Economic Incentives for Indirect TTIP Spillovers. CEPS Special Report No. 94/October 2014 [TTIP Series No. 2]

A deep, comprehensive and ambitious TTIP should not undermine or otherwise negatively affect the WTO and its signatories. Among other things, this means that trade diversion ought to be minimised and positive spillovers stimulated. The present CEPS Special Report provides some elementary quantification, which helps to understand the economic incentives for third countries to seek regulatory alignment with TTIP results, where relevant, and for which TTIP should be ‘open’. It focuses on ‘indirect’ spillovers and employs a rather aggregate economic approach. We find that, of three groups of countries that are important for trade with the EU and the US, the ‘closest’ neighbours (NAFTA, EEA, Switzerland and Turkey) exhibit powerful incentives to align so as to benefit from positive spillovers. This is less clear for two other groups. Of the (seven) ‘biggest traders’ (in manufactured goods, for which spillovers matter most), China turns out to have the greatest interest in alignment in selected sectors, followed by Israel, Japan and South Korea. Whereas the latter three either have or are negotiating FTAs with the US and the EU, precisely China has none and remains outside TPP as well. In terms of sectors, the chemical sector followed by electronic equipment are by far the most important, with agro-products and fish as a good third (SPS issues). However, in chemicals and electrical equipment, the TTIP negotiations so far, and recent US/EU regulatory cooperation, do not indicate an ambitious approach, which could reduce regulatory barriers to market access drastically.

Improving the Effectiveness of Sanctions: A Checklist for the EU. CEPS Special Report No. 95, 6 November 2014

The increasingly frequent imposition of sanctions by the EU over the past decade has not been accompanied by a thorough pre-assessment and contingency planning stage, which, argue the authors, has led to the formulation of suboptimal sanctions regimes. This paper proposes a practical pre-assessment and contingency planning of sanctions – a checklist, which departs from the ‘ad hoc-ism’ of current decision-making on sanctions. The checklist includes the identification of resources linked to the objectionable policies; the leverage of the EU; the costs to the EU; the legality of the measures; their unintended effects; the expected contribution towards EU goals; their coherence with overall EU external relations; and the communication of these policies.

Does EU regulation hinder or stimulate innovation? CEPS Special Report No. 96, 19 November 2014

Introduction. One frequently hears the question posed in the title to this report, but there is little systematic analytical literature on the issue. Fragmented evidence or anecdotes dominate debates among EU regulatory decision-makers and in European business, insofar as there is a genuine debate at all. This CEPS Special Report focuses on the multi-faceted, ambiguous and complex relationship between (EU) regulation and innovation in the economy, and discusses the innovation-enhancing potential of certain regulatory approaches as well as factors that tend to reduce incentives to innovate. It adopts an 'ecosystem' approach to both regulation and innovation, and study the interactions between the two ecosystems. This general analysis and survey are complemented by seven case studies of EU regulation enabling and disabling innovation, two horizontal and five sectoral ones. The case studies are preceded by a broader contextual analysis of trends in EU regulation over the last three decades. These trends show the significant transformation of the nature as well as improvement of the quality of EU regulation, largely in the deepened internal market, which tend to have a favourable and lasting effect on the rate of innovation in the EU (other things being equal). Among the findings include the following: Regulation can at times be a powerful stimulus to innovation. EU regulation matters at all stages of the innovation process. Different types of regulation can be identified in terms of innovation impact: general or horizontal, innovation-specific and sector-specific regulation. More prescriptive regulation tends to hamper innovative activity, whereas the more flexible EU regulation is, the better innovation can be stimulated. Lower compliance and red-tape burdens have a positive effect on innovation. The authors recommend incorporating a specific test on innovation impacts in the ex-ante impact assessment of EU legislation as well as in ex-post evaluation. There is ample potential for fostering innovation by reviewing the EU regulatory acquis.

Who calls the shots in the committees of the new European Parliament? CEPS Special Report No. 97, 21 November 2014

This CEPS Special Report analyses the composition of the 20 committees in the new European Parliament and how representative they are of the 28 member states, identifying which policy areas or committees are of particular interest to MEPs from certain countries. It also examines the allocation of committee chairs and party coordinator positions to assess whether the country of origin matters and if so, why. The study reveals that in general the countries’ share of representatives in the committees is very similar in most of the cases to their representation in Parliament. Still, some policy areas have a special relevance for some countries and attract their MEPs in larger numbers. Due to the procedure used in the allocation of the committee chairs, which favours the largest political groups and the largest national parties within them, MEPs from larger member states tend to hold most of these coveted positions. The internal process followed by the political groups in appointing their coordinators in the respective committees is predisposed towards MEPs with seniority, experience and good connections. All in all, the strategic relevance that national parties attach to these positions makes a difference.

