Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers in Law, 7/2006

From the Introduction. The Media Sector has experienced a technological revolution in the last 15 years. Digital encoding of television signals made possible a more efficient use of the radiospectrum. Digital terrestrial television (hereinafter, “DTT”) allows now for the reception of a significant number of free-to-air channels.1 Moreover, the use of new transmission platforms (hereinafter,“platforms”), namely cable and direct-to-home satellite (hereinafter, “DTH”) paved the way for the arrival in Europe of pay-TV operators, which finance their activities mainly via subscription fees. This changing technological landscape is subject to further evolution in the near future, as incumbent telecommunications operators become increasingly interested in making available broadcasting content2 as part of their broadband offer and 3G mobile handsets can be used for the reception of TV signals....The present paper seeks to ascertain whether the Commission “regulatory approach” towards the exclusive sale of premium content is a sound one, in particular in view of the constant technological evolution outlined above. The assumptions underlying landmark Commission decisions will be compared with recent developments of the media sector in Italy. In the NewsCorp./Telepiù case, decided in 2003, the Commission imposed very strict conditions to allow the merger giving birth to Sky Italia, on the assumption that the operation created a lasting near-monopsony in the different upstream markets for the acquisition of premium intervened against the media conglomerate Mediaset (which controls, inter alia, the main three private free-to-air channels in Italy) for an alleged abuse of dominant position.17 In fact, and contrary to the forecasts made by the Commission, Mediaset was in a position to acquire the broadcasting rights of the main Italian football teams, thereby excluding the incumbent (and near-monopolist) pay-TV operator, Sky Italia. This may go to show that the reality of the sector is more complex and evolves faster than one may infer from the Commission practice, thus putting into question its stance regarding exclusivity. The experience of the evolution of the Italian media sector will be used as the starting point for the evaluation of alternative regulatory options.

Geographic Scope Under Conditions Of Confined And Connected Change: The Case Of Telefónica (Spain). ACES Working Papers, 2012

Traditional explanations of MNE geographic scope formation fit somewhat uncomfortably with recent empirical and theoretical work in IB that suggests (1) that wholesale (not just gradual) changes in MNE geographic scope may be more frequent than previously thought, and (2) that managers’ responses to a world increasingly characterized by random, unpredictable change are more experimental and less optimizing in nature than assumed in most models of international expansion. In this paper we draw from studies portraying industries as dynamic networks, and from the literature on managerial cognition to provide a complementary explanation of the evolution of MNE geographic scope that reconciles the insights of traditional IB models with the questions raised by more recent studies in this field. We illustrate the proposed model through a detailed account of the internationalization process of Telefonica, the Spanish telecommunications company.

Knowledge-Bearing Elites and Industrial Performance in France and Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.5, December 1993

Most comparative studies of public policies for competitiveness focus on the links among public agencies and industrial sectors. This paper argues that the professions---or knowledge-bearing elites-that animate these organizational links are equally significant. For public policies to promote technological advance, the visions and self-images of knowledge-bearing elites are par­ ticularly important. By examining administrative and technical elites in France and Germany in the 1980s, the paper identifies characteristics that enable these elites to implement policy in some cases, but not in others. France's "state-created" elites were well-positioned to initiate and implement large technology projects, such as digitizing the telecommunications network. Germany's state-recognized elites were, by contrast, better positioned to facilitate framework­ oriented programs that aimed at the diffusion of new technologies throughout industry. The linkages among administrative and technical elites also explain why French policymakers had difficulty adapting policy to changing circumstances over time while German policymakers managed in many cases to learn more from previous policy experiences and to adapt subsequent initiatives accordingly.

Addressing fragmentation in EU mobile telecom markets. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/13, July 2015

- Mobile telecommunications markets are an important part of the European Commission’s strategy for the completion of the European Union Digital Single. The use of mobile telecommunications – particularly mobile data access – is growing and becoming an increasingly important input for the economy. - The EU currently does not have a unified mobile telecommunications market. The EU compares favourably to the United States in terms of prices and connection speed, but lags behind in terms of coverage of high-speed 4G wireless connections. -Europe’s long-term goal should be to make data access easier by increasing highspeed wireless coverage while keeping prices down for users. An increase in cross-border competition could help to achieve that goal. - The Commission has two important levers to help stimulate cross-border supply:(a) ensuring competition in intra-country mobile markets in order to provide an incentive for operators to expand into other jurisdictions, and (b) reducing mobile operators’ costs of expansion into multiple EU countries. The further development of policies on international roaming and radio spectrum management will be central to this effort.

Why is Europe lagging on next generation access networks? Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/14, September 2015

Why is Europe lagging on next generation access networks? Fibre-based next generation access (NGA) roll-out across the European Union is one of the goals of the European Commission’s Digital Agenda strategy, however, there remains considerable uncertainty about how the roll-out goal can best be achieved. The underlying differences between the economics of copper-based and new fibre-based broadband infrastructures should lead to a revision of the regulatory framework for telecommunications markets. While the current regulatory measures have been useful in the past decade to sustain competition and facilitate entry into a market with already-existing infrastructures, the need to create new, much faster broadband networks calls for a rethink of the scope and strictness of regulation.

Separatism, Globalization, and the European Union. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 1, February 2015

Globalization is both an integrative and deconstructive process. Globalization integrates states and non-state actors into transnational and global networks (Keohane & Nye, 2000, p. 105). These networks are based on multiple channels of interdependence that include trade, politics, security, environment, and socio-cultural ties (pp. 106-107). Due to advances in telecommunications technology, the expansion of globalization “shrinks” the distance between peoples (p. 105). On the other hand, globalization can also break up the existing political and social order (Mathews, 1997, p. 50). Globalization disperses power and information flows, thus enabling local and transnational identity movements to challenge states (pp. 51-52). This can be exemplified by separatist movements that seek to break away from central authorities.

E-commerce in Europe: parcel delivery prices in a digital single market. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/09 May 2016

Highlights • In its Digital Single Market strategy, the European Commission has rightly noted the importance of reducing the price paid for basic cross-border parcel delivery by consumers and by small and medium size retail senders. • The payment flows for cross-border parcel delivery are strikingly similar to those for telecommunications. Comparisons with roaming can be instructive. As with roaming, it is clear that the links between wholesale payments between the national postal operators and retail prices need to be properly understood in order to craft good policy. Another useful lesson is that national postal regulatory authorities are unlikely to address cross-border problems because of limitations in their respective mandates and because they have no incentive to take measures to benefit residents of other countries. • There are also significant differences between roaming and parcel delivery.While high wholesale charges were a major driver of high retail prices for international mobile roaming, the wholesale payments for cross-border parcel delivery appear to be below cost.This implies that it is the ‘spread’ between retail price and thewholesale payment that is inflated, at least for small retail senders and for consumers. • Comprehensive statistics gathering, coordinated at European level, is indispensable.