The Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights tribunal: challenges for the effective delivery of fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 49, 29 August 2012

This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.

Implementation of the Macroeconomic Adjustment Programmes in the Euro Area: State-of-Play. CEPS E-Book, 11 March 2014

Two of the four macroeconomic adjustment programmes – in Portugal and Ireland – can be considered a success in the sense that the initial expectations in terms of adjustment, both fiscal and external, were broadly fulfilled. A rebound based on exports has taken hold in these two countries, but a full recovery will take years. In Greece the initial plans were insufficient. While the strong impact of the fiscal adjustment on demand could have been partially anticipated at the time, the resistance to structural reforms was more surprising and remains difficult to cure. The fiscal adjustment is now almost completed, but the external adjustment has not proceeded well. Exports are stagnating despite impressive falls in wage costs. In Cyprus, the outcome has so far been less severe than initially feared. It is still too early to find robust evidence in any country that the programmes have increased the long-term growth potential. Survey-based evidence suggests that structural reforms have not yet taken hold. The EU-led macroeconomic adjustment programmes outside the euro area (e.g. Latvia) seem to have been much stricter, but the adjustment was quicker and followed by a stronger rebound.

The G-20 in the aftermath of the crisis: a Euro-Asian view. Bruegel Policy Brief, 24 March 2009

In 2009 the global economy switched from recession to recovery. However, the pace of the recovery has been very different in different parts of the world, with the divergence between emerging and mature economies becoming greater than expected. Europe and emerging Asia are in this respect in clearly opposite situations, while the Japanese situation is closer to that of Europe than to those of its neighbours (Figure 1 on the next page).

Ten Years of Judicial Cooperation. Occasional Paper 4/2014

This paper intends to illustrate the respective roles and functions of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) on the one hand, and the Maltese national courts on the other. It will then define the scope and role of the judicial cooperation between the CJEU and the national courts, highlighting the procedure relating to the preliminary rulings. The paper will then briefly describe the cases brought before the CJEU involving Malta, including those concerning requests for preliminary rulings originating from Malta, and the direct actions by the European Commission before the Court of Justice, as well as those before the General Court. After a description of the rationale behind the publication of the book Malta u l-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja tal-Unjoni Ewropea (Malta and the Court of Justice of the European Union), and following the conference in which it was presented, the main points that emerged from the conference will serve as a backdrop to some statistical analysis pertaining to the Maltese cases, as well as some reflections on the current situation of the judicial cooperation obtained after ten years. It will propose that, besides a mere statistical analysis of the raw figures that emerge, one must rather address his attention to the spirit of EU membership, and reflect on whether Malta’s legal system has actually absorbed and understood the full meaning of the EU membership, ten years after it took place.

The shape of the banking union confirms Berlin's privileged position in the eurozone. OSW Commentary No. 123, 10.01.2014

On 18 December 2013, EU finance ministers reached agreement on the structure of a banking union. The body will be tasked with oversight of the largest banks across the EU. It will also devise recovery and resolution programmes for institutions at risk of bankruptcy, and it will handle wind-up arrangements and decide on the allocation of resulting costs. The proposals are expected to be approved by March of this year by the governments of the eurozone states, by other EU members interested in joining the banking union, and by the European Parliament. A compromise on the supervision of the largest banks in the eurozone was reached several months ago. The most recent negotiations focused on the second pillar of the banking union: a Single Resolution Mechanism. The parties successfully negotiated a set of procedures for rescuing banks capable of recovery and for the closure of institutions that cannot be rescued. A joint position was also agreed on the allocation of costs resulting from such actions.

The End of the Transitional Period for Police and Criminal Justice Measures Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who monitors trust in the European Criminal Justice area? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 74, December 2014

This study examines the legal and political implications of the forthcoming end of the transitional period for the measures in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as set out in Protocol 36 to the EU Treaties. This Protocol limits some of the most far-reaching innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon over EU cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs for a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (until 1 December 2014), and provides the UK with special ‘opt out/opt-in’ possibilities. The study focuses on the meaning of the transitional period for the wider European Criminal Justice area. The most far-reaching change emerging from the end of this transition will be the expansion of the European Commission and Luxembourg Court of Justice scrutiny powers over Member States’ implementation of EU criminal justice law. The possibility offered by Protocol 36 for the UK to opt out and opt back in to pre-Lisbon Treaty instruments poses serious challenges to a common EU area of justice by further institutionalising ‘over-flexible’ participation in criminal justice instruments. The study argues that in light of Article 82 TFEU the rights of the defence are now inextricably linked to the coherency and effective operation of the principle of mutual recognition of criminal decisions, and calls the European Parliament to request the UK to opt in EU Directives on suspects procedural rights as condition for the UK to ‘opt back in’ measures like the European Arrest Warrant.