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh: unfrozen conflicts between Russia and the West. OSW Special Report, 9 July 2008

The Southern Caucasus is the site of three armed conflicts with separatist backgrounds, which have remained unsolved for years: the conflicts in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan's conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (including the areas around Nagorno-Karabakh which were seized by Armenian separatists in the course of the war). Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan have had any control over the disputed areas since the early 1990s. Both states are simultaneously in conflict with the separatists' informal patrons, respectively Russia and Armenia. After over a decade of relative peace during which the conflicts remained frozen, tension has recently risen considerably: in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, large-scale fighting may break out in the coming months, whereas in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri-Armenian conflict, such a threat may materialise within the next five years. The current formula for politically resolving the conflicts is ineffective and close to exhaustion, and the prospect of any alternative peace plans being developed is rather distant. The conflicts in the Southern Caucasus are of increasing concern to the West, mainly because of the Western actors' constantly growing political and economic involvement in Georgia and Azerbaijan (including support for reforms and development of the gas and oil transmission infrastructures), as well as its less intensive commitments in Armenia. An outbreak of open fighting over the separatist regions would destabilise the Southern Caucasus, largely undoing the results of the actions which the EU, NATO and the USA have taken in the region in recent years. Moreover, the situation in the Southern Caucasus, especially the separatisms themselves, have in fact become an element in the wider geopolitical game between the West and Russia. For Russia, the stakes are maintaining its influence in the region, and for the West, demonstrating its ability to effectively promote democracy and economic modernisation in the countries bordering it.

The Ukraine crisis so far. [EPC SPECIAL COLLECTION]

Collection of papers recently published by the European Policy Centre on the crisis involving Ukraine, Russia and the European Union

An Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area: A simulation exercise of two options. CEPS Special Report No. 98/December 2014

This study offers an in-depth economic analysis of the two main proposals for the creation of a European unemployment insurance scheme. One proposes the creation of a harmonised European unemployment benefit scheme that would apply automatically to every eligible unemployed person. The alternative, termed ‘reinsurance’ here, would transfer funds to national unemployment insurance schemes to finance benefits from the centre to the periphery when unemployment is measurably higher than normal. The rationale behind these proposals is to set up an EU-level shock absorber to overcome coordination failures and the crisis-budget constraints of individual countries. The authors consider the possible trade-offs and challenges of, for example, the definition of the trigger, the fiscal rule and the harmonisation of national benefits. They conclude that while both options are viable, ‘reinsurance’ offers a stronger stabilisation effect for the same amount of European distribution.

Enhancing the Legitimacy of EMU Governance. CEPS Special Report No. 98/December 2014

This CEPS Special Report investigates ways to enhance the legitimacy of economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) without introducing Treaty changes. It suggests changes in the governance framework at both the institutional and economic level. Input-oriented legitimacy can be improved by increasing parliamentary oversight on decisions related to EMU and increasing the accountability of the Eurogroup. Output-oriented legitimacy can be improved by strengthening the ability of EMU to reduce the emergence of negative externalities and to mitigate their impact, through market and fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms.

Agriculture, Food and the TTIP: Possibilities and Pitfalls. CEPS Special Report No. 99/December 2014. TTIP Series No. 3 and Paper No. 1 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the balance’’

Progress in agriculture and food issues in the TTIP talks will largely be determined by the level of ambition in the negotiations as a whole. If ambitions are modest, a low-level agreement could probably be reached that includes some limited commitments on agricultural market access and food regulations. These could include promises of mutual support in the area of opening up agricultural markets through the WTO and of further Transatlantic cooperation in trying to resolve conflicts over food regulations. Bolder ambitions would allow more scope for tackling the difficult problems, though at the cost of time. It would be unfortunate if the opportunity were not taken to make some significant progress in removing some longstanding irritants in the area of agricultural policy and food regulations: this is where the economic gains are likely to be significant and the spill-overs useful. This paper argues the case that it is worthwhile making the effort to secure a constructive and imaginative agreement on agriculture and food regulations in the TTIP. A fairly detailed suggestive list of potential sub-deals in agro-food, supported by the analysis in the paper, is the most concrete one of a series of policy conclusions

Public Procurement in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations. Paper No. 2 in the CEPS-CTR project "TTIP in the Balance" and CEPS Special Report No. 100/February 2015

For more than 20 years, the United States and the European Union have engaged in often-contentious negotiations over access to government procurement. The EU is dissatisfied with the level of procurement that the US has opened under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement and, as a consequence, it does not give the US its most comprehensive coverage. The US has been constrained in responding to the EU’s requests for greater access, especially to state procurement, by both its federal structure of government and by domestic purchasing requirements. At the current time, neither party has proposed a way to break the impasse. This paper reviews the current state of affairs between the US and the EU on government procurement, examining the procurement that they open to one another and the procurement that they withhold. It then proposes a strategy for the two sides to use the TTIP negotiations to move forward. This strategy includes both steps to expand their current commitments in the TTIP, as well as to develop a longer-term approach by making the TTIP a ‘living agreement’. This strategy suggests that the EU and the US could find a way to expand their access to government procurement contracts and at least partially defuse the issue.

