Syria and the red lines of international law. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2013

As the US and its allies France and Turkey dither over whether or not to punish Assad for having used sarin gas to kill his own people, the crucial question is: What response might the outside world legally take without the authority of the UN Security Council, which remains blocked by two veto-wielding members, Russia and China? Sadly, international law provides no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. To respond to what US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly called a “moral obscenity”, this commentary explores ways in which formal interpretations of international law might give way to a more pragmatic approach to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons.

The Economic Basis of Attitudes towards the European Community: Familiarity Breeds Content. Institute for Advanced Studies Political Science Series, 12 April 1994

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the economic basis of mass support for, and opposition to the European Community. In other words the main question is: to what extent, and in what ways, is popular support or opposition to the EC dependent upon economic circumstances and considerations? Behind this research question lies the matter of the legitimacy of the EC in the eyes of citizens across Europe. In some respects the results of this study are frustrating and inconclusive. In other respects, however, the results suggest some clear generalizations and conclusions. First, we have found rather little evidence that the EC or European unification are evaluated in primarily economic terms. Secondly, support seems to be associated more strongly with social and attitudinal variables of a non-economic kind. Thirdly, the figures suggest that diffuse and somewhat idealistic reasons for supporting unification and EC membership tend to outweigh more specific reasons. Fourthly, a solid foundation of inertia, custom, and national tradition seem to maintain support and make it grow.

National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe. Notes toward a Relational Analysis. Institute of Advanced Studies Political Science Series, 11 December 1993

Nationalism remains central to politics in and among the new nation-states. Far from »solving« the region's national question, the most recent reconfiguration of political space – the replacement of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia by some twenty would-be nation-states – only recast it in a new form. It is this new phase and form of the national question that I explore in this paper. I begin by outlining a particular relational configuration – the triadic relational nexus between national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands – that is central to the national question in post-Soviet Eurasia. In the second, and most substantial, section of the paper, I argue that each of the »elements« in this relational nexus – minority, nationalizing state, and homeland – should itself be understood in dynamic and relational terms, not as a fixed, given, or analytically irreducible entity but as a field of differentiated positions and an arena of struggles among competing »stances.« In a brief concluding section, I return to the relational nexus as a whole, underscoring the dynamically interactive quality of the triadic interplay.

Vanishing lines in the sand – Why a new map of the Middle East is necessary. CEPS Commentary, 1 October 2013

As the stalemate in Syria drags on, territorial divisions in the country are becoming more entrenched and the civil war is spreading to Syria’s neighbours; aggravating long-standing sectarian divisions in the whole region. In the view of Steven Blockmans, a lasting agreement cannot be reached in the Middle East if world powers stick to infamous 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement in which France and the UK secretly dealt with what came to be called the ‘Syria Question’. Any way out of the quagmire will require a grand bargain – one that establishes a new order in the whole region and draws borders accordingly.

Shifting EU Institutional Reform into High Gear. Report of the CEPS High-Level Group. CEPS Task Force Reports

To contribute to the important debate on EU institutional reform in the run-up to the European Parliament elections and the start of a new Commission, CEPS formed a High-Level Group on EU Institutional Reform under the leadership of Danuta Hübner MEP and member of the CEPS Board of Directors. The report of this distinguished group of MEPs, former and current EU institutional members and leading scholars on EU law and institutional affairs focuses on reforms that could be taken within the framework of the current treaties to build a more responsive and accountable Union. The report analyses the main inter- and intra-institutional weaknesses in terms of efficiency, democracy and differentiation and puts forward a number of recommendations addressing issues such as the reorganisation of the College of Commissioners, the promotion of strategic legislative planning, the enhancement of the role of the EP and the rotating Presidency of the Council, the improvement of the democratic accountability of the European Council and the adequate engagement of the national parliaments.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism. EPIN Paper No. 40, June 2014

