throughout the process. To achieve this, member states, and Cyprus in particular, need to be persuaded to end their opposition to formulating benchmarks for the opening of accession negotiating chapters 23 and 24.

Freedom of religion in Turkey - The Alevi issue. EPC Commentary, 24 January 2014

Freedom of religion is a fundamental right that must be protected and respected by states. While Turkey has taken important steps in advancing religious freedoms over the last decade, a number of challenges remain. Turkey’s Alevi Community continues to face serious problems in terms of being officially recognised by the state and in practicing their religion. While Turkey is officially a secular country, Sunni Islam is the unofficial state religion. Despite Ankara being a signatory of several international conventions and treaties that guarantee fundamental freedoms for all, key fundamental rights of Alevis remain ignored by the state. Last September, hopes were raised that a new “democratisation package” would include steps to further their freedoms but it failed to do so, with the government announcing that a ‘special’ Alevi reform package would be unveiled by the end of 2013. This did not happen.

Turkey votes: Part I - The storm before the election. EPC Commentary, 26 March 2014

At an election rally on 20 March 2014, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared he wanted to “root out Twitter, no matter what the international community thought”. A few hours later Twitter was shut down. The decision backfired. Turkey’s some 12 million Twitter users immediately found ways to circumnavigate the ban; it highlighted the increasingly authoritarian trend of Erdoğan; and it brought immediate condemnation from numerous foreign leaders. The move has been viewed by many Turks as part of an operation to cover up a corruption probe that has consumed Turkey since 17 December, before key local elections on 30 March. The elections, which will be followed by Presidential election in August and political ones expected in 2015, have become a referendum on Erdoğan’s popularity, and are set to shape Turkey’s political landscape. A lot is at stake as a big win for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) may not only be used by Erdoğan to justify his response to the corruption scandal but also risks consolidating his increasingly authoritarian style of governance.

Turkey votes: Part II - Erdoğan reloaded. EPC Commentary, 3 April 2014

On 30 March, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) scooped a significant victory in local elections, taking almost 44 percent of the vote despite accusations of corruption, undermining the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms. While there have been claims of election fraud and the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has demanded recounts in several cities including Istanbul and Ankara, it is clear that even allowing for some level of fraud the win was substantial and more than most people expected. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has reached a juncture. He has two choices: return to the path of democracy after a period of democratic back-sliding which included passing several controversial reforms such as a new internet law which led to the recent banning of Twitter and Youtube; or alternatively he can forge ahead with his much talked of revenge campaign against those he has accused of creating a “parallel state” and conspiring to remove him from power. Given that Erdoğan viewed this election as a referendum on his popularity and leadership there is a serious risk that he will do the latter; using the significant mandate given to him to do whatever he wants, including further cracking down on democracy.

Turkey votes: Part III - President Erdoğan - A foregone conclusion? EPC Commentary, 10 July 2014

On 1 July, after months of speculation, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced he would run in the country’s first direct presidential elections on 10 August. Erdoğan, who has dominated Turkish politics for over a decade, is viewed as the clear favourite. With current polls suggesting he could take as much as 52% of the vote, an outright victory in the first round is possible. His main rival, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, is very much the underdog. Until recently, an international diplomat with no experience in politics, he is the joint candidate of Turkey’s two main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Selahattin Demirtaş, the Co-Chairman of the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) is also in the race, but is not expected to make it into double digits. The Kurdish vote however, could prove to be crucial if the ballot goes to a second round on 24 August. With Erdoğan wanting to increase Presidential powers, the stakes are high. With his belief in majoritarian rule, and increasingly authoritarian style of governance there has been an erosion of democracy and civil liberties. Many observers fear this trend may increase.

