Synthesis Report on Structural Reforms in Member States. Report addressed to the Council and the Commission. 8 March 1999.

The Economic Policy Committee (EPC) is made up of representatives of the Member States and contributes to the work of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Council as regards the coordination of Member State and Community economic policies. The EPC also provides the Commission and the Council with advice in this area, focusing particularly on structural reforms.

Annual Report on Structural Reforms 2001. Report addressed to the Council and the Commission. 6 March 2001.

3rd report. The Economic Policy Committee (EPC) is made up of representatives of the Member States and contributes to the work of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Council as regards the coordination of Member State and Community economic policies. The EPC also provides the Commission and the Council with advice in this area, focusing particularly on structural reforms.

The Fundamental Rights Agency and Civil Society: Reminding the Gardeners of their Plants' Roots. EDAP 02/2012, 2012

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the EU body responsible for advising EU institutions on fundamental rights, is equipped with a Fundamental Rights Platform (FRP) to ensure an on-going and structured exchange of information and feedback between the FRA and Civil Society. When the FRA was founded in 2007, there was little pre-existing knowledge on how to design such a Platform; hence, the development of the relationship between the FRA and Civil Society over the first five years proved an interesting experiment. Although the Platform was never intended as a mechanism of democratic co-decision making, it is far more than a loose marketplace where Civil Society actors across the spectrum of fundamental rights themes gather. The Platform offers channels of consultation and exchange not only among the participants but also with the FRA. It allows for cross-pollination, ensuring informed grassroots input into FRA work and FRA expertise flow to Civil Society actors. This synergetic relationship builds upon both the self-organising forces of Civil Society and the terms of references of the FRP as defined by the FRA. The Platform allows to find a certain unity in the remarkable diversity of fundamental rights voices. To what degree, however, the Platform’s dynamics allow the transformation of sometimes ‘compartmentalised’ single human rights discussions into wider trans-sectoral and transnational debates within the Human Rights Community depends on the motivation and the interest(s) of the different Civil Society players.

EU-Mercosur trade relations: impacts of exchange rate misalignments on tariffs. CEPS Working Document No. 372, February 2013

The issue of “trade and exchange rate misalignments” is being discussed at the G20, IMF and WTO, following an initiative by Brazil. The main purpose of this paper is to apply the methodology developed by the authors to exam the impacts of misalignment on tariffs in order to analyse the impacts of misalignments on the trade relations between two customs unions – the EU and Mercosur, as well as to explain how tariff barriers are affected. It is divided into several sections: the first summarises the debate on exchange rates at the WTO; the second explains the methodology used to determine exchange rate misalignments; the third and fourth summarises the methodology applied to calculate the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on the level of tariff protection through an exercise of ‘misalignment tariffication’; the fifth reviews the effects of exchange rate misalignments on tariffs and its consequences for the trade negotiations between the two areas; and the last concludes and suggests a way to move the debate forward in the context of regional arrangements.

Implementing the AIFMD: Success or failure? ECMI Commentary No. 34, 28 March 2013

This commentary considers the implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) by the European Commission. The AIFMD creates an internal market for asset management and as an endeavour to develop market-based finance is an important piece of legislation for the European economy. The author, Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía, considers the implementation of some of the provisions that raised concern among industry participants. He finds that, on balance, a practical and flexible approach to implementation has been followed that should help secure the success of the framework, which at present is still uncertain. The commentary also considers the remuneration guidelines adopted recently by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). It encourages EU and national authorities to commit to the success of the AIFMD framework, as part of a broader effort to develop capital markets and reduce the historical reliance of the European economy on bank finance.

Economic Policy Coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union: From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact. CEPS Working Document No. 381, August 2013

This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’, as fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy-making within the EU. It then presents the main features of the new so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ and its relationship to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in EMU, which was already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and is now seriously aggravated due to the crisis in the eurozone. Furthermore, implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.

