183 resultados para Energy policy--Economic aspects--Germany (West)
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Is the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) ready for the challenge of cutting emissions by 20 %? This paper tries to provide an answer to this question by studying the efficiency of the scheme, both in the secondary and in the primary markets for allowances. On the one hand, this paper draws conclusions from the operation of the scheme so far. For this purpose, it studies a wide variety of market data using economic and econometric techniques. On the other hand, building on this evidence, this paper presents and evaluates some of the changes introduced in the scheme for the third trading period.
Germany and the Eurocrisis: The timing of politics and the politics of timing. ACES Cases No. 2014.3
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This paper speculates on the future of the euro. It uses Germany as a prism for the discussion about what might be done next to bolster the Euro. Researching the future—always a challenging task—is made harder when multiple state actors contend for prominence on the basis of shifting coalitions at home, all while interacting at an international level. That said, almost everyone accepts that German choices will play the central role in the path ultimately chosen. This paper thus foregrounds Germany’s role in shaping the way ahead, and it does so through an explicitly political framework focused primarily on the electoral implausibility of an alternative German policy course.
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A country’s economic and social development depends on reliable, sustainable access to energy — at a reasonable cost. Energy security has become a growing preoccupation for all countries, especially those that rely on imports. In addition, no country wants to rely on single sourcing for their oil or gas, meaning that the diversification of supplies is also important. Today, both the US and the EU are paying much closer attention to their energy security.
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From the Introduction. The EU has seen a renewed interest in strengthening its common energy policy and promoting energy security. The greatest trigger has been Russia’s unpredictable, aggressive behaviour in Ukraine in the past year. Lack of trust in a long-standing economic partner and concerns about relying on a trade partner that does not adhere to international norms have left their mark.
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Summary. It is clear that any action to combat climate change must involve extensive efforts in reducing the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the energy sector. In the EU, nearly 80% of total GHG emissions come from the energy sector (European Commission, 2011, p. 21). Any credible action within the EU on combating climate change therefore requires deep shifts in the way we produce and use our energy. This paper highlights that renewable energy policies to 2020 are insufficient to meet the EU’s long-term climate policy objectives of reducing GHG emissions by between 80 and 95% by 2050, and thereby aiming to avoid an increase in global temperatures of more than 2°C. Such an ambition would likely require a very high share of renewable energy (in the range of 80 to 100%) in the overall energy mix of the EU, given current uncertainties about the feasibility of potential technological developments (e.g. carbon capture and storage technology).
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The idea of linking cohesion policy to EU economic governance has received the support of several EU institutions. The nature of such link is still to be agreed upon and is likely to lead to intense discussions. This Policy Brief argues that while the Commission’s envisaged proposal has its merits, it would nevertheless result in a partial and inconsistent link between the cohesion policy and EU economic governance. A more flexible and coherent approach is proposed.
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This paper serves as a background for the International High Level Energy Conference organised by Egmont - Royal Institute for International Relations - and the Development Group in Brussels on 10th May 2012
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Ensuring the sustainability, security and cost-competitiveness of energy supplies for the EU citizens are the main objectives of the EU climate and energy policy, which remains high on the EU agenda. The next European legislature will have the difficult task to reconcile these different objectives into a comprehensive 2030 framework for climate and energy policies. Taking into account the changing energy dynamics, this paper analyses thus the state of play of these objectives today in order to better understand how the 2030 framework for climate and energy policies should be designed.
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Summary. Energy saving has been a stated policy objective of the EU since the 1970s. Presently, the 2020 target is a 20% reduction of EU energy consumption in comparison with current projections for 2020. This is one of the headline targets of the European Energy Strategy 2020 but efforts to achieve it remain slow and insufficient. The aim of this paper is to understand why this is happening. Firstly, this paper examines the reasons why public measures promoting energy efficiency are needed and what form these measures should optimally take (§ 1). Fortunately, over the last 20 years, much research has been done into the famous ‘energy efficiency gap’ (or ‘the energy efficiency paradox’), even if more remains to be done. Multiple explanations have been given: market failures, modelling flaws and behavioural obstacles. Each encompasses many complex aspects. Several types of instruments can be adopted to encourage energy efficiency: measures guaranteeing the correct pricing of energy are preferred, followed by taxes or tradable white certificates which in turn are preferred to standards or subsidies. Information programmes are also necessary. Secondly, the paper analyzes the evolution of the different programmes from 2000 onwards (§ 2). This reveals the extreme complexity of the subject. It deals with quite diverse topics: buildings, appliances, public sector, industry and transport. The market for energy