Why the EU must reengage with Turkey. EPC Commentary, 29 September 2014

Democratic values and basic rights in Turkey are hanging by a thread. Over the past eighteen months the rule of law, civil liberties and freedoms have been eroded which has left many Turks anxious over the direction in which their country is heading. With Turkey’s accession negotiations de facto frozen, the EU finds itself with little leverage over Ankara. Calls of concern have fallen on deaf ears as Turkey’s leadership has become increasingly belligerent, with its EU related narrative overflowing with resentment. Because Turkey’s accession negotiations are irreversibly intertwined with Turkey-EU cooperation in other areas, this has had a negative impact on the broader relationship between both sides. Recent examples include the issue of foreign fighters traveling from Europe to Syria via Turkey. Each side has accused the other of not doing enough to stem the flow. Likewise, following the decision of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to ban the import of agricultural goods from countries that have placed sanctions on Moscow, the EU asked Turkey to demonstrate solidarity, as a “candidate country”, and not to increase exports of agricultural products to Russia. Turkey rejected this request and is reportedly working on strengthening trade ties with Moscow. Turkey remains an important partner in a number of key areas including trade, energy, foreign and security policy and migration. At a time when the EU faces crises in both its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, a reliable and predictable Turkey, with which it can cooperate in the Black Sea and Middle East neighbourhoods is crucial. Hence the vision and plans of the EU’s new leadership, in particular new Foreign Policy Chief, Federica Mogherini, and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, how to shape relations with Ankara is particularly significant. The Union’s current policy is counterproductive and is further eroding trust and cooperation rather than enhancing it. It needs to be turned around.

MODEL COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS. Is Turkey a Model for State-Building in the Arab World? Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 10/2014

This study analyzes the Turkish case as a model country for the state-building processes in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab revolts that took place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. To this end, it deals with the Turkish case in three phases: the founding of the Turkish Republic, political developments until 2002, and the post-2002 Justice and Development Party period. The study focuses on state-society relations manifested in the form of a secular-religious cleavage intertwined with problematic civil-military relations. Each phase of Turkey’s history is compared to cleavages and civil-military relations in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. After analyzing the constitution-making processes in the latter three countries following the Arab revolts, the study concludes by discussing the viability of the Turkish model in the light of Turkey’s search for a new constitution.

The crisis in Iraq and the twists and turns of Turkish Middle East policy. OSW Commentary No. 142, 29.07.2014

The spectacular offensive by Islamic radicals in Iraq this June has led the country to the verge of collapse, and is another scene of the deep crisis in the Middle East, in which Turkey is entangled. The immediate consequence of this is a severe crisis of prestige after the kidnapping by terrorists of Turkish diplomats and Ankara’s inability to resolve the situation; in the long term consequences include escalation of the Kurdish problem, and a further increase in threats to the security of Turkey itself as well as the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. Both Ankara’s options and its political will to actively respond to the crisis are extremely limited. Yet again in recent years, the current crisis, the broader situation in the Middle East, and finally the position of Turkey in the region elude unambiguous assessments and forecasts – these are prevented by the scale and growth of the reappraisals and tensions in the region. The only undoubted fact is that Turkey is strategically and irreversibly entangled in the Middle East’s problems, which are an important factor affecting the transformation of the state which the ruling AKP is implementing; and in the near future, this state of affairs will only deepen.

The sultans of swing: Turkey's stance on integration with the European Union. OSW Point of View Number 37, November 2013

Despite a rise in anti-EU rhetoric and a growing assertiveness in Ankara’s relations with Brussels, Turkey will continue to seek closer integration with the European Union in the coming years. The current stalemate in the accession process has been a source of irritation to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government. Nonetheless, a complete collapse of accession talks would be a much worse scenario for the ruling AKP party. Currently, the government is primarily interested in keeping the negotiation process alive, rather than hoping to gain full membership any time soon. Erdoğan’s government will likely seek to continue the accession talks because the AKP is acutely aware of their importance for the country’s domestic politics, for its the economy, and – although to a lesser extent – for Turkey’s international standing. The opportunity to capitalise on this process will encourage the Turkish government to avoid crises in its relations with the EU, or to at least mitigate the impact of any potential diplomatic fallouts.

