EU's sanctions against Russia - The need for clear goals (Comments on the 20-21 March Council). EPC Commentary, 21 March 2014

Over the last two decades, the European Union (EU) has increasingly relied on the use of restrictive measures in its external action. The EU has shown itself to be more open to the possibility of resorting to sanctions outside the United Nations, as well as in cooperation with other international actors, such as the United States. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has blocked and is expected to block any efforts of using this international body to address the crisis in Ukraine so the EU cannot hope for a global sanctions regime and is forced to use a unilateral sanctions regime, in cooperation with some other like-minded players (US, Canada, Australia, Japan).

Russia goes on the offensive ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. OSW Commentary No. 115, 30.09.2013

In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.

A feigned liberalisation: Russia is restricting Gazprom's monopoly on exports. OSW Commentary No. 121, 26.11.2013

An act restricting Gazprom’s monopoly in Russian gas exports came into effect on 1 December 2013. Previously Gazprom had had a legal guarantee to its monopoly position. The changes are an effect of consultations between various ministries that had been conducted for many months and were affected by lobbying from Novatek and Rosneft (Gazprom’s competitors on the domestic gas market); they need not, though, be seen as system changes. The ‘liberalisation’ they appear to bring in is feigned. Proof of this are found for example in both the limited material scope of the new law (it concerns only exports of liquefied natural gas, LNG) and the small number of the beneficiaries of the new regulations (the new solutions will be beneficial for Novatek and Rosneft). Contrary to initial announcements, the right to export LNG has not been restricted to South-Eastern Asian markets, which means that Russian liquefied natural gas is also likely to be sold to Europe in the coming years. Although these changes have been motivated above all by the individual interests of Gazprom’s competitors, they are also to a certain extent a response to the processes taking place on regional gas markets. They may, therefore, turn out to be beneficial for the state (increasing Russia’s share on the global LNG market and attracting foreign investors to gas extraction projects being implemented in Russia). The new regulations are probably the first step down the long road to breaking Gazprom’s monopoly in gas exports via the pipeline system.

Kazakhstan's attitude towards integration with Russia: less love, more fear. OSW Commentary No. 137, 29.05.2014

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine have created a new context for Kazakhstan’s foreign and domestic policy. The ongoing crisis in the relations with Russia and the West has also changed the current order in the entire post-Soviet area. From Astana’s perspective, the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine can be considered dangerous since it shows Russia’s determination to interfere with the domestic affairs of its neighbours in the pursuit of its own interests. Furthermore, this policy reveals and raises the price a country needs to pay for its potential attempts to break free from the Russian zone of influence. At present the biggest challenge for the authorities in Astana is the accelerated implementation of the idea of the Eurasian Union promoted by Moscow, which is to be another stage in the integration of post-Soviet states (presently Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus). The signing of the Eurasian Union’s founding documents planned for late May 2014 and the launch of this organisation (scheduled for January 2015) is sure to bring Kazakhstan closer to Russia and simultaneously limit its economic and political independence. Nevertheless, Astana’s position in relations with Moscow will to a large extent depend on the new shape of the relations between Russia and China. China is pursuing its own strategic interests in Central Asia (including in the energy sector) and its main partner in the region is Kazakhstan. At the domestic level, Russia’s actions in Ukraine made the authorities in Astana fear that measures similar to those used in Ukraine could be applied towards Kazakhstan. On the one hand this has led to increased efforts aimed at consolidating the state and strengthening its structures, and on the other hand it has brought about a revision of those aspects of domestic policy which Russia could interpret as a pretext for interfering.

Crimean Tatars after Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. OSW Commentary No. 141, 30.06.2014

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a modus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficulties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars.

A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia. OSW Commentary No. 143, 29.07.2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.

Germany on Russia. Yes to links, no to rapprochement. OSW Point of View Number 39, March 2014

The German media have been correctly describing the atmosphere between the Chancellor's Office and the Kremlin as the chilliest in years. Various factors have laid bare the fact that the strategic partnership between Germany and Russia is at best currently undergoing a 'technical pause’: the underwhelming outcomes of the German-Russian intergovernmental consultations in the autumn of 2012 and of Chancellor Merkel's meeting with President Putin during the Hanover fair in the spring of 2013, as well as the way in which the EU dealt with the Cyprus debt issue and, finally, the support that Germany has extended to the anti-presidential protests in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the priorities of Germany's foreign and economic policy have changed considerably, not only as a result of the eurozone crisis, but also, even more importantly, because the attention of German business and politics has been shifting to the so-called neue Gestaltungsmächte, or new regional powers. German politicians increasingly believe that Russia should not be offered new methods or mechanisms of co-operation. Firstly, because the existing ones have not been fully utilised, and secondly, because Germany at this stage seems to have no idea of what the long-term strategy of co-operation with Putin's Russia should be.

Security of Russian gas supplies to the EU - the question of infrastrucutral connections. OSW Point of View, February 2005

The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas. The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.