How much does EU citizenship cost? The Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair: A breakthrough for sincere cooperation in citizenship of the union? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 64, April/2014

How much does European citizenship cost in the EU? This was the question that has raised so much controversy over the Maltese citizenship-for-sale programme. The outright selling of Maltese nationality to rich foreigners led to unprecedented responses by the European Parliament and European Commission. This paper examines the affair and its relevance for current and future configurations of citizenship of the EU. It studies the extent to which member states are still free to lay down the grounds for the acquisition and loss of nationality without any EU supervision and accountability. It provides a comparative overview of member state schemes and the exact price for buying citizenship and a residency permit in the EU. It is argued that the EU’s intervention on the Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair constitutes a legal precedent for assessing the lawfulness of passport-for-sale or golden migration programmes in other EU member states. The affair has also revealed the increasing relevance of a set of European and international legal principles limiting member states’ discretion over citizenship matters and providing a supranational constellation of accountability venues scrutinising the impact of their decisions over citizenship of the Union. The Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair has placed at the forefront the EU general principle of sincere cooperation in nationality matters. Member states’ actions in the citizenship domain cannot negatively affect in substance the concept and freedoms of European citizenship. That notwithstanding, the European institutions’ insistence on the need for Maltese nationality law to require a ‘genuine link’ in the form of an effective residence criteria for any rich applicants to benefit from the fast-track naturalisation poses a fundamental dilemma from the angle of Union citizenship: what is this genuine link really about? And what is precisely ‘habitual’, ‘effective’ or ‘functional’ residence? It is argued that by supporting the ‘real connections’ as the most relevant standard, the European institutions may be paradoxically fuelling nationalistic misuses by member states of the ‘genuine link’ as a way to justify restrictive integration policies on the acquisition of nationality.

Does ASEM work? CEPS Policy Brief No. 321, 14 October 2014

This CEPS Policy Brief is based on a larger study for the EEAS and European Commission, written by the same authors in the run-up of the Milan ASEM summit of 16-17 October 2014. The main idea of the study is to assess whether ASEM works and how, by verifying the factual evidence in detail. After all, ASEM has no institutions, no budget and no treaty, whilst dialogues and a loose improvement over time in Asia-Europe relations refer to process much more than genuine ‘results’. The stocktaking covers all ASEM activities since the 2006 Helsinki summit. Summit and foreign ministers’ declarations and ASEM calendar of activities (and interviews) are used to trace ASEM activities in the three ASEM pillars (political, economic, and peoples-to-peoples/cultural). All the ‘regular’ ASEM meetings at ministerial and other levels (many of which are only known to relatively few) have been mapped. Also the ASEM working methods, based on the 2000 AECF framework and many subsequent initiatives, have been scrutinised, including whether they are actually implemented or not or partially. Such methods refer to how to work together in areas of cooperation (beyond the typical ASEM dialogue), organisation, coordination and ASEM visibility. The main conclusion is that ASEM works reasonably well, once one accepts the ASEM of today, although some inefficiencies still characterise the ‘system’. There is a host of secondary conclusions on the three pillars, the foreign ministers, the strong government-to-government nature of ASEM and the working methods. We recommend that today’s ASEM needs no reform and that not having ASEM would entail political and diplomatic costs. We emphasise that ASEM is well placed to stimulate exchange of information between the mega-FTAs such as TPP, RCEP and TTIP. However, the ASEM of tomorrow might be different, given the great changes in geo-political and economic conditions since ASEM began in the mid-1990s. Moreover, the size of ASEM has become such that classical ways of operating with (after Milano) 53 countries (including the EU and ASEAN) cannot possibly be effective all the time. We suggest that, in the run-up to the 20th ASEM birthday (2016), EU and Asian independent think-tanks get together to write an ‘options report’ reconsidering options for a new ASEM, as the basis for a profound and wide debate how to get more value-added out of ASEM.

The 2030 framework on climate and energy - Getting Europe on the right track? EPC Commentary, 30 January 2014

Climate vs competitiveness? The European Commission published its proposal on the 2030 climate and energy framework on 22 January. Reflective of the current economic climate, it was accompanied by a report on energy prices and the Commission decided not to propose regulation on shale gas but to issue recommendations on environmental standards. The same day also saw the publication of a communication “For a European Industrial Renaissance”. Climate considerations no longer drive the agenda. The enthusiasm of 2007, when the “20/20/20” climate and energy targets were set for 2020, has diminished. The new reality has brought competitiveness to the top of the EU’s priority agenda.

A more effective structure for the Commission. EPC Commentary, 7 March 2014

The changeover in the European Commission in autumn of this year will be one of the key factors that will determine the direction of the European Union for the coming years. The question of who will get what job, how far the European Parliament elections can influence the appointment of the Commission President (and the impact this has on the relationship between EP and the Commission), and what the new focus of the Commission will be in terms of policy priorities will all have a strong influence on EU policy for some time to come.

