Europe’s most wanted? Recalibrating Trust in the European Arrest Warrant System. CEPS Paper Liberty and Security in Europe 55/21 March 2013

This paper assesses the uses and misuses in the application of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system in the European Union. It examines the main quantitative results of this extradition system achieved between 2005 and 2011 on the basis of the existing statistical knowledge on its implementation at EU official levels. The EAW has been anchored in a high level of ‘mutual trust’ between the participating states’ criminal justice regimes and authorities. This reciprocal confidence, however, has been subject to an increasing number of challenges resulting from its practical application, presenting a dual conundrum: 1. Principle of proportionality: Who are the competent judicial authorities cooperating with each other and ensuring that there are sufficient impartial controls over the necessity and proportionality of the decisions on the issuing and execution of EAWs? 2. Principle of division of powers: How can criminal justice authorities be expected to handle different criminal judicial traditions in what is supposed to constitute a ‘serious’ or ‘minor’ crime in their respective legal settings and ‘who’ is ultimately to determine (divorced from political considerations) when is it duly justified to make the EAW system operational? It is argued that the next generation of the EU’s criminal justice cooperation and the EAW need to recognise and acknowledge that the mutual trust premise upon which the European system has been built so far is no longer viable without devising new EU policy stakeholders’ structures and evaluation mechanisms. These should allow for the recalibration of mutual trust and mistrust in EU justice systems in light of the experiences of the criminal justice actors and practitioners having a stake in putting the EAW into daily effect. Such a ‘bottom-up approach’ should be backed up with the best impartial and objective evaluation, an improved system of statistical collection and an independent qualitative assessment of its implementation. This should be placed as the central axis of a renewed EAW framework which should seek to better ensure the accountability, impartial (EU-led) scrutiny and transparency of member states’ application of the EAW in light of the general principles and fundamental rights constituting the foundations of the European system of criminal justice cooperation.

E3+3 coercive diplomacy towards Iran: Do the economic sanctions add up? CEPS Policy Brief No. 292, 6 June 2013

More than ten years of international negotiations have brought no resolution to the nuclear dispute with Iran. In January 2012 the EU and US autonomously adopted an unprecedented sanctions package, mainly directed at the Iranian oil industry. Eighteen months later, figures show that the Iranian economy has been hit hard. Sanctions have not changed the regime’s calculus, however. Instead of further upping the pressure on Iran, the authors argue for a return to a more balanced dual-track approach so as to reinforce the moderate narrative within the Iranian ruling elite.

Armanents duplication in Europe: a quantitative assessment. CEPS Policy Brief No. 297, 16 July 2013 [is another Brief with no. 297]

Effectively addressing the issue of duplication in Europe’s defence systems will require a considerable amount of political will and, more importantly, a far-sighted vision of the way to go. Difficult choices will have to be made, and EU member states will have to invest in a complex exercise of coordination of defence and industrial policies and planning. However, the efficient management of EU defence budgets and the maintenance of a viable industrial base demand such efforts. After all, what is at stake is the EU’s ability to guarantee its own security. The author makes a series of proposals to address this issue ahead of the European Council of December 2013, which will be devoted to matters of security and defence.

The European Union’s Rule of Law Promotion in its Neighbourhood: A Structural Foreign Policy Analysis. EU Diplomacy Paper 04/2013

The promotion of the rule of law has become an important dimension of the European Union’s relations towards its neighbourhood. The rule of law is, however, a complex and multifaceted notion and the EU’s rule of law promotion policy has often been criticised for being either inefficient or self-interested. This collection of short papers offers an analysis of various case studies using the analytical framework of structural foreign policy (SFP) developed by Stephan Keukeleire. It aims to promote an original analytical perspective on the EU’s foreign policy but also to critically test and further develop the SFP analytical framework. The contributions of this collection consist of the shortened version of students’ Master’s theses written at the College of Europe during the academic year 2011-2012 in the framework of the course “The EU as a Foreign Policy Actor” taught by Stephan Keukeleire, Chairholder of the TOTAL Chair of EU Foreign Policy in the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies.

Net Neutrality and Mandatory Network-Sharing: How to disconnect the continent. CEPS Policy Brief No. 309, 18 December 2013

A lively debate emerged on the proposed “Connected Continent” legislative package presented by the European Commission in September 2013. The package contains a proposed rule on the ‘open Internet’, which was heavily discussed in European Parliament hearings in early December. This commentary argues that while the proposed rule is in principle balanced and appealing, it is utterly impractical due to the enormous uncertainty that its application would entail. At the same time, the rule is very far from what neutrality proponents have argued for almost a decade: rather than the place for internet freedom, it would transform the Web into a place requiring constant micro-management and tutoring of user behaviour. Both arguments lead to the conclusion that the current proposal should be at once reformed and analysed under a more holistic lens. On the one hand, Europe should launch an ambitious project for the future, converged infrastructure by mobilising resources and reforming rules to encourage investment into ubiquitous, converged, ‘always on’ connectivity. On the other hand, enhanced legal certainty for broadband investment could justify a more neutrality-oriented approach to traffic management practices on the Internet. The author proposes a new approach to Internet regulation which, altogether, will lead to a more balanced and sustainable model for the future, without jeopardising user freedom.

