Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

Turkey's economy: a story of success with an uncertain future. OSW Commentary No. 120, 2013-11-05

In the decade since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, Turkey’s economy has become synonymous with success and well-implemented reforms. Economic development has been the basis of both socio-political stability inside the country and of an ambitious foreign policy agenda pursued by the AKP. However, the risks associated with a series of unresolved issues are becoming increasingly apparent. These include the country’s current account deficit, its over-reliance on short-term external financing, and unfinished reforms, for example of the education sector. This leaves Turkey exposed to over-dependence on investors, especially from the West. Consequently, Ankara has become a hostage of its own image as an economically successful state with a stable socio-political system. Any changes to this image would cause capital flight, as exemplified by the outflow of portfolio investment1 and an increase in the cost of external debt2 that followed the nationwide protests over the proposed closure of Gezi Park last summer. In addition, Turkey remains vulnerable to potential changes in investor sentiment towards emerging markets.

Proportionality needed in the subsidiarity debate in the EU – Appraisal of the British and Dutch initiatives. CEPS Essay No. 11, 8 April 2014

In a new CEPS Essay, Michael Emerson assesses the initiatives taken by the UK and Dutch governments to cut out excessive EU regulatory intrusion, namely in the form of the ongoing British Balance of Competences Review and the Dutch list of 54 items of EU regulation that they would like to see repealed or reformed. He concludes that while one can approve of a campaign for better EU regulation and for cutting out unnecessary micro-regulation, it would require impressive commitment by all member states and the EU institutions to follow the best features of the British and Dutch leads for this to have a real effect in the fight against populist euroscepticism. In his view, that battle will have to be won primarily with bigger weapons – some combination of better macroeconomic results, bigger foreign policy achievements and the emergence of a European-level political leadership to which the people can relate. In short, there has to be due proportionality in the diagnosis of the responsibility of inadequate subsidiarity for the EU’s ills.

EU development ministers discuss approach to Central Asia. EUCAM Commentary No. 16, July 2011

On 14 July European development ministers met in Sopot, Poland. Among a host of development related matters Central Asia was on the agenda and European Union Special Representative Pierre Morel and Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs were invited to give political and development assistance oriented background to the European ministers. The Polish Presidency wants to devote special attention to EU development assistance to this often over-looked region, which the EU has traditionally viewed predominantly through a foreign policy lens. Development strategies to Central Asia need to be discussed in the context of the five year old political strategy, set to be reviewed this coming autumn.

Central Asia on New Delhi's Geostrategic Radar. EUCAM Commentary No. 18, October 2011

Central Asia today holds much strategic interest for India as an emerging 21st Century regional and global power. Despite being a latecomer in what some see as a new ‘Great Game’, New Delhi is keen to reconstruct the ‘Silk Route’. While Indo-Central Asian relations go back to antiquity when cultural, commercial and political ties thrived, post-independence India was physically cut off from Afghanistan and West Asia. It remained embroiled in domestic preoccupations and the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, all of which led to a limited foreign policy until the early nineties and a belated rediscovery of the region.

Promises and hurdles in EU-Kazakhstan energy cooperation. EUCAM Commentary No. 20, November 2011

Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Karim Massimov, once referred to energy cooperation as the ‘core’ of relations between his country and the European Union (EU). Indeed, there is great mutual interest in this area. Six percent of the EU’s crude oil imports and 16 percent of its uranium imports come from Kazakhstan. And around 80 percent of the latter’s oil exports go towards Europe. For Kazakhstani producers, access to European lucrative and reliable markets is of utmost importance. Over the last several years, the thrust of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy was aimed at increasing the capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) that pumps Kazakhstani oil to Europe. Moreover, Kazmunaigaz’s (KMG) – the national oil and gas company – major external investment was in the Romanian oil company Rompetrol.

Russia and its Near Neighborhood: Competition and Conflict within the EU. Natolin Research Paper 04/May 2011

Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s ‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much would depend on Russia’s internal development.