This paper is the second in a series for a CEPS project entitled “The British Question and the Search for a Fresh European Narrative”. It is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. In all, 32 sectoral policy reviews are being produced over the period 2013-2015, as input into public information and debate leading up to a referendum on whether the UK should remain in, or secede from, the EU, planned for 2017. This second set of reviews covers a broad range of EU policies (for the single market for goods, external trade, transport policy, environment, climate change, research, asylum, non-EU immigration, civil judicial cooperation, tourism, culture and sport). The findings confirm what emerged from the first set of reviews, namely that there is little or no case for repatriation of EU competences at the level they are defined in the treaties. This does not exclude that at a more detailed level there can be individual actions or laws that might be done better or not at all. However, that is the task of all the institutions to work at on a regular basis, and hardly a rationale for secession. For the UK in particular the EU has shown considerable flexibility in agreeing to special arrangements, such as in the case of the policies here reviewed of asylum, non-EU immigration and civil judicial cooperation. In other areas reviewed here, such as the single market for goods, external trade, transport, environment, climate change and research, there is a good fit between the EU’s policies and UK priorities, with the EU perceived by stakeholders as an ‘amplifier’ of British interests.

EU integration and party politics in the Balkans. EPC Issue Paper No.77, September 2014

Throughout the Balkan region, popularly elected leaders consistently fail to meet the democratic standards set by the EU and, more importantly, they fall short of their voters’ expectations. Distrust in representative institutions and disengagement from political life runs dramatically high among the people of the Balkan countries, and this generalised sense of dissatisfaction is starting to breed cynicism also towards the idea of a better future inside the Union. This study highlights the interplay between EU integration and national politics in the region, and that both are consequential for the quality of Balkan democracies, as well as reminiscent of the Western and Central and Eastern European experience.

Reflections on the 26-27 June European Council Summit. EPC Commentary, 27 June 2014

In the end, the system of Spitzenkandidaten or Top Candidate has prevailed despite unease or even outright opposition from a number of Member States. This could be seen as a victory of the European Parliament, especially since it does now create expectations about the European Parliament strongly influencing future decisions. However, it is not straightforward: the Spitzenkandidaten process did not encourage higher participation, implying that the legitimacy question is far from answered. In addition, Member States unhappy with the EP gaining more and more powers might well look into how the powers of the EP can be curtailed in future, for example through greater involvement of national parliaments.

The benefits of Union? EPC Commentary, 19 September 2014

Yesterday, as predicted by the polls, the people of Scotland rejected independence, opting to remain part of the United Kingdom, which also means that the EU does not have to face a Scottish application for membership. Some claim that this referendum has buried the question of Scottish independence indefinitely but this debate is probably not over: a UK referendum on EU membership would reopen the independence question, as Scotland tends to see the EU more favourably.

Better use of resources is the means to growth, prosperity and welfare - but will the EU jump on the opportunity? EPC Commentary, 25 September 2014

As the new European Commission steps in and looks for ways to promote growth and competitiveness, its success will depend on what emphasis will be given to creating a more sustainable European economy. What will determine the EU’s competitiveness and comparative advantage on a global scene is how well we will respond to the ongoing economic and ecological crises – which are intertwined and reinforce each other. The big question is what emphasis will the new Commission and the EU as a whole give to promoting sustainable and greener growth, based on good management of natural resources and biodiversity, smarter use of resources and mitigating climate change?

The future of human rights protection in the new Libya: prospects and challenges. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 6/2014

There is no doubt that demand for the respect of human rights was one of the factors behind the Arab Spring and Libya is no exception. Four decades of absolute dictatorship headed by Muammar Gaddafi had been further tainted with gross violations of human rights of Libyan citizens and restrictions on their basic freedoms. Before the revolution, Libya was a country where no political parties were allowed. Freedom of expression and the press were extremely restricted. Reports about the country’s human rights violations published by a number of international organizations documented large scale human rights abuses at the hands of the Gaddafi regime. The 17 February 2011 revolution in Libya led to a turning point in the country’s history. The regime of Muammar Gaddafi which had dominated the country since 1969 eventually collapsed, leading to the beginning of the painful task of reconciliation and state building. Nonetheless it is estimated that more than 7000 prisoners are held captive by various militias and armed groups without due process. This in addition to thousands of internally displaced persons. State building involves the consolidation of a democratic state based on a democratic constitution. In 2011, a constitutional declaration was adopted to replace the one that had been in effect since 1969. This was intended as a stop-gap solution to allow the new political forces unleashed in the country time to write a new democratic constitution. To help consolidate the democratic state, three elements are required: that human rights be placed at its core; that these rights are truly implemented and applied; and lastly that the independence of the judiciary is safeguarded. For all this to happen it is also essential to strengthen education on human rights by encouraging non-governmental organizations to take a stronger role in promoting human rights. Libyan citizens can only avail themselves of these rights and strengthen their implementation if they know what they are and how they can benefit from their implementation