Defining Europe's Capital Markets Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/12, 13 November 2014

The new European Commission has signalled that it will work to create a ‘capital markets union’. This is understood as an agenda to expand the non-bank part of Europe’s financial system, which is currently underdeveloped. The aim in the short term is to unlock credit provision as banks are deleveraging, and in the longer term, to favour a more diverse, competitive and resilient financial system. Direct regulation of individual non-bank market segments (such as securitisation, private placements or private equity) might be useful at the margin, but will not per se lead to significant capital markets development or the rebalancing of Europe’s financial system away from the current dominance by banks. To reach these goals, the capital markets union agenda must be broadened to address the framework conditions for the development of individual market segments. Six possible areas for policy initiative are, in increasing order of potential impact and political difficulty: regulation of securities and specific forms of intermediation; prudential regulation, especially of insurance companies and pension funds; regulation of accounting, auditing and financial transparency requirements that apply to companies that seek external finance; a supervisory framework for financial infrastructure firms, such as central counterparties, that supports market integration; partial harmonisation and improvement of insolvency and corporate restructuring frameworks;and partial harmonisation or convergence of tax policies that specifically affect financial investment.

Le role des politiques monétaires et la convergence macroeconomique sur le développement des systèmes financiers dans les pays du sud de la Méditerranée. = The role of monetary policies and macroeconomic convergence in the development of financial systems in south Mediterranean countries. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 12/April 2012

This MEDPRO Technical Report shows that the monetary and exchange rate policies conducted by central banks in the South Mediterranean region display apparent homogeneity in their operational frameworks, albeit with some specificities and differing degrees of advancement. While central banks state that price stability is their ultimate objective, failures to control interest rates as operational objectives of monetary policy result in monetary authorities resorting to quantitative approaches to monetary policy, meaning that monetary aggregates and credit targets are being used as intermediate targets of monetary policy. An econometric exercise limited to Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) has been conducted to analyse the potential scenarios of convergence and monetary policy coordination. Given the high structural heterogeneity and the slow pace of real convergence due to weak commercial integration in the Maghreb, results nevertheless show alternative dynamics in the integration of effective nominal exchange rates, as well as a complete convergence dynamic in exchange rate policies. Partial convergence of monetary policies regarding the stabilisation of inflation rates remains an open option for a transitional phase where financial integration is low.

Politicising the Union? The Influence of ‘Leading Candidates’ for the Commission Presidency. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 36, October 2014

‘Leading candidates’ competed for the European Commission Presidency in the campaign for the European elections in May 2014. This element of political contestation poses a challenge to the Union’s institutional design. This article investigates to what extent competing ‘leading candidates’ enhances the process of deliberation and party contestation and thus strengthen the role of European Parliament (EP) party groups. In light of the example of the ‘Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats’ and its ‘leading candidate’, Martin Schulz, it is shown that the election campaign did strive to be EU-wide. However, Schulz’s influence on internal party cohesion and coalition formation remained limited. Therefore the influence of an elected ‘leading candidate’ is regarded as a symbolic act, which could deepen the relationship between the EP and the Commission as well as strengthen the democratic and political standing of both institutions vis-à-vis the European Council.

Social Content of the International Sphere: Symbols and Meaning in Franco-German Relations, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.2, 2002

“The Franco-German friendship is rich in memories and gestures that are at once important and symbolic, and that characterize the exceptional nature of the relationship between our two countries,” reflects former French economics minister and European Commission President Jacques Delors. Such symbolic acts and joint memories are not primarily about cooperation in specific instances. Rather, more generally, they denote what it means to act together. They lend significance to a relationship; they signify what is “at stake,” or what it is “all about.” They are about a deeper and more general social purpose underlying specific instances of cooperation. They are about the value and intrinsic importance that social relations incorporate. Symbols contribute to the institutionalization of social meaning and social purpose in dealing with one another. In this paper I clarify the concept of “predominantly symbolic acts and practices among states,” systematically explore such acts for the bilateral Franco-German relationship between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s, and scrutinize the specific meaning and effects that these practices have helped to generate and perpetuate.

More Union for the EU’s IPO Market. ECMI Commentary No. 41/23 March 2016

n his assessment of the latest draft prospectus Regulation, published on 30 November 2015, Karel Lannoo argues in this ECMI Commentary that the text goes somewhat further than the European Commission has previously entertained, but it falls short of creating a European market. In his view, the Commission is hostage to its own (or member states’) unwillingness to expand the powers of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to become an EU-wide listing authority. In short, the Union that the EU wants to create for capital markets still seems a distant ambition.