Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 78/January 2015

This study provides a comparative analysis of the national legal regimes and practices governing the use of intelligence information as evidence in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. It explores notably how national security can be invoked to determine the classification of information and evidence as 'state secrets' in court proceedings and whether such laws and practices are fundamental rights- and rule of law-compliant. The study finds that, in the majority of Member States under investigation, the judiciary is significantly hindered in effectively adjudicating justice and guaranteeing the rights of the defence in ‘national security’ cases. The research also illustrates that the very term ‘national security’ is nebulously defined across the Member States analysed, with no national definition meeting legal certainty and “in accordance with the law” standards and a clear risk that the executive and secret services may act arbitrarily. The study argues that national and transnational intelligence community practices and cooperation need to be subject to more independent and effective judicial accountability and be brought into line with EU 'rule of law' standards.

Le Parlement européen et les actes délégués: De la conquête d’un pouvoir à son exercice = The European Parliament and the delegated acts: From the conquest of power to its exercise. Brugges Political Research Paper No. 34, February 2014

Résumé. Le traité de Lisbonne a procédé à une importante réforme de la comitologie, en établissant deux catégories d’instruments: les actes d’exécution et les actes délégués. Pour ces derniers, le Parlement européen a obtenu des pouvoirs importants et est pour la première fois sur un strict pied d’égalité avec le Conseil dans le système exécutif. En vertu d’une approche institutionnaliste rationnelle, cet article analyse comment le Parlement, à l’origine exclu du système, est parvenu à acquérir les pouvoirs qui sont formellement les siens aujourd’hui. Ensuite, l’action du Parlement face à ses nouveaux pouvoirs dans le cadre des actes délégués est abordée. Il s’agit d’étudier comment le Parlement défend ses prérogatives dans les relations interinstitutionnelles et agit après l’acquisition de nouvelles prérogatives. Cette analyse permet plus globalement d’aborder des aspects essentiels du fonctionnement du Parlement européen, de l’Union européenne ainsi que ses dynamiques (inter)institutionnelles.