The ICC and its Deteriorating Relationship with Africa in Light of the Kenya Cases: What Should the EU Position be? IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/09 • November 2013

Summary. The African Union (AU), a union consisting of 54 African States, held an Extraordinary Summit on 11-12 October 2013, to discuss its relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court). The meeting took place just weeks before the trial of Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta is scheduled to begin, and was clearly intended to voice discontent and put on hold the ongoing ICC proceedings against Kenyatta as well as his deputy, Vice-President William Ruto. Before the Summit, there were even widespread rumors that the Assembly of the AU would call for a mass withdrawal of African States Parties from the ICC Statute. Eventually, the Assembly did not go that far and took two important, but less controversial decisions. It called for the granting of immunities to Heads of States from prosecutions by international criminal tribunals and requested a deferral of the ICC cases against Kenyatta and Ruto through a resolution adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC). After providing a background to the Kenya cases, this policy brief aims to evaluate what the position of the EU and its Member States as outspoken supporters of the ICC and the fight against impunity should be, especially given the fact that France and the UK, as permanent UNSC members, could block a UNSC deferral at any time.

Closing financial institutions on both sides of the Atlantic: Are there differences in approach? CEPS Commentary, 25 February 2015

In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis both the EU and the US have implemented resolution procedures for their largest and most systemic financial institutions. This Commentary examines the main differences between the two frameworks. The EU framework allows, inter alia, action to prevent the failure of a credit institution, while the US regulatory framework requires that all systemic banks subject to resolution must be closed and resolved. The greater flexibility under the EU resolution framework allows action to be taken to preserve a credit institution without putting it through an insolvency process, which makes limiting moral hazard less obvious. Moreover, the scope of the EU framework is still narrow, since it does not allow the recovery of non-bank financial institutions, whereas the US framework does.

The Court of Justice of the European Union. College of Europe Research Paper in Law 02/2014

The Court of Justice of the European Union is one of the institutions of the Union. Praised by some as the relentless and steady motor of European integration and attacked by others as an example of a clearly biased institution, more ink has perhaps been spilled over the years on discussing the (de)merits of the Court of Justice than any other Union institution. In face of such considerable literature coming from legal, political science, sociological, and more recently also historical quarters, this chapter cannot but scratch the surface of the vast topic by providing a concise introduction into selected institutional themes in a legal1 and, where possible, diachronic perspective: the structure of the Union courts located in Luxembourg; basic information about the type of judicial business the Court of Justice carries out; the composition of the Court of Justice, including the recent changes made to the way in which judges and advocates-general are selected; the often discussed style and structure of the judgments; and, finally, the even more frequently discussed and recurring question of the legitimacy of the Court of Justice.

Addressing the immediate needs of the Greek banks. CEPS Commentary, 31 July 2015

Based on a detailed calculation of the recapitalisation requirements of the Greek banks, we find that the sector needs an infusion of capital, but that the level largely depends on the stringency of the capital requirements applied. An expedient quick fix to comply with the minimum capital requirements could be achieved by a bail-in of existing creditors under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of around €5 billion, leaving only €6 billion needed for re-capitalisation. If the ‘Cypriot’ standard is applied, however, the required re-capitalisation would be €15 billion. A ‘generous’ approach, which takes into account the phasing in of the new more-stringent capital requirements until 2018, would imply a re-capitalisation of €29 billion (or more bailing-in of creditors). The re-capitalisation should be undertaken preferably by the EIB, the EBRD or the new Greek investment fund, rather than via loans from the ESM to the Greek government.

What role for social investment in the new economic governance of the Eurozone? EPC Policy Brief, 10 November 2015

The EU, and the Eurozone in particular, has been going through a period of prolonged economic difficulty. While there are some signs of recovery, growth rates remain too low, only returning to the already modest growth rates of the pre-crisis period. This not only affects the creation of jobs, but also, through lower tax revenues and stagnant GDP levels, the consolidation of public finances.

European Bank Resolution: Making it work! Interim report of the CEPS Task Force on Implementing Financial Sector Resolution. CEPS Task Force Report, January 2016

From the start of 2016, new rules for bank resolution are in place – as spelled out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) – across the EU, and a new authority (the Single Resolution Board, or SRB) is fully operational for resolving all banks in the eurozone. The implementation issues of the new regime are enormous. Banks need to develop recovery plans, and authorities need to create resolution plans as well as set the minimum required amount of own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for each bank. But given the diversity in bank structures and instruments at EU and global level, this will be a formidable challenge, above all with respect to internationally active banks. In order to explore ways in which the authorities and banks can meet this challenge, CEPS formed a Task Force composed of senior experts on banking sector reform and chaired by Thomas Huertas, Partner and Chair, EY Global Regulatory Network. This report contains its policy recommendations.

The reform of the EU courts (II). Abandoning the management approach by doubling the General Court. Egmont Paper 83, March 2016

The 2011 proposal of the European Court of Justice aiming to increase the number of judges of the General Court has mutated after four years into a complete change of the EU judicial system. This long legislative debate was the first implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the judicial domain. It has revealed different problems – formal and substantial – of the approach of public service reform in the European institutions.