Moldova – Heading into a hot autumn. EPC Policy Brief, 6 October 2014

After four years of negotiations, Moldova signed an Association Agreement (AA) including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) Agreement with the European Union (EU) on 27 June 2014. Ratified in the Moldovan Parliament on 2 July it came into provisional application on 1 September. While this development represents an important milestone in Moldova’s relations with the EU, the journey has not been easy. Russia has increased its presence and pressure in the region, as the country gets closer to bettering relations with the EU, Russia has increased its activities in Moldova, including in the autonomous region of Gagauzia and in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Alongside pressure from Russia, the next few months will be very politically challenging for Moldova, with internal and external developments continuing to shape Moldova’s future. Not only will Chisinau need to move ahead with the difficult and expensive implementation of the DCFTA, the ruling coalition simultaneously needs to campaign for the elections with very importantly, a united front. In this Policy Brief, Amanda Paul presents the state of play and the prospects of Moldova since signing the Association Agreement with the EU and explores the effects of Russian bans on exports and services, access to energy and trade as well as the role of the EU

Helping Moldova stay on the EU course. Proposals for a real 'more for more' approach. EPC Policy Brief, 11 December 2013

At the Vilnius Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in November, Moldova initialled its Association Agreement including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU and became the first EaP country to meet all the requirements of their Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. 2014 may prove to be a make or break year for Moldova, with Chisinau facing a number of serious challenges. From the EU’s point of view, it could also prove to be a make or break year for the Eastern Partnership. The period following Vilnius should be a soul-searching time for the EU. Of the three pillars (AA, DCFTA, visa regime) of the Eastern Partnership, two are now being openly challenged by Russia. While the EU should not engage in a populist competition with Russia, it does need to adapt its actions to the realities on the ground. In this Policy Brief, Cristian Ghinea, Amanda Paul and Victor Chirila argue that the EU should work for greater visibility, better public diplomacy and deliver visible, tangible benefits to the Moldovan population as rapidly as possible. Not only will this help counter Russian activities, but it will also help shore up support for pro-EU reformers in the country.

Russia goes on the offensive ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. OSW Commentary No. 115, 30.09.2013

In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

Could Transnistria block Moldova's integration with the EU? OSW Commentary No. 95, 2012-10-23

Moldova’s progress in its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the European Union, with a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as its key element, has become a source of tension between Chisinau and the breakaway Republic of Transnistria. An almost certain refusal by Transnistria to join the DCFTA, will deprive the region of the benefits it currently enjoys under the EU Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) worsening its already precarious economic situation. It is to be expected that the issue will become an additional source of tension between the two sides of the Transnistrian conflict, and might also have a negative impact on the EU–Russia relationship. The signing of the Association Agreement, which is scheduled for the autumn of 2013, will be an important step towards Moldova’s integration with the EU. Both sides assign great importance to the speediest possible finalisation of the Agreement, and so far the negotiations have been described as progressing very smoothly. Transnistria’s highly sceptical attitude towards its possible accession to the DCFTA, however, is consistent with the interests of its main ally, Moscow. It is highly probable that Russia intends to thwart Moldova’s EU association process. Moscow’s objective seems to be to draw Moldova permanently into its own sphere of influence, and therefore it perceives Chisinau’s movement towards the EU as a transgression against its geopolitical interests. Consequently, in order to hinder this process, Russia may instrumentally exploit its extensive influence over Transnistria to provoke a crisis between Tiraspol and Chisinau. An apparent increase in Russian presence in the region over the last few months (including tighter control over Transnistria’s KGB and the Ministry of Information) may suggest that the Kremlin is preparing to implement such a scenario.

No Move without Free Movement: The EU-Swiss controversy over quotas for free movement of persons. CEPS Policy Brief No. 331, 23 April 2015

The focus of this Policy Brief is the Swiss referendum of 2014 against ‘mass immigration’ in Switzerland. It identifies the challenges that a quota on EU citizens’ free movement rights to Switzerland would pose to EU-Swiss relations, considering: i) the value of freedom of movement in the EU and its indivisibility from the internal market and other economic freedoms; ii) the specificity of the EU legal system following the Lisbon Treaty that established democratic and judicial accountability mechanisms; iii) the lack of supranational judicial oversight of the EU-Switzerland agreements framework; and iv) the existence of the so-called guillotine mechanism, according to which the termination of the Free Movement Agreement would entail the automatic termination of the other agreements with the EU. The authors set out a number of options and consider their implications for EU-Swiss relations.