The European Union and the Arms Trade Treaty: An Analysis of the EU’s Effectiveness in Multilateral Security Governance. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 3/2013

This paper examines the participation of the European Union (EU) in the multilateral negotiations of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Given the EU’s declared commitment to effective multilateralism and dedication to act as a global security provider, the paper analyses to what extent the EU can be seen as an effective actor in supporting and promoting the ATT. It is argued that overall the EU was an effective player during the multilateral negotiations on the ATT, but the degree of its effectiveness varied along different dimensions. The EU was relatively successful in the achievement of its goals and in maintaining external cohesion during the negotiations, but it scored relatively low in its efforts to commit other major players to sign up to the ATT. The high level of institutional cooperation and the convergence of EU member states’ interests facilitated the EU’s effectiveness in the ATT negotiations, whereas the international context proved to be the major constraining factor.

National Visions of EU Defence Policy - Common Denominators and Misunderstandings. CEPS Paperbacks. December 2013

The premise of this study is simple: before discussing what defence strategy the EU should adopt at Brussels-level, member states should clarify what they expect individually from the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Inspired by the confusion about EU defence policy in most European capitals, this authoritative study inverts the usual analytical approach applied to the debate on European strategy. Rather than initiating the enquiry from the perspective of common interests guiding CSDP, it analyses how seven prominent member states see CSDP as a tool to pursue their strictly national interests. Five researchers immersed themselves in the foreign policy worlds of Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Stockholm and Madrid, looking at CSDP through national lenses and away from the potentially distorting influence of ‘Brussels’ rhetoric.

An Arab Springboard for EU Foreign Policy? CEPS Paperbacks. January 2012

The EU has not been perceived as reacting very rapidly or effectively to the so-called Arab Spring. Events do appear to validate the idea underpinning the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): only where governments guarantee to their citizens security, prosperity, freedom and equality, can peace and stability last – otherwise, people will revolt. But in practice, in its southern neighbourhood the EU has acted in precisely the opposite manner, so the Arab Spring is occurring in spite of rather than thanks to EU policy. The ENP stands at a crossroads therefore: Can a new start be made? Which instruments and, in times of austerity, which means can the EU apply to consolidate democratization? And, finally, can the EU continue to wage an ENP without addressing the hard security dimension, especially as the US seem to be withdrawing from crisis management in the region – or shall it continue to leave that to others?

Common Security and Defence in 2014: Revise and resubmit. CEPS Commentaries, 27 March 2014

The conclusions of the December 2013 European Council on defence sounded like a ‘revise and resubmit’ recommendation for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). That outcome was not too disappointing in itself, because precise technical guidelines were provided to revamp Europe’s defence, with good prospects of real progress. But it was not too ambitious either, as a clear indication of Europe’s future role in global security was in effect postponed until 2015, thus requiring ‘resubmission’ at a later date. Furthermore, member states did not seem particularly committed to reaching a formal agreement on a common strategic narrative; a sign that the governance gap continues to affect CSDP. Giovanni Faleg asks whether the European Council on defence marked the twilight of CSDP, or whether we will now see a new phase of cooperation, characterised by escalating external pressures in the southern neighbourhood and a resurgent Russian threat in the east.

Historic turning point or just another chapter? The results of a foreign-policy summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 24 March 2014

The March 2014 European Council could enter the history books as a turning point, not only in the EU’s relations with Russia but also in its role as a foreign policy actor. Events in Ukraine inevitably dominated the Summit, with EU leaders adopting a balanced approach aimed at achieving three key objectives – de-escalation, containment/deterrence and cooperation – based on political and economic support for Ukraine, increased but limited pressure on Russia, and moves to strengthen ties with other EU neighbours. The Summit also discussed a range of economic and environmental policy issues, with the situation in Ukraine casting a long shadow over the discussion on energy policy, but failed to reach agreement on the EU’s climate goals to 2030, or to put more flesh on the bones of calls for a European “industrial renaissance”. However, two other developments were particularly significant: the creation of the second pillar of the future banking union, establishing a single regime for winding down failing banks; and changes to the savings tax directive, bringing years of negotiation to an end.