Turcja - korytarz transzytowy dla surocow energetycznych do UE? Prace OSW 17/2005. = Turkey - an energy transit corridor to the EU? OSW Study 17/2005

1. The priority of Ankara's energy policy is to make Turkey an important transit corridor for energy resources transported to the EU. Turkey wishes to play an active role in the distribution and sale of gas and oil flowing across its territory. 2. Transit and sale of energy resources, and gas in particular, are expected to provide a major source of income for Turkey and a tool by which Ankara will be able to build its position in the region and in Europe. 3. Since Turkey is an EU candidate country, Brussels will probably welcome Turkey's role as a transit corridor as much as Ankara will. 4. The success of Ankara's energy strategy hinges on developments in Turkey's internal energy market. 5. It also depends on a number of external factors including: - Export policies and internal situation in producer countries. Most importantly, it depends on: a. Russia and its energy policy priorities b. Stability in the Middle East. - Policies of consumer countries, including the EU in particular. - Policies of world powers present in the region (USA).

The declared end of South Stream and why nobody seems to care. CEPS Commentary, 5 December 2014

More than seven years after the South Stream pipeline project was first announced in June 2007, it finally seems to have been dropped by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin on his visit to Turkey this week. This CEPS Commentary looks at the ostensible reasons for President Putin’s decision as well as on what’s potentially behind them. It concludes that the EU may actually benefit from this decision in being able to secure more gas with less political interference from Russia.

Turkey: has the AKP ended its winning streak? OSW Commentary No. 117, 2013-10-07

Since the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in Turkey in 2002, it has enjoyed a constant winning streak: it won each election (with a support level of 49.83% in 2011), subordinated the army (which had de facto stood above the civilian government) and was reforming the country. The situation in the country was stable (especially when compared to the crises and restlessness in the 1990s), the economy was booming, Turkey’s position in regional politics was strengthening, and Ankara’s significance on the international arena was growing. This encouraged the ruling class to make long-term plans, leading up to the hundredth anniversary of the republic in 2023. In the coming decade, Turkey governed by the AKP was to become one of the global economic and political centres, a full member of the EU and at the same time a political and economic leader in the Middle East. However, the negative trends in the situation both domestically (mass public protests, the deadlocked Kurdish issue and the unsuccessful attempt to amend the constitution) and abroad (the war in Syria and the coup in Egypt) seen over the past few months have laid bare the limitations of the AKP’s rule and have affected the government’s democratic mandate, prestige and credibility on the international arena, as well as peace and order and domestic security. When compared to the beginning of 2013, the way the situation will develop in Turkey is at this moment definitely less predictable; and the possible scenarios include both relative peace (however, with socio-political tension present in the background) and the threat of destabilisation. Therefore, although the AKP will still remain the sole major political force, this party will have to face challenges which will decide not only its political future but also the directions the country will be developing in. However, a comprehensive solution of the accumulated problems and a simple return to the status quo ante, convenient to the government, seem unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Turkey's economy: a story of success with an uncertain future. OSW Commentary No. 120, 2013-11-05

In the decade since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, Turkey’s economy has become synonymous with success and well-implemented reforms. Economic development has been the basis of both socio-political stability inside the country and of an ambitious foreign policy agenda pursued by the AKP. However, the risks associated with a series of unresolved issues are becoming increasingly apparent. These include the country’s current account deficit, its over-reliance on short-term external financing, and unfinished reforms, for example of the education sector. This leaves Turkey exposed to over-dependence on investors, especially from the West. Consequently, Ankara has become a hostage of its own image as an economically successful state with a stable socio-political system. Any changes to this image would cause capital flight, as exemplified by the outflow of portfolio investment1 and an increase in the cost of external debt2 that followed the nationwide protests over the proposed closure of Gezi Park last summer. In addition, Turkey remains vulnerable to potential changes in investor sentiment towards emerging markets.