Germany on Russia. Yes to links, no to rapprochement. OSW Point of View Number 39, March 2014

The German media have been correctly describing the atmosphere between the Chancellor's Office and the Kremlin as the chilliest in years. Various factors have laid bare the fact that the strategic partnership between Germany and Russia is at best currently undergoing a 'technical pause’: the underwhelming outcomes of the German-Russian intergovernmental consultations in the autumn of 2012 and of Chancellor Merkel's meeting with President Putin during the Hanover fair in the spring of 2013, as well as the way in which the EU dealt with the Cyprus debt issue and, finally, the support that Germany has extended to the anti-presidential protests in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the priorities of Germany's foreign and economic policy have changed considerably, not only as a result of the eurozone crisis, but also, even more importantly, because the attention of German business and politics has been shifting to the so-called neue Gestaltungsmächte, or new regional powers. German politicians increasingly believe that Russia should not be offered new methods or mechanisms of co-operation. Firstly, because the existing ones have not been fully utilised, and secondly, because Germany at this stage seems to have no idea of what the long-term strategy of co-operation with Putin's Russia should be.

The Dilemmas of Diffusion: Institutional Transfer & the Remaking of Vocational Training Practices in Eastern Germany, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.10, 1996

Through a case study of the diffusion of the celebrated West Gennan "dual system" of vocational training to the territory of the fonner German Democratic Republic, we develop the argument that local sociopolitical relations matter crucially for the successful transfer and implementation of institutional arrangements. Notwithstanding massive levels of government funding, the presence of complementary supports, and the concerted efforts of Ger­many's social partners, the dual system is experiencing significant difficulties in the new federal states of the East. These difficulties are not due simply to the particular politics of unification (the wholesale transfer of West German institutions whether or not they were appropriate to Eastern Germany) nor even simply to the paucity of dynamic private firms capable of and willing to train new apprentices. The difficulties stem also from the under­ lying weaknesses of the East German sociopolitical infrastructure on which the entire dual system rests. This. hy­ pothesis is elaborated and substantiated through a range of data on training in the East and especially through the use of detailed case studies of Leipzig and Chemrutz.

The Visegrad group and Germany: towards a new paradigm. CEPS Commentary, 28 November 2013

In surveying the strategic realignment now underway in Central Europe among the four members of the Visegrad Group, Michal Simecka observes in a new CEPS Commentary that it is hard to think of another point in modern history that permitted a scenario of Germany and its eastern neighbours working together to constructively shape Europe.

One country, two societies? Germany twenty years after reunification. OSW Study 35/2011

3 October 2010 marked the twentieth anniversary of the reunification of the two German states. This is an occasion for summing up and evaluating the changes which have taken place in Germany since 1990. Germany became reunited through the incorporation of the East German federal states to the then Federal Republic of Germany. The West German point of view is predominant in public discourse regarding this issue, which is manifested through grading the new federal states for their progress in assimilation to the western part of Germany. However, this way the positive changes which have taken place in the social, political and economic areas in the eastern federal states over the past two decades are often disregarded. This paper is an attempt to show the changes which have taken place in Germany, involving areas in which new federal states have outperformed the western part of the country.

Forerunners or scaremongers? Germany to abandon nuclear power. OSW Commentary No. 58, 2011-07-21

The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.