The European Union Maritime Security Strategy: sailing uncharted waters? EPC Commentary, 26 June 2014

On 24 June 2014 the General Affairs Council of the European Union approved the “European Union Maritime Security Strategy” (EUMSS), following the mandate by EU Heads of State or Government in their ‘Defence Summit’ last December and building on the Joint Communication “For An Open and Secure Global Maritime Domain” by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in early March. These documents come at a time of considerable transformations in ‘the world’s last global common’: the sea.

Hostages to Moscow, clients of Beijing. Security in Central Asia as the role of the West diminishes. OSW Study 10/2014

The goal of this publication is to attempt to assess the thirteen years (2001- -2014) of the West’s military presence in the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia, closely associated with the ISAF and OEF-A (Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan) missions in Afghanistan. There will also be an analysis of the actual challenges for the region’s stability after 2014. The current and future security architecture in Central Asia will also be looked at closely, as will the actual capabilities to counteract the most serious threats within its framework. The need to separately handle the security system in Central Asia and security as such is dictated by the particularities of political situation in the region, the key mechanism of which is geopolitics understood as global superpower rivalry for influence with a secondary or even instrumental role of the five regional states, while ignoring their internal problems. Such an approach is especially present in Russia’s perception of Central Asia, as it views security issues in geopolitical categories. Because of this, security analysis in the Central Asian region requires a broader geopolitical context, which was taken into account in this publication. The first part investigates the impact of the Western (primarily US) military and political presence on the region’s geopolitical architecture between 2001 and 2014. The second chapter is an attempt to take an objective look at the real challenges to regional security after the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan, while the third chapter is dedicated to analysing the probable course of events in the security dimension following 2014. The accuracy of predictions time-wise included in the below publication does not exceed three to five years due to the dynamic developments in Central Asia and its immediate vicinity (the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran), and because of the large degree of unpredictability of policies of one of the key regional actors – Russia (both in the terms of its activity on the international arena, and its internal developments).

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Foreign policy at the service of modernisation: old wine in a new wineskin. OSW Commentary No. 39, 2010-08-31

Russia’s contacts with the external world over the past year have been characterised by a gradual improvement in its relations with the West, as well as the use of non-confrontational rhetoric, the most far-reaching example of which was the address President Dmitri Medvedev gave to Russian ambassadors this July. In an attempt to harmonise foreign policy with the widely propagated programme for the modernisation of Russia1 President Medvedev presented a vision of the Russian Federation as a responsible global power which is open to co-operation. According to this vision, Russian foreign policy would help to attract foreign investments and technologies. The West was presented as a partner, not a rival. Both this rhetoric and the atmosphere of co-operation in relations with the USA and the EU contrast with the assertive and aggressive Russian policy which was symbolised by and culminated in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008. The changes observed in Russian foreign policy are quite limited, and are not constructing a new external strategy. Those changes are rather an attempt to find more efficient ways to implement old strategic goals. The new image of a responsible global power is inconsistent, and Russian policy is still assertive and geopolitically motivated. Although a new rhetoric is really in place, the Russian political elite’s perception of their country’s place and role in the contemporary international order remains unchanged. Moscow’s readiness to become engaged in genuine co-operation with the West has not increased significantly; it is still to a great extent declarative in nature.

European Neighbourhood Policy Package - Conclusions for the Eastern Partners. OSW Commentary No. 78, 2012-05-25

In 2011 the European Union began a process aimed at reforming its policy on the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. The change in circumstances in neighbouring countries following the Arab Spring, along with the lack of significant progress regarding Eastern Europe’s integration with the EU, formed the main driving force behind this process. The prime objective of the changes to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was the need to introduce new incentives for partner countries to modernise and integrate more closely with the EU Another aim was to increase the flexibility of EU instruments (by adapting them to the specific context of each partner state). One year later, on 15 May 2012, the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published the European Neighbourhood Policy Package which reported on the progress made in the implementation of the ENP over the preceding year and set out the aims and Action Plans for 20131. An analysis of the outcomes of changes made to the EU policy towards Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus suggests that the aim of the revision was aimed more at addressing the changing political landscape in the region rather than at the implementation of a substantial reform of the neighbourhood policy. The ENP is largely based on bureaucratic procedures (the negotiation of bilateral agreements, the implementation of support programmes). These have only a limited capacity to bring about lasting change in the region, as has been exemplified by the deterioration of democratic standards in a number of countries; this was highlighted in EU’s own reports. This problem is particularly clear in the case of Ukraine; until recently it was seen as the leader of European integration but is now raising much concern due to a deterioration in the state of democracy there. EU instruments have a limited influence on the situation in Eastern Partnership countries and the region’s significance on the EU’s agenda is falling (the priority is now given to counteracting the economic crisis, and prominence in the neighbourhood policy has been given to the Southern Mediterranean). In response to this EU policy on Eastern Europe will focus to a larger extent on technical and sectoral cooperation.