Greece back on centre stage: the results of a déjà vu summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 23 March 2015

The March 2015 European Council might not enter history books, but the outcome of an informal ‘mini summit’ between seven EU leaders has the potential to prepare the grounds for a breakthrough in the negotiations between Athens and its lenders. In this post-summit analysis, Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that the search for a compromise promises to be a cumbersome, time-consuming and nerveracking exercise. But a solution now seems possible, proving all those doomsayers who have been predicting a ‘Grexit’ or ‘Graccident’ wrong. On other topics, EU leaders committed their countries to build an Energy Union, although questions remain about whether member states will agree to cede sovereignty on a number of significant points. This analysis looks also at the economic issues dealt with at the Spring Summit, with a focus on the perspectives for the European Semester and the Juncker Investment Plan. It ends with a summary of decisions taken on a number of other topics, including relations with Russia and Ukraine, the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, developments in Libya and in Tunisia, and the endorsement of the Council’s new Secretary General.

The impact of the withdrawal from Afghanistan on Russia’s security. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 54, March 2014

ISAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 will directly impact the wider region. Not only is there a risk of instability spilling over to Central Asia, but the drawdown will also accelerate the ongoing shift in the balance of power in Central Asia towards China. Should a spillover occur, the burden will mainly fall on Russia and China. Russia will, however, only continue playing the dominant role in the security of the former Soviet Central Asia (FSCA) until China takes on responsibility for the security of its direct sphere of influence or “dingwei”. Russia’s Near Abroad, however, overlaps both with the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood in Europe and China’s dingwei in Central Asia and the Far East. It is, therefore, necessary to approach Russian reactions to these encroachments on its historical spheres of influence in a single context, taking into account the interrelationship between these three.

The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine: a useful but flawed OSCE tool. EPC Policy Brief, 23 April 2015

The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine functions as the eyes and ears of the international community in Eastern Ukraine; it monitors, impartially, the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and observes whether or not both parties comply with the Minsk II Agreement. The success, or failure, of this Mission will not only be of crucial importance for the situation in Eastern Ukraine, but will also determine the OSCE’s entire future and ability to operate in conflict regions. Although the SMM is a flawed tool, Dennis Sammut and Joseph D’Urso argue that its deployment and the subsequent reinvigoration of OSCE is the perfect opportunity for the EU to rethink its relation to and position in the organisation, and to assume a bigger and more decisive role.

Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER NUMBER 175/01.07.2015

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.

Nord Stream expansion: what does it mean for Europe? EPC Commentary, 2 July 2015

Two announcements in sequence have shaken the energy debate on 18 and 19 June. Gazprom announced the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding with Shell, Exon and OMV for the construction of strings 3 and 4 of Nord Stream, aiming at doubling the current 55 bcm capacity of the corridor running in the Baltic sea bed and connecting the Russian terminal of Vyborg to Germany. On the day after, a €2 bn deal between Russia and Greece was signed for extending the Turkish Stream project into Greek territory. ...

The systemic roots of Russia’s recession. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/15, OCTOBER 2015

The Russian economy grew rapidly between 2000 and 2007, but growth decelerated after the 2008-09 global financial crisis, and since mid-2014 Russia has moved into recession. A number of short-term factors have caused recession: lower oil prices, the conflict with Ukraine, European Union and United States sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions. However Russia's negative output trends have deeper structural and institutional roots. They can be tracked back about a decade to when previous market-reform policies started to be reversed in favour of dirigisme, leading to further deterioration of the business and investment climate. • Russia must address its short-term problems, but in the medium-to-long term it must deal with its fundamental structural and institutional disadvantages: oil and commodity dependence and an unfriendly business and investment climate underpinned by poor governance. Compared to many other commodity producers, Russia is better placed to diversify its economy, mostly due to its excellent human capital. Ruble depreciation makes this task easier

Russophobia in the Kremlin’s strategy. A weapon of mass destruction. OSW POINT OF VIEW #56, 2015-11-02

Building up an image of Russophobic countries is currently instrumental in shaping a neo-imperial political identity among the citizens of the Russian Federation, mobilising them in the face of real or alleged threats, and also serves as a form of restoring psychological comfort to them in the face of the failure of the Kremlin’s actions (as in Ukraine, for example). The mythologised stereotype of Russophobic countries also remains a crowning argument and a simple explanation for the ongoing tensions in relations between Russia and the West.