The ENP in practice - the European Union's policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova one year after the publication of the Strategy Paper. OSW Point of View, June 2005

Clear qualitative changes have taken place in relations between the European Union and its Eastern neighbours over the past year. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been playing a significant part in the context of these changes. In the cases of Moldova and Ukraine, which are the countries interested in enhancing co-operation with the EU, the ENP has provided a formula that allows taking steps to implement this objective. The ENP has also contributed to "outlining an alternative" to Belarus' current self-isolation. However, the ENP has first of all given a clear message to Russia by specifying the EU's interests and objectives concerning Eastern Europe. The ENP has clearly stated that the EU wants to build democracy and a free market in those countries, and has signalled that the European Union intends to discuss the issues concerning the countries directly with them, and not through Moscow's offices.

Eastern Policy of the EU: the Visegrad Countries' Perspective. OSW Point of View, February 2003

1. After its enlargement, scheduled for 2004, the European Union will face a completely new situation at its eastern borders. This new situation calls for a new concept of the EU eastern activities, i.e. for development of the new Eastern Policy of the EU. 2. Due to a number of specific features such as geographical location, closeness of ties, direct risk factors etc., the Visegrad countries will and should be particularly interested in the process of formulating the new EU Eastern Policy. Consequently, they should be the co-makers of this policy. 3. The new EU Eastern Policy should differ fundamentally from the Union's traditional eastern relations. Firstly, its scope should not cover the entire CIS area: instead, the policy should focus on some of the European successor states of the former Soviet Union, namely Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, following the accession of Romania. It does not seem advisable to exclude the Russian Federation from this policy and to develop and implement a separate policy towards it. The new Eastern Policy should be an autonomous component and one of the most important elements in the overall foreign policy of the EU. 4. Secondly, the new Eastern Policy should be founded on the following two pillars: a region-oriented strategy, which could be called the Eastern Dimension, and reshaped strategies for individual countries. The Eastern Dimension should set up a universal framework of co-operation, defining its basic mechanisms and objectives. These should include: the adaptation assistance programme, JHA, transborder co-operation, social dialogue and transport infrastructures. The approach, however, should be kept flexible, taking into account the specific situation of each country. This purpose should be served by keeping in place the existing bilateral institutional contacts between the EU and each of its eastern neighbours, and by developing a national strategy for each neighbour.

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh: unfrozen conflicts between Russia and the West. OSW Special Report, 9 July 2008

The Southern Caucasus is the site of three armed conflicts with separatist backgrounds, which have remained unsolved for years: the conflicts in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan's conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (including the areas around Nagorno-Karabakh which were seized by Armenian separatists in the course of the war). Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan have had any control over the disputed areas since the early 1990s. Both states are simultaneously in conflict with the separatists' informal patrons, respectively Russia and Armenia. After over a decade of relative peace during which the conflicts remained frozen, tension has recently risen considerably: in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, large-scale fighting may break out in the coming months, whereas in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri-Armenian conflict, such a threat may materialise within the next five years. The current formula for politically resolving the conflicts is ineffective and close to exhaustion, and the prospect of any alternative peace plans being developed is rather distant. The conflicts in the Southern Caucasus are of increasing concern to the West, mainly because of the Western actors' constantly growing political and economic involvement in Georgia and Azerbaijan (including support for reforms and development of the gas and oil transmission infrastructures), as well as its less intensive commitments in Armenia. An outbreak of open fighting over the separatist regions would destabilise the Southern Caucasus, largely undoing the results of the actions which the EU, NATO and the USA have taken in the region in recent years. Moreover, the situation in the Southern Caucasus, especially the separatisms themselves, have in fact become an element in the wider geopolitical game between the West and Russia. For Russia, the stakes are maintaining its influence in the region, and for the West, demonstrating its ability to effectively promote democracy and economic modernisation in the countries bordering it.

How far do the borders of the west extend? Russian/Polish strategic conflicts in the period 1990-2010. OSW Report, 2010-03-18

From a historical perspective, the last two decades can almost be regarded as a 'golden age' of Polish-Russian relations. This is the first time in several centuries that a sovereign Poland and Russia have been able to develop mutual relations without resorting to force; moreover, they have established a bilateral legal basis and put into practice its provisions on "the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, non-interference with internal affairs and the nations' right to self-determination. This does not change the fact that since 1990 the atmosphere between the two countries has much more often been chilly and tense. Contrary to the widely-held belief, Polish-Russian conflicts do not stem from genetic Russophobia on the part of Poland, or irrational prejudice on the part of Russia. Their substance is real and concerns strategic issues. At the deepest level, though, this is a dispute about how far the borders of the Western world extend, and about the Russian Federation's sphere of influence. However, it is not a clash between two states; moreover, Poland is certainly not the most important actor in this regard, although due to the historical context and its geographic location, it is one of the countries that lies closest to the 'line of contact', and is therefore particularly entangled in the disagreement.