Defying the Treaty: The Influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies on the Development of the Eastern Partnership. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 6, October 2014

Many scholars now argue that the Treaty of Lisbon has removed the role and influence of the rotating Council Presidency in the domain of the European Union’s foreign affairs. This paper will, however, go beyond a superficial, treaty-based analysis of the influence of the post-Lisbon rotating Council Presidency and instead look at two primary, residual, informal Presidential roles, namely agenda-shaping and brokering. It will examine the extent to which these informal roles allowed the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies of July to December 2011 and 2013 respectively to influence the development of the bilateral, multilateral and internal tracks of the Eastern Partnership. The paper will argue that the considerable influence of these rotating Presidencies defied the logic of the Lisbon Treaty, suggesting that the ‘golden age’ of this six-month position, whereby individual Member States pursue foreign policy issues of significant domestic interest at the European level, has not yet passed.

Between Irrelevance and Integration? New Challenges to Diplomacy in the 21st Century and the Role of the EEAS. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 8, November 2014

The changing nature of diplomacy poses new challenges for diplomatic actors in the 21st century, who have to adapt their structures in order to remain relevant on the international stage. The growing interdependence and complexity of issues necessitate a more networked approach to diplomacy, while states retain their predominance in diplomacy. The main underlying challenge of modern diplomacy therefore requires finding a balance between traditional and new elements. This paper examines to what extent the European External Action Service (EEAS) meets the new challenges of modern diplomacy and copes with the diverse interests of the other stakeholders involved, namely the institutions and Member States of the European Union (EU). On the basis of a conceptual framework of modern diplomacy and an analysis of the different aspects of the EEAS’ structures, the paper argues that the EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy, since the interests of the other stakeholders put constraints on its free development. The latter therefore have to choose between irrelevance and integration with regard to EU foreign policy and the future of the EEAS.

The EU and its Neighbours: Predictions for 2015. CEPS Commentary, 5 January 2015

Against a backdrop of chaos and violence in the EU’s neighbourhood, Steven Blockmans acknowledges that the troubles of 2014 will cast a long, dark shadow over 2015. In this new CEPS Commentary the author attempts to predict some of the EU foreign policy developments that are likely to mark the New Year.

American Attitudes on European Political Integration — The Nixon-Kissinger Legacy. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2007

This paper concentrates on the Nixon-Kissinger view of European political integration. In contrast with the mainstream position of the American Administrations during the 1950s and 1960s, Kissinger was convinced that by encouraging European unity, the United States was in fact creating its own rival. The start of a new system of European foreign policy cooperation in 1970 was seen by Kissinger as a particularly important example of Europe’s attempt to challenge the American hegemony. Kissinger emphasized the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. Three main lines of action were pursued to keep the development of the European Community under control: maintaining bilateral contacts with key European allies, requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table, and linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe. The legacy of this policy still seems to influence the current American policy on the European Union. The Nixon-Kissinger term was, however, detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations. Tendencies to emulate it should therefore be discouraged.

Mogherini’s first 100 days: Not the quiet diplomat. CEPS Commentary, 12 February 2015

To mark the passage of 100 days since Federica Mogherini took up the post of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission HR/VP, Steven Blockmans and Francesco Saverio Montesano reflect in a new CEPS Commentary on her early achievements and assess the efficacy of new approaches and working methods she has brought to EU foreign policy-making.

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

Higher education scholarships as a soft power tool: an analysis of its role in the EU and Singapore. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No. 23, March 2015

The European Union and Singapore are vastly different entities, each with its own regional and global priorities and policies. Both actors employ a range of tools and instruments to aid in their foreign policy objectives, including in the projection of their soft power. It is worth analysing and comparing the specific instruments of these two actors’ soft power strategies, including but not limited to their stated objectives and perceived effectiveness. This paper will compare the role of higher education and scholarships in diffusing soft power through a comparative case study of the Erasmus Mundus scholarship program and the Singapore Scholarship administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It will look at the ways in which these programs have shaped the standing of the actors in diffusing their norms and objectives in the regional and international arena. A comparative analysis of these programs will hopefully provide some insight into the proximity between foreign policy-making and higher education internationalisation. This paper will begin with an overview of the aforementioned programs and related schemes, before dissecting and comparing the intent and the policy-making processes behind these, and concludes with a discussion on the present and future role of higher education as a strategic soft power tool.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.5, 1998

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, political scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by the four major decisions toward European integration taken under de Gaulle's Presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in Luxembourg Compromise. In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence speeches, memoirs, or government documents suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interested in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations even in the least likely case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leaders geopolitical ideology even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary source research.