Transatlantic MRAs: Lessons for TTIP? CEPS Special Report No. 101/March 2015

It is striking that there is little or no mention in the TTIP debate so far of the US-EU Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) concluded in 1998. At the time, expectations of the gains from the MRA were high. One should expect the MRA to be instructive for TTIP and entail some lessons to be learned for today’s attempt to lower technical barriers to trade (TBTs) across the North Atlantic. We offer an analysis of the 1998 MRA, the difficulties in the prior negotiations and those during the implementation phase, the subsequent and present status of sectoral approaches. The MRA experience revealed clearly how difficult it is to accomplish the acceptance of all relevant aspects of conformity assessment of the trading partner for the mere purpose of testing and certifying export goods on the requirements of the importing economy. The MRA has succeeded only in a few sectors. However, the ambition in TTIP with respect to TBTs is said to go so much further. It is therefore important for all those involved or interested in TTIP to learn the lessons of this early exercise in lowering TBT costs. This paper reaches two main conclusions: i) the US-EU MRA was only partially successful and only for some one-fifth of the export flows at the time: a disappointing outcome and a far cry from the expectations of business and political leaders; and ii) the EU’s attempt to ‘balance’ the negotiations in 1995 by bringing in three relatively competitive sectors did not work out – it was precisely there that problems accumulated. It is critical that domestic regulators must be satisfied during and after the negotiations that their pursuit of health, safety, environment and consumer protection objectives will not be watered down in any way. Lessons drawn include, among others: MRAs are not about regulatory change (by definition), but if initial regulatory cleavages between trading partners are too wide, conditions become so restrictive that parties may regard them as a denial of the very purpose of the MRA. There are incentives to opt for alternatives in the market for the formalised designation of conformity assessment bodies in the MRA and these are often cheaper and faster, while equally qualified. Even in heavily regulated sectors such as medicines and medical devices, the narrow MRA has been superseded by near-global forms of effective cost-reducing cooperative (i.e. not treaty-based) regulatory alignment, a confirmation of the OECD approach that governments should think in terms of an entire spectrum of forms of regulatory cooperation.

The Geostrategic Implications of TTIP. CEPS Special Report No. 105/April 2015

This paper analyses the strategic considerations that define the perceived need for transatlantic renewal, and examines the geo-economic impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on both emerging powers and poorer countries. It argues that TTIP has the potential to be a catalyst for trade liberalisation at the global level, as long as the US and the EU are proactive about making the ‘open architecture’ of TTIP a reality.

Antitrust, Regulation and the Neutrality Trap: A plea for a smart, evidence-based internet policy. CEPS Special Report No. 104/April 2015

When they look at Internet policy, EU policymakers seem mesmerised, if not bewitched, by the word ‘neutrality’. Originally confined to the infrastructure layer, today the neutrality rhetoric is being expanded to multi-sided platforms such as search engines and more generally online intermediaries. Policies for search neutrality and platform neutrality are invoked to pursue a variety of policy objectives, encompassing competition, consumer protection, privacy and media pluralism. This paper analyses this emerging debate and comes to a number of conclusions. First, mandating net neutrality at the infrastructure layer might have some merit, but it certainly would not make the Internet neutral. Second, since most of the objectives initially associated with network neutrality cannot be realistically achieved by such a rule, the case for network neutrality legislation would have to stand on different grounds. Third, the fact that the Internet is not neutral is mostly a good thing for end users, who benefit from intermediaries that provide them with a selection of the over-abundant information available on the Web. Fourth, search neutrality and platform neutrality are fundamentally flawed principles that contradict the economics of the Internet. Fifth, neutrality is a very poor and ineffective recipe for media pluralism, and as such should not be invoked as the basis of future media policy. All these conclusions have important consequences for the debate on the future EU policy for the Digital Single Market.

The Services Dimension of TTIP. Paper No. 6 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the Balance’’ and CEPS Special Report No. 106, 8 May 2015

This CEPS Special Report examines the main facets of the debate about TTIP and services. First, it looks at the political and economic context and the various alternatives in terms of political support, stressing that only a partnership that ensures substantial economic gains will attract the support of the top policy-makers. Second, the paper makes the point that large economic gains in services require deep discussions on regulatory issues, and third, such discussions cannot rely on the negotiating techniques normally used for goods. There is thus a need to adopt a new approach, based on the mutual recognition and equivalence of regulations enforced in the services concerned, preceded by a mutual evaluation to grant such equivalence – all measures to be carried out by the regulatory bodies concerned, not by trade negotiators. This new game is a complex one but it has huge side benefits: it induces each TTIP partner to review the quality of their own regulations; it is at ease with the notion of a ‘living’ (evolving) agreement; and it can easily be open to third countries. All these benefits should reassure a general public that is fearful of a hastily baked deal.