efficiency is as diffuse as energy consumption patterns themselves. It is composed of many market actors who demand more efficient provision of energy services, and that suppliers of the necessary goods and know-how deliver this greater efficiency. Consumers in this market include individuals, businesses and governments, and market activities cover all energy-consuming sectors of the economy. Additionally, energy efficiency is the perfect example of a shared competence between the EU and the Member States. Lastly, the legal framework has steadily increased in complexity, and despite the successive energy efficiency programmes used to build this framework, it has become clear that the gap between the target and the results remains. The paper then examines whether the 2012/27/EU Directive adopted to improve the situation could bring better results. It briefly describes the content of this framework Directive, which accompanies and implements the latest energy efficiency programme (§ 3). Although the Directive is technically complex and maintains nonbinding energy efficiency targets, it certainly represents an improvement in several aspects. However, it is also saddled with a multiplicity of exemption clauses and interpretative documents (with no binding value) which weaken its provisions. Furthermore, alone, it will allow the achievement of only about 17.7% of final energy savings by 2020. The implementation process, which is essential, also remains fairly weak. The paper also gives a glimpse of the various EU instruments for financing energy efficiency projects (§ 4). Though useful, they do not indicate a strong priority. Fourthly, the paper tries to analyze the EU’s limited progress so far and gather a few suggestions for improvement. One thing seems to remain useful: targets which can be defined in various ways (§ 5). Basically, all this indicates that the EU energy efficiency strategy has so far failed to reach its targets, lacks coherence and remains ambiguous. In the new Commission’s proposals of 22 January 2014 – intended to define a new climate/energy package in the period from 2020 to 2030 – the approach to energy efficiency remains unclear. This is regrettable. Energy efficiency is the only instrument which allows the EU to reach simultaneously its three targets: sustainability, competitiveness and security. The final conclusion appears thus paradoxical. On the one hand, all existing studies indicate that the decarbonization of the EU economy will be absolutely impossible without some very serious improvements in energy efficiency. On the other hand, in reality energy efficiency has always been treated as a second zone priority. It is imperative to eliminate this contradiction.
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Summary. For more than two decades, the development of renewable energy sources (RES) has been an important aim of EU energy policy. It accelerated with the adoption of a 1997 White Paper and the setting a decade later of a 20% renewable energy target, to be reached by 2020. The EU counts on renewable energy for multiple purposes: to diversify its energy supply; to increase its security of supply; and to create new industries, jobs, economic growth and export opportunities, while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many expectations rest on its development. Fossil fuels have been critical to the development of industrial nations, including EU Member States, which are now deeply reliant upon coal, oil and gas for nearly every aspect of their existence. Faced with some hard truths, however, the Member States have begun to shelve fossil fuel. These hard truths are as follows: firstly, fossil fuels are a finite resource, sometimes difficult to extract. This means that, at some point, fossil fuels are going to be more difficult to access in Europe or too expensive to use.1 The problem is that you cannot just stop using fossil fuels when they become too expensive; the existing infrastructure is profoundly reliant on fossil fuels. It is thus almost normal that a fierce resistance to change exists. Secondly, fossil fuels contribute to climate change. They emit GHG, which contribute greatly to climate change. As a consequence, their use needs to be drastically reduced. Thirdly, Member States are currently suffering a decline in their own fossil fuel production. This increases their dependence on increasingly costly fossil fuel imports from increasingly unstable countries. This problem is compounded by global developments: the growing share of emerging economies in global energy demand (in particular China and India but also the Middle East) and the development of unconventional oil and gas production in the United States. All these elements endanger the competitiveness of Member States’ economies and their security of supply. Therefore, new indigenous sources of energy and a diversification of energy suppliers and routes to convey energy need to be found. To solve all these challenges, in 2008 the EU put in place a strategy based on three objectives: sustainability (reduction of GHG), competitiveness and security of supply. The adoption of a renewable energy policy was considered essential for reaching these three strategic objectives. The adoption of the 20% renewable energy target has undeniably had a positive effect in the EU on the growth in renewables, with the result that renewable energy sources are steadily increasing their presence in the EU energy mix. They are now, it can be said, an integral part of the EU energy system. However, the necessity of reaching this 20% renewable energy target in 2020, combined with other circumstances, has also engendered in many Member States a certain number of difficulties, creating uncertainties for investors and postponing benefits for consumers. The electricity sector is the clearest example of this downside. Subsidies have become extremely abundant and vary from one Member State to another, compromising both fair competition and single market. Networks encountered many difficulties to develop and adapt. With technological progress these subsidies have also become quite excessive. The growing impact of renewable electricity fluctuations has made some traditional power plants unprofitable and created disincentives for new investments. The EU does clearly need to reassess its strategy. If it repeats the 2008 measures it will risk to provoke increased instability and costs.
