It has only just begun: EU and anticorruption institutions in Moldova. EPC Policy Brief, 1 August 2014

The Republic of Moldova recently signed the Association Agreement with the EU, closely followed by a detailed Association Agenda, which comes with concrete steps and conditionalities in the future dialogue between Chisinau and Brussels. The current paper discusses the most recent evolutions of the anticorruption institutions in Moldova, which owe a lot to EU`s influence. We pay specific attention to the justice reforms chapters in the Agenda and we conclude with recommendations for the EU to continue to pay attention to corruption in Moldova, but address it in a more coherent manner.

Differentiated Europe needs strong institutions. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

Differentiated Europe can be analysed in terms of the three meta-challenges outlined in this publication – stagnation, fragmentation and legitimacy. My argument is simple: stagnation or the prospect of it has been a catalyst for differentiation, fragmentation poses a risk of differentiation gone too far and legitimacy of differentiation is embedded on institutional cohesion and good results.

Do we need a resolution fund paid for by financial institutions? EuropEos Commentary No. 2, 17 May 2010

In this EuropEos Commentary, Stefano Micossi reviews recent efforts to build a stronger and more coherent regulatory system for financial markets and finds the idea of a resolution fund at best a distraction, and at worst a harbinger of renewed financial instability.

Do agricultural subsidies crowd out or stimulate rural credit institutions? The Case of CAP Payments. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 4, September 2011

In this paper we estimate the impact of subsidies from the EU’s common agricultural policy on farm bank loans. According to the theoretical results, if subsidies are paid at the beginning of the growing season they may reduce bank loans, whereas if they are paid at the end of the season they increase bank loans, but these results are conditional on whether farms are credit constrained and on the relative cost of internal and external financing. In the empirical analysis, we use farm-level panel data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network to test the theoretical predictions for the period 1995–2007. We employ fixed-effects and generalised method of moment models to estimate the impact of subsidies on farm loans. The results suggest that subsidies influence farm loans and the effects tend to be non-linear and indirect. The results also indicate that both coupled and decoupled subsidies stimulate long-term loans, but the long-term loans of large farms increase more than those of small farms, owing to decoupled subsidies. Furthermore, the results imply that short-term loans are affected only by decoupled subsidies, and they are altered by decoupled subsidies more for small farms than for large farms; however, when controlling for endogeneity, only the decoupled payments affect loans and the relationship is non-linear.

Agricultural Credit Market Institutions: A Comparison of Selected European Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 33, January 2013

This paper describes and compares the institutional framework of the agricultural credit markets in selected European countries. The institutions can be both formal (rules, regulations, authorities and actors) and informal (norms, values and relations). They also interact and in situations where the formal institutions are weak, the informal ones increase in importance. The study is based on a questionnaire sent to agricultural financial experts in selected countries. The case studies show that credit regulations are typically general, with no specific regulations for the agricultural credit market. On the other hand, several countries support agricultural credit in various forms, implying that the governments do not perceive the general credit market to function in the case of agricultural firms. In a risk assessment, the most frequent reasons for rejecting a loan application are all linked to economic performance and the situation of the farmer. Personal characteristics, such as educational level or lack of experience, were generally perceived as less influential. Another interesting point when it comes to risk assessment is that in some countries the importance of asset-based lending compared with cash flow-based lending seems to differ when concerning a first-time applicant and when there is an application to extend a loan. To get an idea of the availability of credit, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was calculated, and it showed remarkably low values for Poland and Slovakia. For all the countries, the calculated value was lower than what the financial experts would have expected. This might imply credit rationing in agriculture in some of the countries studied. The financial experts all judged the possibility of an agricultural firm obtaining a loan as higher than that for other small rural firms, implying that the latter are also credit-rationed.

(EU) friends: NGO cooperation and involvement across multi-level policy processes. IES Working Paper 1/2007

A growing body of research focuses on the expanding roles of NGOs in global and supranational governance. The research emphasizes the increasing number of participation patterns of NGOs in policymaking and cross-national cooperation. It has produced important insights into the evolving political role of NGOs and their growing involvement in governance. The focus on activities at a transnational level has, however, lead to the virtual exclusion of research on other levels of governance. It has not been possible to tell whether the locus of their political activity is shifting from the national to the transnational environment, or whether it is simply broadening. Missing from the literature is an examination of the variety of cooperative relationships, including those between NGOs, which impact policy involvement across different levels of governance. To bridge this gap, I address two key questions: 1) Is the strategy of cooperation among NGOs a common feature of social movement activity across levels of governance, and if so, what does the structure of cooperation look like? 2) What impact, if any, does cooperation have on the expanding political involvement of NGOS, both within and across levels of governance? Using data from an original survey of migrant and refugee organizations across much of Europe, I test several hypotheses that shed light on these issues. The findings broadly indicate that 1) Cooperation is a widely-used strategy across levels of governance, 2) Cooperation with specific sets of actors increases the likelihood of NGO involvement at different levels of governance. Specifically, cooperation with EU-level actors increases the likelihood of national-level involvement, and 3) NGOs are more likely to extend their involvement across a range of institutions if they cooperate with a broad range of actors.

Closing financial institutions on both sides of the Atlantic: Are there differences in approach? CEPS Commentary, 25 February 2015

In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis both the EU and the US have implemented resolution procedures for their largest and most systemic financial institutions. This Commentary examines the main differences between the two frameworks. The EU framework allows, inter alia, action to prevent the failure of a credit institution, while the US regulatory framework requires that all systemic banks subject to resolution must be closed and resolved. The greater flexibility under the EU resolution framework allows action to be taken to preserve a credit institution without putting it through an insolvency process, which makes limiting moral hazard less obvious. Moreover, the scope of the EU framework is still narrow, since it does not allow the recovery of non-bank financial institutions, whereas the US framework does.

The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European Union. College of Europe Research Paper in Law 01/2014

Introduction. The European Union’s external action is not only defined by its influence on international developments, but also by its ability and the need to respond to those developments. While traditionally many have stressed the EU’s ‘autonomy’, over the years its ‘dependence’ on global developments has become more clear.2 International law has continued to play a key role in, not only in the EU’s external relations, but also in the Union’s own legal order.3 The purpose of this paper is not to assess the role or performance of the EU in international institutions.4 Rather it purports to reverse the picture and focus on a somewhat under-researched topic: the legal status of decisions of international organizations in the EU’s legal order.5 While parts of the status of these decisions relate to the status of international agreements and international customary law, it can be argued that decisions of international organizations and other international bodies form a distinct category. In fact, it has been observed that “this phenomenon has added a new layer of complexity to the already complex law of external relations of the European Union”.6 Emerging questions relate to the possible difference between decisions of international organizations of which the EU is a member (such as the FAO) and decisions of organizations where it is not (irrespective of existing competences in that area – such as in the ILO). Questions also relate to the hierarchical status of these decisions in the EU’s legal order and to the possibility of them being invoked in direct or indirect actions before the Court of Justice. This contribution takes a broad perspective on decisions of international organizations by including decisions taken in other international institutions which do not necessarily comply with the standard definition of international organizations,7 be it bodies set-up by multilateral conventions or informal (transnational / regulatory) bodies. Some of these bodies are relatively close to the EU (such as the Councils established by Association Agreements – see further Section 5 below); others operate at a certain distance. Limiting the analysis to formal international organizations will not do justice to the manifold relationships between the European Union and various international bodies and to the effects of the norms produced by these bodies. The term ‘international decisions’ is therefore used to refer to any normative output of international institutional arrangements.