Basic Statistics for Fifteen European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. 3rd Edition, November 1961

Population; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; standard of living; trends of major economic indicators in the six

Statistiques de base de douze pays Europeens. Comparaison avec les Etats-Unis d'Amerique et l'Union des Republiques Socialistes Sovietiques. Deuxieme Edition. Octobre 1958 = Basic Statistics for Twelve European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Second Edition. October 1958

Population; produit national; agriculture; industrie; transports; niveau de vie; commerce exterieur

Statistiques de base de douze pays Europeens. Comparaison avec les Etats-Unis d'Amerique et l'Union des Republiques Socialistes Sovietiques. First Edition. Fevrier 1958 = Basic Statistics for Twelve European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. First Edition. February 1958

Population; produit national; agriculture; industrie

Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Fourth Edition. November 1963

Population; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; standard of living; trends of major economic indicators in the six; supplementary statistics on iron and steel-trends from 1952-62; supplementary statistics in an social field-employment, earnings, expenditure, social security

Statistiques de base de douze pays Europeens. Comparaison avec les Etats-Unis d'Amerique et l'Union des Republiques Socialistes Sovietiques. Novembre 1961 = Basic Statistics for Twelve European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. 3rd Edition, November 1961

Population; produit national; agriculture; energie; industrie; transports; commerce exterieur; niveau de vie; evolution de donnees economiques importantes pour les six pays

Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Fifth Edition. November 1964

Population; labour force; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; social statistics; standar5d of living; trends of major economic indicators in the countries of the community; supplementary statistics on iron and steel-trends from 1956-63

The EU's Group-to-Group Dialogue with the Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN – How much have they achieved? A Comparative Analysis. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No, 18, December 2013

Four decades of the EU's group-to-group dialogues with the Southern Mediterranean grouping of countries and with ASEAN have produced different dynamics and outcomes, despite the EU’s common strategy to use economic soft power to achieve their goals for the partnerships. Diverging conditions in the two regions created inconsistency in the EU's application of the common approach. The EU's neighbourhood security concerns forced it to relax its political stand with their Southern Mediterranean partners. For ASEAN, geographical distance dilutes the EU’s security concerns it that region and has afforded the EU to be more ideological and assertive on democracy and human rights practices. These issues have provoked disagreements in EU-ASEAN dialogues, but both sides have also tried to remain pragmatic in order to achieve some progress in the partnership. In contrast, the protracted the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to hamper the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, resulting in little progress. Social upheavals in the Southern Mediterranean also brought their partnership to a standstill. The EU's cooperation with former authoritarian regimes like Libya and Syria have only caused damage to its credibility in the Southern Mediterranean, and future Euro-Mediterranean dialogues are likely to be affected by it.

The end of chocolate box-style integration? EU-Swiss relations after the referendum. CEPS Commentaries, 28 February 2014

Surveying the landscape following the Swiss referendum on February 9th, Adam Łazowski observes that once Swiss voters are deprived of the benefits of the EU internal market, they may come to appreciate that their days of cherry-picking from among EU policies are over. This might present the EU with a golden opportunity to press for a comprehensive framework agreement with Switzerland that would simplify the existing regime and provide for a uniform institutional set-up. He concludes, however, that what both sides cannot avoid is a frank discussion about free movement of persons, noting that that dossier will be crucial for any future steps that will be taken by the EU and the Swiss authorities.

Russia goes on the offensive ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. OSW Commentary No. 115, 30.09.2013

In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Paper Tiger or Game-Changer? Challenges of and Opportunities for EU Engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers (BRIGG) 1/2015.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) started work on 1 January 2015. Considered as Russia’s response to the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), it has been almost ignored in Brussels. However, with the Ukraine crisis and the deteriorating relations with Moscow, some European leaders have begun to reconsider Putin’s proposal for a region-to-region engagement. This paper tries to analyse under which conditions this could represent a long-term solution for a new European order. First, it is argued that the EEU is still far from being a credible international interlocutor. Second, Russia’s commitment to international trade rules and liberalization is questioned, whereas its geopolitical objectives seem predominant. EU engagement with the EEU in Ukraine would mean, in the short term, legitimizing Russia’s vision of a ‘bipolar Europe’ divided in spheres of influence. In the long run, prospects for inter-regional cooperation remain open, but the way to go is long and full of obstacles.

Winds of Change for US and EU Relations with Cuba. CEPS Commentary, 21 March 2016

The visit by President Obama to Cuba this week marks a new and dramatic phase in the relations between the US and its next-door island neighbour just 90 km off its coastline. It will have taken almost 90 years for an American President to cross the Florida straits after the previous visit, by President Calvin Coolidge, who arrived not by air but on a battleship.