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

Can Europe deliver growth? The SAPIR report and beyond. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 6/2004

In this critical appraisal of the SAPIR report of July 2003, we choose not to focus on the economic analysis provided in the Sapir Report - where we largely agree - or the analysis of governance questions and design at the EU level. Rather, we concentrate on the assignment, orientation and policy recommendations of the Report with the following question in mind: to what extent does the Report help to revitalize the growth debate in Europe? Unfortunately, the focus of the Report’s recommendations is entirely on the EU level of policy and governance, whereas the motor of growth is very clearly being hindered at the Member State level. The present authors suggest that a number of coordination processes at the EU level are best regarded as ‘dangerous liaisons’which are not really goal-oriented but instead ingeniously seem to serve to protect the actors’ autonomously-decided positions. The Union is trapped in a low-growth equilibrium due to this deceptive construction and because in many policy areas relevant for growth, the EU cannot act without the explicit consent of the Member States, or it simply cannot act at all. Indeed, given the single market and EMU, Europe can only deliver growth at the Member States' level. We exemplify this point in a number of concrete policy areas.

The Political Logic of Disintegration: Seven Lessons from the Soviet Collapse. CEPS Essay (No. 1), September 2012

In short, the European Union, as we know it, no longer exists. The very foundations on which it was built are eroding. Shared memories of the Second World War have faded away – half the 15- and 16-year-olds in German high schools do not know that Hitler was a dictator, while a third believe that he protected human rights. The collapse of the Soviet Union has stripped away the geopolitical rationale for European unity. The democratic welfare state that was at the heart of the post-war political consensus is under siege by, among other things, sheer demographics. And the prosperity that bolstered the European project’s political legitimacy is vanishing. More than six out of ten Europeans believe that the lives of today’s children will be more difficult than those of people from their own generation. Against this background, how unthinkable is the EU’s disintegration? Should Europeans make the mistake of taking the Union for granted? Should they assume that the Union would not collapse because it should not collapse? Here, Europe’s capacity to learn from the Soviet precedent could play a crucial part. For the very survival of the EU may depend on its leaders’ ability to manage a similar mix of political, economic and psychological factors that were in play in the process of the Soviet collapse. The game of disintegration is primarily a political one driven much more by the perceptions and misperceptions of the political actors than simply by the constellation of the structural factors – institutional and economic.

Derisory Results or Reasons to be Cheerful? Evaluating the Implantation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Natolin Research Paper 01/January 2011

This paper considers the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The paper presents a portrait of the three neighbours in terms of their current political and socio-economic profiles, as well as the status of their relations with the European Union. Subsequently, it provides an overview of the development of ENP. A general set of conclusions are offered in relation to the key issue of good governance, where, the paper argues, ENP has delivered derisory results, with patchy effects across the region. Moreover, the paper identifies the democratic back-sliding in Ukraine and entenched authoritarianism in Belarus, which ENP has done very little to address. The EU’s willingness to provide better mobility options for ENP citizens to visit and work in the EU is a key test for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in the coming year. This paper sees that whilst there are reasons to be cheerful here, with the EU’s recent offer of greater Visa Liberalisation for Ukraine and Moldova, there remains much to be done and in the meantime the EU remains a ‘Fortress Europe’. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for ENP, which include the need to finally tackle corruption in the region, bring more differentiation into ENP, soften the EU’s borders through more generous Visa regimes, develop a more robust Belarus strategy and to think more creatively about the use of ENP funds for regional and cross- border activities.