2016 already puts its mark on the economic map of Europe. CEPS Essay No. 22/8 January 2016

The start of 2016 brought highly symbolic changes to the trade policy map of Europe between the EU- and Russian-led blocs, as the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine entered into force provisionally, while Russia moved in precisely the opposite direction by scrapping its free trade agreement with Ukraine. However the ongoing changes go far wider and deeper. The energy sector and major industries see disengagement between Ukraine and Russia, and Russia’s share in Ukrainian trade is falling substantially. New transport corridors with China may offer synergies with trade opportunities for all three DCFTA states, with Georgia first in line. Visa liberalisation for the entire DCFTA space is now firmly in prospect. Divergent macroeconomic trends between a recovering eurozone and recession in Russia will accentuate the changes in trade structures. A better organisation of the pan-European economic space is surely desirable, but prospects for links between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union remain problematic.

Tajikistan: a chronic stagnation. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 200/15.03.2016

Since gaining its independence Tajikistan has faced severe political, economic and social problems. The last several months has seen a clear increase in their intensity. This is in part caused by the deteriorating economic situation in Russia and the significant fall of remittances from the Tajik labour migrants in Russia, as well as by President Emomali Rahmon’s rising authoritarianism. Despite this intensification, qualitatively speaking Tajikistan’s problems have been unchanged for years. Besides the state’s structural weakness, the main cause is the ongoing neo-colonial dependence on Russia, which effectively limits Dushanbe’s room for political manoeuvre and keep Tajikistan in Russia’s sphere of control. This dependence on the one hand protects the country from collapsing, but on the other it precludes the development of the state, resulting in Tajikistan’s enduring stagnation. Similar processes also take place in other countries of post-Soviet Central Asia. However, in the case of Tajikistan the dependence and stagnation it causes are the strongest and their mechanisms most easily observed.

A challenge for liberal democracy: How to understand the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 16.10.2014

The Russian intervention in Ukraine has provoked a deep crisis which will likely last for years, with profound consequences not only for Ukraine, Russia and Eastern Europe, but also for the internal situation in the European Union. The current Russian aggression is frequently seen as a profound violation of international law, breaking the rules that are fundamental for relations in Europe. It is perceived as perhaps a step towards rebuilding imperial Russia or, at the very least, an attempt to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, one very important aspect is virtually neglected, namely, that Russia’s Ukraine venture may have a significant impact on the future of liberal democracy in Europe and beyond.

Nord Stream II - yes or no? - Political decision of a political Commission. EPC Commentary, 14 June 2016

When the new European Commission started work in autumn 2014, the president of the Commission took great pride in calling it a ‘political Commission’, which will be big on big things and small on small. Whilst the EU is currently dealing with many crises, reality is that things do not come much bigger than Nord Stream II. Will this be a political Commission that stands by its principles, including respect for liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights? Will this Commission have the backbone to politically assess a project that threatens EU unity and its core values, undermines the Union’s commonly agreed commitment to building an Energy Union and facilitates Russia’s aggression against Ukraine? President Juncker’s controversial visit to Russia and meeting with President Putin on 16-17 June is a test-case: will this Commission be ready to defend its commitments and principles when discussing ‘economic issues’?

From apathy to nationalist mobilisation: politics makes a comeback in Armenia. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 215 | 08.06.2016

In the military dimension, the Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh (2–5 April 2016) changed little in the conflict zone. It has, however, had a significant impact on the situation in Armenia. The country was shocked out of the political malaise that had been the dominant mood in the last few years, and the Karabakh question, which used to animate political life in the late 1980s and early 1990s, once again became a driving force behind developments. In the internal dimension, the renewed fighting galvanised the political scene, triggered a rise in nationalist sentiments, mobilised the public and consolidated it around the Karabakh question, overshadowing the frustrations caused by the country’s difficult economic situation. In the external dimension, the war, which was viewed as Moscow-endorsed Azerbaijani aggression, undermined people’s trust in Russia and the Armenian-Russian alliance. It also made it clear for Armenians how uncertain the Russian security guarantees were and exacerbated their feelings of vulnerability and isolation on the international stage.