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Retraining the labor force to match the demands of a modem economy is seen as an important task during the transition process from a centrally-planned to a market economy. This need was particularly pressing in East Germany, because the transition process has proceeded much faster than in the rest of Eastern Europe. Therefore, substantial resources have been devoted to this purpose. This paper analyzes the impact of continuous off-the-job training in East Germany from the point of view of individuals who were part of the labor force before German unification in 1990. It tries to answer questions about the average gains from participating in a specific type of training. Typical outcomes considered to measure those gains are income, employment status, job security, and expected future changes in job position. The methodology used for the evaluation is the potential outcome approach to causality. This approach has received considerable attention in the statistical literature over the last fifteen years and it has recently been rediscovered by the econometric literature as well. It is adapted to allow for important permanent and transitory shocks, such as unemployment, which influence the decision to participate in the training as well as future labor market outcomes. The empirical part is based on the first four waves of the Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)-East (1990-1993). This panel data set has the advantage that the fourth wave contains a special survey on continuous training and that it allows keeping track of individual behavior on a monthly, respectively yearly, basis. The econometric analysis focuses on off-the-job training courses that began after unification and were completed not later than in early 1993. Although it is obviously too early to evaluate the long-term implications, the results suggest that there are no positive effects in the short run.
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Through a case study of the diffusion of the celebrated West Gennan "dual system" of vocational training to the territory of the fonner German Democratic Republic, we develop the argument that local sociopolitical relations matter crucially for the successful transfer and implementation of institutional arrangements. Notwithstanding massive levels of government funding, the presence of complementary supports, and the concerted efforts of Germany's social partners, the dual system is experiencing significant difficulties in the new federal states of the East. These difficulties are not due simply to the particular politics of unification (the wholesale transfer of West German institutions whether or not they were appropriate to Eastern Germany) nor even simply to the paucity of dynamic private firms capable of and willing to train new apprentices. The difficulties stem also from the under lying weaknesses of the East German sociopolitical infrastructure on which the entire dual system rests. This. hy pothesis is elaborated and substantiated through a range of data on training in the East and especially through the use of detailed case studies of Leipzig and Chemrutz.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY All observers agree that energy efficiency must be the cornerstone of any serious EU energy strategy. In this general context, the EU building sector is critical. It represents about 40% of EU final energy consumption (residential houses, public/private offices, commercial buildings, etc.) and approximately 36% of EU CO2 emissions. This is massive. The EU has certainly not been inactive in this field. The Energy Performance in Buildings Directive 2002/91/EC (EPBD) was the first and the main instrument to address the problem of the energy performance of buildings. It has established numerous principles: a reliable methodology which enables the calculation and rating of the energy performance of buildings; minimum energy performance standards for new buildings and existing buildings under major renovation; energy performance certificates; regular inspection of heating and air-conditioning systems; and, finally, quality standards for inspections and energy performance certificates. They were strengthened in 2010 by the recast Directive 2010/31/EU. This directive also introduces a decisive concept for the development of the building sector: ‘nearly zeroenergy buildings’. In 2012, the new Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU dealt with other aspects. In the building sector, three of them are particularly important. They concern: (1) the establishment of long-term strategies for mobilizing investment in the renovation of the national building stocks; (2) the introduction of energy saving schemes for ‘designated’ energy companies with a view to reducing consumption among ‘final consumers’ by 1.5% annually; and (3), as an option, the setting up of an Energy Efficiency National Fund to support energy efficiency initiatives. This paper also briefly examines the different instruments put in place to disseminate information and consultation, and the EU funding for energy efficiency in buildings. Results, however, have remained limited until now. The improvement of the energy performance of buildings and the rhythm of renovation remain extremely weak. Member States’ unwillingness to timely and properly transpose and implement the Directives continues despite the high degree of flexibility permitted. The decentralized approach chosen for some specific aspects and the differentiation in the application of EPBD standards between Member States do not appear optimal either. Adequate financial schemes remain rare. The permanent deficit of qualified and trained personnel and the inertia of public authorities to make the public understand the stakes in this domain remain problematic. Hence the need to take new initiatives to reap the benefits that the building sector is meant to bring.
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“A first assessment is that this would not work”, EC Vice-President in charge of Energy Union Mr. Maros Sefcovic said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal at the World Economic Forum in Davos on the 22nd of January. He was commenting on the recent announcement by President Vladimir Putin and Gazprom’s Alexei Miller. Indeed, the Russian gas giant’s CEO announced that South Stream would be replaced by a new project, Turkish Stream, linking Russia to the European part of Turkey and this in addition to the existing 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) Blue stream. This policy brief looks at the various implications this new reality could have for Europe’s energy security.
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Introduction. This Policy Brief follows-up on the DIA-CORE Policy Brief on “Assessing costs and benefits of deploying renewables”, dated 26 September 2014, which highlighted the complexities in making a comprehensive and appropriate assessment of costs and benefits resulting from an increased use of renewable energy sources (RES). It distinguished the different types of effects into system-related effects, distributional effects and macro-economic effects, and looked at the related data requirements, which need to be comprehensive and standardised. This DIA-CORE Policy Brief uses the tools proposed in the previous Policy Brief to estimate the effects on Member States of reaching the EU-wide RES target of 27% of the EU’s energy consumption by 2030. This allows to draw some conclusions on the differentiated impacts across Member States, and the potential implications for an effort sharing approach. It also assesses whether a higher ambition level could be beneficial. The paper also takes into account the implications of national policy frameworks and highlights the importance of reforms to reduce the costs of RES adoption.