143 resultados para Politics and the press
Resumo:
Summary: The ‘Six Pack’ forms part of the economic governance reforms which are being implemented in order to prevent a repeat of the current sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area. This legislative package involves strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact, with stronger financial sanctions and more focus on debt; a new directive on national budgetary frameworks and a new framework to monitor and correct macroeconomic imbalances. Furthermore, the implementation of the ‘Six Pack’ also involves procedural reforms, in particular reverse majority voting, as well as more oversight by the European Parliament. Inter-institutional negotiations on the ‘Six Pack’ took over a year. In the meantime, the sovereign debt crisis had deepened and broadened, implying that the ‘Six Pack’ may have come ‘too late’. The ‘Six Pack’ has also proved to be ‘too little’ to address the crisis and by the time it entered into force, further measures and proposals to strengthen economic governance had to be made. Nevertheless, the ‘Six Pack’ comprises some positive developments. In particular, recognising that fiscal policy is a matter of national sovereignty, it sets a new approach which relies on institutional reforms at national level. As such, it constitutes a first, small step to improve economic governance in the Euro Area.
Resumo:
Summary: Overall the monetary pillar of the EMU project has worked well so that it is incorrect to speak of a 'euro' crisis though it is at the epicentre of the present crisis. The origins of the problems it is facing have more to do with the economic component, particularly because of the breach of budgetary rules which points to a failure of politics. Hence the solution must be political, namely a strong commitment by governments to achieve balanced budgets and implement structural reforms so as to lay the basis for improved competitiveness, job creation and sustainable growth.
Resumo:
There is a puzzling, little-remarked contradiction in scholarly views of the European Commission. On the one hand, the Commission is seen as the maestro of European integration, gently but persistently guiding both governments and firms toward Brussels. On the other hand, the Commission is portrayed as a headless bunch of bickering fiefdoms who can hardly be bothered by anything but their own in ternecine turf wars. The reason these very different views of the same institution have so seldom come into conflict is quite apparent: EU studies has a set of relatively autonomous and poorly integrated sub fields that work at different levels of analysis. Those scholars holding the "heroic" view of the Com mission are generally focused on the contest between national and supranational levels that character ized the 1992 program and subsequent major steps toward European integration. By contrast, those scholars with the "bureaucratic politics" view are generally authors of case studies or legislative his tories of individual EU directives or decisions. However, the fact that these twO images of the Commis sion are often two ships passing in the night hardly implies that there is no dispute. Clearly both views cannot be right; but then, how can we explain the significant support each enjoys from the empirical record? The CommiSSion, perhaps the single most important supranational body in the world, certainly deserves better than the schizophrenic interpretation the EU studies community has given it. In this paper, I aim to make a contribution toward the unraveling of this paradox. In brief, the argument I make is as follows: the European Commission can be effective in pursuit of its broad integration goals in spite of, and even because of, its internal divisions. The folk wisdom that too many chefs spoil the broth may often be true, but it need not always be so. The paper is organized as follows. 1 begin with an elaboration of the theoretical position briefly out lined above. 1 then tum to a case study from the major Commission efforts to restructure the computer industry in the context of its 1992 program. The computer sector does not merely provide interesting, random illustrations of the hypothesis 1 have advanced. Rather, as Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman have stressed, the Commission's efforts on informatics formed one of the most crucial parts of the en tire 1992 program, and so the Commission's success in "Europeanizing" these issues had significant ripple effects across the entire European political economy. I conclude with some thoughts on the fol lowing question: now that the Commission has succeeded in bringing the world to its doorstep, does its bureaucratic division still serve a useful purpose?
Resumo:
This paper examines recent policies and politics of services, in particular child care services in European welfare states. It is argued that social (care) services are becoming an increasingly political issue in postindustrial societies and are at the very center of welfare-state restructuring. Some countries have recently developed new policy pro grams for child care-but there are important differences among these programs. To understand these differences as well as some common features, the paper argues that it is necessary to examine the institutional organization of child care and short-term political factors as well as the rationales articulated in political debates to support or im pede various policies. The paper concludes that a comprehensive system of child care provisions is still far off in most countries, despite a rhetoric of choice and postindustrial care and labor-market patterns.
Resumo:
In May and June 1997, Germany's commitment to Economic and Monetaty Union (EMU) underwent its most serious test ever when the Bundesbank and the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl dashed openly over the government's plans to revalue the country's gold reserves. Faced with a budget short-fall and strong political opposition to either tax increases or spending cuts, Finance Minister Waigel attempted to introduce a modest change in the Bundesbank's bookkeeping procedures to bring them in line with the standard practices at other European central banks. The Bundesbank resisted, arguing that the changes would infringe upon its closely guarded independence. This paper analyzes how the politics of coalition interacted with Germany's political institutions to cause this conflict.