172 resultados para European Studies
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The EU‘s external action includes a preference for regional interlocutors and a tendency to promote regionalism. This work concentrates on the southeast Asian area and it aims at investigating the nature of EU‘s promotion of ASEAN regional integration. The EU‘s ideas and practices of regionalism as well as the single market experience influence the EU‘s international action. The power deriving from the EU‘s institutionalized market is used by the Union in a normative way to diffuse the EU‘s ideas and principles, advance the EU‘s interests and spread its model of economic integration through political dialogue, development cooperation and preferential trade arrangements. This action seems to result in a certain diffusion of the EU‘s ideas and practices in southeast Asia as well as in a subsequent reappropriation and redefinition of external inputs by ASEAN.
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This paper studies inflation persistence with time-varying coefficient autoregressions for twelve central European countries,in comparison with the United States and the euro area. Inflation persistence tends to be higher in times of high inflation. Since the oil price shocks, inflation persistence has declined both in the US and euro-area. In most central and eastern European countries, for which our study covers 1993-2012, inflation persistence has also declined, with the main exceptions of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, where persistence seems to be rather stable.
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The promotion of the rule of law has become an important dimension of the European Union’s relations towards its neighbourhood. The rule of law is, however, a complex and multifaceted notion and the EU’s rule of law promotion policy has often been criticised for being either inefficient or self-interested. This collection of short papers offers an analysis of various case studies using the analytical framework of structural foreign policy (SFP) developed by Stephan Keukeleire. It aims to promote an original analytical perspective on the EU’s foreign policy but also to critically test and further develop the SFP analytical framework. The contributions of this collection consist of the shortened version of students’ Master’s theses written at the College of Europe during the academic year 2011-2012 in the framework of the course “The EU as a Foreign Policy Actor” taught by Stephan Keukeleire, Chairholder of the TOTAL Chair of EU Foreign Policy in the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies.
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From the Introduction. The Treaty on European Union, also known as the Treaty of Maastricht or the Maastricht Treaty, created the European Union (EU) from the existing European Economic Community (EEC.) It was signed by the member states on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993.1 Among its many innovations was the creation of European citizenship, which would be granted to any person who was a citizen of an EU member state. Citizenship, however, is intertwined with immigration, which the Treaty also attempted to address. Policy on visas, immigration and asylum was originally placed under Pillar 3 of the EU, which dealt with Justice and Home Affairs. In 1997, however, the Amsterdam Treaty moved these policies from Pillar 3 to Pillar 1, signaling “a shift toward more supranational decision-making in this area,” as opposed to the intergovernmental method of Pillars 2 and 3.2
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This paper examines the EU-Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly (EuroNest PA), an inter-parliamentary forum consisting of representatives from the European Parliament (EP) and from all Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries except Belarus, aiming at political and economic association between the EU and the EaP. More specifically, it analyzes the extent to which the EP tries and manages to socialize the national parliaments of the EaP countries. After introducing the theoretical framework, the paper outlines the structure and working methods of the EuroNest PA, clarifies the absence of Belarus in the framework, and examines the results of the first three plenary sessions. The paper concludes that, although the establishment of the EuroNest PA as such provides a framework to advance the EP’s goals of transmitting its norms and values to the EU’s Eastern neighbouring countries, in practice socialization has taken place only to a limited extent thus far.
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No abstract.
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From the Introduction. According to Article 220 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) “each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed”. The “pre-Nice” allocation of jurisdiction between the two Community courts can be summarized as follows. At Court of Justice level, mention should first of all be made of references for a preliminary ruling. A national court, in a case pending before it, can - or in some circumstances must - refer to the Court of Justice a question relating to the interpretation of provisions of the EC Treaty or of secondary Community law, or relating to the validity of provisions of secondary Community law.1 Moreover, the Court of Justice ensures the observance of the law in the context of actions for annulment or failure to act brought before it by the Community institutions, the European Central Bank (hereinafter ECB) and the Member States.2 These actions concern, respectively, the legality of an act of secondary Community law and the legality of the failure of the institution concerned to adopt such act. The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction in actions brought by the Commission or by a Member State relating to the infringement of Community law by a Member State (hereinafter infringement actions)3 and in actions relating to compensation for non-contractual damage brought by Member States against the Community.4 Finally, as regards the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, mention should be made of appeals which can be lodged on points of law only against rulings of the CFI.5
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From the Introduction. In the academic year 1991-1992, Utrecht University, on my initiative, started to offer courses in European criminal law. This initiative came at a symbolic moment, just prior to the entry into force of the EU Treaty of Maastricht1 and the outlining of European policy in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The Director of the Legal Department, Paul DEMARET, was aware of the significance of this development and I have been given the opportunity to teach this subject at the College of Europe since 1995. Since then, JHA has evolved into one of the main areas of EU legislation. Now we are again on the threshold of an important historical feat. In June 2003, the European Convention reached agreement concerning a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.2 The use of the term “Constitution” for the future EU Treaty is not simply cosmetic. The realisation has dawned that EU integration must be embedded in a treaty document which also regulates the rights and duties of citizens, not just with respect to European citizenship, but also with respect to, for example, Justice. Where JHA is concerned, this result acknowledges that the harmonisation of criminal law and criminal procedure and transnational cooperation cannot preclude the harmonisation of principles of due law and fair trial. Despite the substantial Europeanisation of criminal law, many criminal lawyers are defending the achievements and typicalities of their national criminal law like never before. EU initiatives are assessed from the perspective of the national agenda and national achievements. We are still too far removed from a European criminal law policy that is both European and enjoys national support. The core issue is therefore not how to keep our criminal (procedural) law national and free from European influences, but rather how to ensure democratic decision making, the quality of the constitutional state and the guarantees of criminal law in a national administrative model which has to operate increasingly interactively within a European and international context. In this contribution, the contours of the Europeanisation of criminal law are outlined and analysed. First, attention will be paid to the EC and, second, to the JHA. Following this, an evaluation and a look ahead at the current IGC are indicated.
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From the Introduction. The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legislator, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European public servants law.
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No abstract.
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From the Introduction. This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases.
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From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.
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From the Introduction. It is not frequent for a National Regulation Authority (NRA) to bring an action against the Commission decision and, cynically speaking, case Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej2 v Commission3 shows that the avoidance of a sweeping retaliation may be one of the reasons for it. The General Court followed the Commission‟s argument that, notwithstanding the peculiarities of the employment conditions of the Polish Regulator‟s legal counsel giving it virtually full independence, as well as the fact that the Polish law itself does not differentiate between in-house counsel and third party attorneys, the claim should be rejected on the grounds of inadmissibility. The GC based its judgment on Art 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice4, which requires that, with the exception of the Member States' Governments and the EU Institutions, parties to the dispute must be represented by a lawyer. In so doing, the Court explicitly referred to the infamous Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission5 and EREF v Commission6. Most importantly, the Court stated that the lawyers representing Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej (UKE) are bound to enjoy a degree of independence inferior to that of lawyers who are not linked to their clients by an employment contract7.
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This paper analysis the 1994 EU referenda in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway in a comparative perspective. It shows that the results were, to some extent at least, related to how pronounced the respective elite consensus was on the necessity or desirability of EU membership. It also shows that in all cases the main motivation of the Yes voters was economic. The paper goes on to analyse the regional and social variations in voting patterns. In the concluding chapter some of the medium- and longterm effects of the referenda debates and results on Austrian, Finnish and Swedish government policy within the EU are outlined.
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In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.