The long-term EU budget: size or flexibility? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/20, November 2012

The EU is in the process of negotiating its 2014-20 financial framework. Failure to reach an agreement would imply a delay in the preparation of the strategic plans each member state puts together to explain how it will use Structural and Cohesion Funds. Even if solutions are found – for example annual renewals of the budget based on the previous year's figures – there will be political and institutional costs. EU leaders have too often and too forcefully advocated the use of the EU budget for growth to be able to drop the idea without consequences. • The overwhelming attention paid to the size of the budget is misplaced. EU leaders should instead aim to make the EU budget more flexible, safeguard it from future political power struggles, and reinforce assessment of the impact of EU funded growth policies. • To improve flexibility a commitment device should be created that places the EU budget above continuous political disagreement. We suggest the creation of a European Growth Fund, on the basis of which the European Commission should be allowed to borrow on capital markets to anticipate pre-allocated EU expenditure, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. Markets would thus be a factor in EU budget policymaking, with a potentially disciplining effect. Attaching conditionality to this type of disbursement appears legitimate, as capital delivered in this way is a form of assistance.

Good governance of gender balance. CEPS Commentary, 16 November 2012

CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo observes in this CEPS Commentary that there is a compelling need to attract more women to positions of high responsibility in Europe in light of their demonstrated capacity to contribute significantly to the improvement of governance.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

The EU budget becomes politically more explosive. CEPS Commentary, 3 December 2012

H. Onno Ruding describes the negotiations on the EU budget, which will resume in 2013 following their collapse in late November, as “more awkward than usual”. In this new CEPS Commentary, he advises EU leaders to make the instrument more forward-looking in promoting economic growth in Europe and less focused on maintaining legacy entitlements of past years. In his view, this means more spending on research, innovation, education and infrastructure and also requires further reductions in the still-dominant agricultural subsidies as well as regional and structural funds.

The false promise of a eurozone budget. CEPS Commentary, 7 December 2012

n this new CEPS commentary, CEPS Director Daniel Gros takes a closer look at the US experience to point out that the federal budget provides much less insurance against state specific shocks than widely assumed, while the US Banking Union act as a very powerful shock absorber. Accordingly, he argues that the euro’s long-term stability depends far more on completing plans for a European banking union than on the introduction of a fiscal capacity for the eurozone.