Georgia and the EU – maintaining the momentum. EPC Commentary, 1 July 2016

The Association Agreement (AA) between Georgia and the European Union (EU), signed in June 2014, will enter into force on 1 July 2016 after having been ratified by the parliaments of the 28 member states. The AA, with its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), foresees far-reaching political and economic integration with the EU by significantly deepening political and economic ties. Many provisions of the agreement have already begun to be implemented, and some are even beginning to give tangible results, such as the opening up of European markets to Georgian exports. Yet this benchmark moment was somehow overshadowed by the EU’s failure to extend visa free travel to Georgians, as had been expected, despite acknowledging that Georgia had fulfilled all the criteria that had been set. Whilst this was quickly explained by the EU as being only a temporary setback, based on reasons more related to other countries, such as Turkey and Ukraine, with which similar arrangements were being negotiated, it exposed the fragility of maintaining the necessary momentum in Georgia-EU relations.

Mutual perceptions of Asia and the EU/Europe. Media, elite and public opinion in Singapore and Germany. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 12, December 2012

In an increasingly interlinked and interdependent world, Europe and Asia are key players. Free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the ones the EU concluded with South Korea and Singapore, are indicative of strong mutual economic interests. It is therefore timely to take a closer look at the mutual perceptions of Asians and Europeans – not only at the governmental and policymaking levels, but also in terms of public opinion and the media. Drawing on data from an extensive research project led by the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), New Zealand, the empirical study in this paper assesses the mutual perceptions of the EU/Europe and Asia, and their respective actors, focusing on two countries – Germany and Singapore. It seeks to do so through an analysis of the data collected from print and broadcast media, interviews with media practitioners, and the findings from public opinion surveys.

Towards a new multilateral energy architecture? Security Policy Brief No. 39, October 2012

From climate change over peak oil to the geopolitical scramble for the Arctic, there are ample signs that a global energy crisis is unfolding. The sheer scale and urgency of this looming crisis calls for international coordination. Yet, even a cursory look at the existing international energy institutions leads to a sobering conclusion: the global energy governance architecture is weak, fragmented and incomplete. This policy brief discusses both the flaws in the multilateral energy architecture and some emerging ideas to strengthen it, such as the proposal for a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement and the new American disclosure rules for the extractive sector.

The Impact of TTIP: The underlying economic model and comparisons. CEPS Special Report No. 93/13 October 2014. [TTIP Series No. 1]

What are the economic and other impacts of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership? At the request of the European Parliament, CEPS has provided an appraisal of the TTIP Impact Assessment carried out by the European Commission, with special elaboration of the underlying economic model. The methodology applied by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) for this economic modelling is analysed in depth, together with the assumptions used to make TTIP amenable to an economic appraisal. The research paper also compares the IA on TTIP with selected previous empirical economic assessments of EU trade agreements and with a set of alternative studies on TTIP itself. In reading our findings, two central caveats should be kept in mind that affect any analysis of the CGE model included in the European Commission’s Impact Assessment. First, TTIP is a rather unusual bilateral trade agreement; and second, TTIP is so wide-ranging that an alternative approach, such as the so-called ‘partial’ (equilibrium) approach – already a second-best solution – would be totally inappropriate to the case under examination.

Taking its place in Europe – Iceland’s long road to its EU application. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 03/2013

Iceland applied for EU membership in 2009. Before that it had sought to alleviate pressures on her to fully integrate with Europe firstly by pursuing limited integration through membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and later by joining the European Economic Area (EEA). This paper traces the steps taken by this peripheral European country from its struggle of independence from Denmark, through World War II, American occupation, the founding of a republic, NATO membership and the Cod Wars with Britain. The paper analyses the various phases of the debate on the ties to the European institutions leading to EEA and Schengen membership, the “miraculous economic success“ which ended in the epic crash of 2008 which precipitated a much contested EU application.

