The New Silk Road: a versatile instrument in China’s policy. OSW Commentary No. 161, February 10 2015

Introduction. The Chinese leader Xi Jinping presented the concept of the New Silk Road – a collection of land and maritime routes – in autumn 2013. Initially, it envisaged the creation of a network of infrastructural connections, mainly transport corridors, between China and its most important economic partner – Europe. The concept grew in importance throughout 2014 to become the key instrument of China’s foreign policy, especially in the areas of public diplomacy and soft power. Towards the end of 2014, the Chinese government announced it would establish a Silk Road Fund worth US$40 billion. The New Silk Road idea is a flexible formula used by China in its dialogue with many other countries. Its inclusive nature helps contribute to diluting the negative impression caused by China’s rapid economic expansion and assertiveness in foreign policy, especially with regard to its neighbours. The process of implementing the New Silk Road concept will allow China to expand its influence within its neighbourhood: in Central and South-Eastern Asia. The New Silk Road will be an alternative point of reference to the US dominance and Russian integration projects in these regions. The concept will legitimise and facilitate the growth of China’s influence in the transit countries on the route to Western Europe, i.e. in the Middle East (Arab countries, Israel and Turkey, the Horn of Africa and Central Europe (the Balkans and the Visegrad Group countries). This concept is also essential for China’s domestic policy. It has become one of Xi Jinping’s main political projects. It will boost the development of China’s central and western provinces. The fact that the concept is open and not fully defined means that it will be a success regardless of the extent to which it will be implemented in practice. Its flexible nature allows China to continue investments already initiated bilaterally and to present them as components of the New Silk Road concept.

The New Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II): Less Accession, More Assistance?. EIPA Working Paper 2014/W/01

The EU enlargement engine seems to have run out of political steam. Support within the member countries for future enlargement is at all-time low, while some of the candidate countries have also seemed to put the enlargement process on the backburner. However, at least rhetorically, the EU is still committed to the enlargement process and maintains its entire enlargement tool box, such as the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) – one of the most important EU external financial instruments. The new IPA regulation (IPA II), adopted in March 20141, clearly reflects the fact that the enlargement process is on a holding pattern.

Energy efficiency: the ever neglected priority of the European energy strategy. Egmont Paper No. 66, June 2014

Summary. Energy saving has been a stated policy objective of the EU since the 1970s. Presently, the 2020 target is a 20% reduction of EU energy consumption in comparison with current projections for 2020. This is one of the headline targets of the European Energy Strategy 2020 but efforts to achieve it remain slow and insufficient. The aim of this paper is to understand why this is happening. Firstly, this paper examines the reasons why public measures promoting energy efficiency are needed and what form these measures should optimally take (§ 1). Fortunately, over the last 20 years, much research has been done into the famous ‘energy efficiency gap’ (or ‘the energy efficiency paradox’), even if more remains to be done. Multiple explanations have been given: market failures, modelling flaws and behavioural obstacles. Each encompasses many complex aspects. Several types of instruments can be adopted to encourage energy efficiency: measures guaranteeing the correct pricing of energy are preferred, followed by taxes or tradable white certificates which in turn are preferred to standards or subsidies. Information programmes are also necessary. Secondly, the paper analyzes the evolution of the different programmes from 2000 onwards (§ 2). This reveals the extreme complexity of the subject. It deals with quite diverse topics: buildings, appliances, public sector, industry and transport. The market for energy efficiency is as diffuse as energy consumption patterns themselves. It is composed of many market actors who demand more efficient provision of energy services, and that suppliers of the necessary goods and know-how deliver this greater efficiency. Consumers in this market include individuals, businesses and governments, and market activities cover all energy-consuming sectors of the economy. Additionally, energy efficiency is the perfect example of a shared competence between the EU and the Member States. Lastly, the legal framework has steadily increased in complexity, and despite the successive energy efficiency programmes used to build this framework, it has become clear that the gap between the target and the results remains. The paper then examines whether the 2012/27/EU Directive adopted to improve the situation could bring better results. It briefly describes the content of this framework Directive, which accompanies and implements the latest energy efficiency programme (§ 3). Although the Directive is technically complex and maintains nonbinding energy efficiency targets, it certainly represents an improvement in several aspects. However, it is also saddled with a multiplicity of exemption clauses and interpretative documents (with no binding value) which weaken its provisions. Furthermore, alone, it will allow the achievement of only about 17.7% of final energy savings by 2020. The implementation process, which is essential, also remains fairly weak. The paper also gives a glimpse of the various EU instruments for financing energy efficiency projects (§ 4). Though useful, they do not indicate a strong priority. Fourthly, the paper tries to analyze the EU’s limited progress so far and gather a few suggestions for improvement. One thing seems to remain useful: targets which can be defined in various ways (§ 5). Basically, all this indicates that the EU energy efficiency strategy has so far failed to reach its targets, lacks coherence and remains ambiguous. In the new Commission’s proposals of 22 January 2014 – intended to define a new climate/energy package in the period from 2020 to 2030 – the approach to energy efficiency remains unclear. This is regrettable. Energy efficiency is the only instrument which allows the EU to reach simultaneously its three targets: sustainability, competitiveness and security. The final conclusion appears thus paradoxical. On the one hand, all existing studies indicate that the decarbonization of the EU economy will be absolutely impossible without some very serious improvements in energy efficiency. On the other hand, in reality energy efficiency has always been treated as a second zone priority. It is imperative to eliminate this contradiction.

The Energy Performance of Buildings: Promises Still Unfulfilled. Egmont Paper No. 78, May 2015

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY All observers agree that energy efficiency must be the cornerstone of any serious EU energy strategy. In this general context, the EU building sector is critical. It represents about 40% of EU final energy consumption (residential houses, public/private offices, commercial buildings, etc.) and approximately 36% of EU CO2 emissions. This is massive. The EU has certainly not been inactive in this field. The Energy Performance in Buildings Directive 2002/91/EC (EPBD) was the first and the main instrument to address the problem of the energy performance of buildings. It has established numerous principles: a reliable methodology which enables the calculation and rating of the energy performance of buildings; minimum energy performance standards for new buildings and existing buildings under major renovation; energy performance certificates; regular inspection of heating and air-conditioning systems; and, finally, quality standards for inspections and energy performance certificates. They were strengthened in 2010 by the recast Directive 2010/31/EU. This directive also introduces a decisive concept for the development of the building sector: ‘nearly zeroenergy buildings’. In 2012, the new Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU dealt with other aspects. In the building sector, three of them are particularly important. They concern: (1) the establishment of long-term strategies for mobilizing investment in the renovation of the national building stocks; (2) the introduction of energy saving schemes for ‘designated’ energy companies with a view to reducing consumption among ‘final consumers’ by 1.5% annually; and (3), as an option, the setting up of an Energy Efficiency National Fund to support energy efficiency initiatives. This paper also briefly examines the different instruments put in place to disseminate information and consultation, and the EU funding for energy efficiency in buildings. Results, however, have remained limited until now. The improvement of the energy performance of buildings and the rhythm of renovation remain extremely weak. Member States’ unwillingness to timely and properly transpose and implement the Directives continues despite the high degree of flexibility permitted. The decentralized approach chosen for some specific aspects and the differentiation in the application of EPBD standards between Member States do not appear optimal either. Adequate financial schemes remain rare. The permanent deficit of qualified and trained personnel and the inertia of public authorities to make the public understand the stakes in this domain remain problematic. Hence the need to take new initiatives to reap the benefits that the building sector is meant to bring.