Germany and the Eastern Partnership. OSW Commentary No. 37, 2010-06-17

Germany perceives the Eastern Partnership as an initiative that is conducive to German interests, but at the same time as one that could undermine them. Berlin would like the Eastern Partnership to be an instrument that brings the partner countries closer to the EU economically but not politically. Germany has opted for a tightening of the economic cooperation with the partner countries, by signing deals on deep free trade areas and harmonising part of the legislation of these countries with the acquis communautaire. On the other hand, Germany does not want the Eastern Partnership to evolve and turn into an initiative that offers the partner countries prospects of membership and antagonises Russia. Therefore Germany is trying to counteract any elements of the Eastern Partnership that would help it develop in the aforementioned direction. Moreover, Germany has set its own bilateral cooperation with partner countries in the east above the joint projects of the Eastern Partnership. In doing so, Berlin’s guiding principle is that German money allocated for the projects on development cooperation in the east should bring political and economic benefits first of all to Germany.

Tug-of-war over EU's policy towards its neighbours. OSW Commentary No. 49, 2011-03-09

The revolutions in North Africa, the approaching end of the ‘strategic review’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiated by the European Commission, and the beginning of negotiations on the European Union’s new financial perspective, have intensified the debate among the member states and EU institutions on what policy the EU will adopt towards its neighbourhood in the future. The discussion concerns not only the shape of the ENP but also non-ENPI foreign policy instruments which Brussels applies towards neighbouring countries, such as the thematic instruments and loan support. Serious differences of opinion have emerged among the member states. The countries located in the southern part of the EU want Brussels to boost its policy towards North Africa, even at the expense of engagement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Meanwhile Central European countries, including Germany, favour a more balanced approach towards both directions. The future shape of the ENP, as well as the EU’s other foreign policy instruments, will have a strong impact on the approach the EU adopts towards its Eastern neighbourhood. If some of the proposals are realised, especially the southern member states’ request to transfer some of the funds from the Eastern to the Southern neighbourhood, the chances of meeting the Eastern Partnership goals, such as the association of the partner countries with the EU and the creation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas, could be reduced.

Russia's turn towards Asia: more words than actions. OSW Commentary No. 92, 2012-10-08

The APEC summit in Vladivostok (8–9 September) was expected to confirm Russia’s ambitions to play a more significant role in the Asia-Pacific region (particularly in East Asia) and balance Moscow’s foreign policy by shifting some of its focus from Europe to Asia. The measures taken ahead of the summit included both the implementation of economic projects in Russia’s Far East and greater diplomatic engagement in the region. The summit itself, however, was less effective than expected. Russia failed to define its place in the Asia-Pacific order, and did not propose any new political or economic initiatives that would go beyond the discussions that have already been held within APEC for years, including plans for a free trade area.

Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989. ACES Working Paper (Report) No. 8, 2007

Early on the morning of December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the leader of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), declared martial law, ending the so-called "Polish Crisis," which began with the creation of the Independent Free Trade Union "Solidamosc" in August 1980. Over the next eight years, the Communist government and the opposition struggled over power, culminating in 1989 with the creation of a Solidamosc-led government which ended fifty years of Communist rule in Poland and led the way to further democratic revolutions throughout Eastern Europe. The purpose of this dissertation is to utilize newly available and underutilized archival sources as well as oral history interviews, from both international and American perspectives, to fully chronicle American policy toward Poland from the declaration of martial law until the creation of the Solidarnosc government. Rather than explaining Polish-American relations in bilateral terms, the dissertation illuminates the complex web of influences that determined American policy in Washington and affected its implementation within Poland. This includes descriptions of internal tensions within the Reagan administration, differences between American decisions in Washington and implementation in Warsaw, lobbying from Polish-American groups, clashes between Capitol Hill and the White House, coordination with American labor organizations to support Solidarnosc, disagreements with West European allies in NATO and international financial organizations, cooperation with the Vatican and the Polish Catholic Church, synchronization with American humanitarian organizations working in Poland, limitations caused by the realities of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, and complications caused by domestic Polish concerns. By taking a broad view of American policy and highlighting internal Polish decisions, with both the Communist government and the democratic opposition, the dissertation provides concrete examples of America's role in Poland's transformation, arguing, however, that this role was very limited. These conclusions are relevant to arguments about the end of the Cold War, the nature of American power, as well as current discussions about possibilities to promote democracy within hostile regimes.