EU Sanctions: A Relevant Foreign Policy Tool? EU Diplomacy Paper No. 3, May 2014

This paper examines an instrument which establishes an explicit link between economic power and foreign policy of the European Union (EU): restrictive measures or sanctions. As the EU is increasingly confronted with situations requiring a firm response, sanctions – arguably the EU’s ‘hardest’ tool – have become somewhat of a standard reaction. To what extent are sanctions a relevant tool for EU external action? By looking at several case studies from a set of 47 autonomous EU sanction cases, this paper acknowledges the many internal and external difficulties the EU faces when using the sanctions tool. However, it also shows that despite those challenges, the ‘hard’ and coercive nature of the sanction instrument nevertheless make it a relevant foreign policy tool which allows the EU to react to external crises.

EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations? MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15/August 2012

The outbreak of the Arab Spring and the unrest, revolution and war that followed during the course of 2011 have forced the EU to acknowledge the need to radically re-think its policy approach towards the Southern Mediterranean, including in the domain of migration. Migration and mobility now feature as key components of High Representative Catherine Ashton’s new framework for cooperation with the region (Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity), while the EU has declared its intention to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up “mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries – so-called ‘Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security’ – now placed at the centre of the EU’s renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). However, the success of this approach and its potential to establish genuine cooperative partnerships that will support smooth economic and political transformation in North Africa hinge on the working arrangements and institutional configurations shaping the renewed GAMM at EU level which has long been marked by internal fragmentation, a lack of transparency and a predominance of home affairs and security actors. This paper investigates the development of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean in a post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. It asks to what extent has the application of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of an “EU Foreign Minister” in High Representative Ashton, supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS), remedied or re-invigorated the ideological and institutional struggles around the implementation of the Global Approach? Who are the principal agents shaping and driving the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security? Who goes abroad to speak on the behalf of the EU in these Dialogues and what impact does this have on the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Dialogues under the renewed GAMM as well as the wider prospects for the Southern Mediterranean?

The role of EU Special Representatives in the post-Lisbon foreign policy system: A renaissance? IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/02/June 2012

Summary. EU Special Representatives have been deployed since 1996 in order to contribute to the EU’s crisis management efforts in various crisis regions. As they are not part of the formal hierarchy of the European External Action Service and thus a rather flexible foreign policy instrument at the disposal of the Member States, new special representatives have been appointed in 2011 and 2012. This Policy Brief argues that the representatives’ autonomy must not necessarily lead to ‘clashes of competence’ with the EU’s diplomatic service.

The Role of Civil Society Dialogue in the EU-China Cooperation on Renewable Energy. IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/05/December 2012

Summary. Expanding EU-China institutional cooperation in the energy sector has been matched by a parallel process of stronger economic ties between European and Chinese companies in the renewable energy (RE) sector (particularly wind and photovoltaics). While the foundation of early EU-China institutional relations was based primarily on trade cooperation, international efforts to mitigate climate change and the common challenge of decreasing energy dependence in a sustainable manner brought a new dimension to their partnership in the energy sector in the mid 90s. Although the role of EU-China energy cooperation has grown tremendously in the context of EU external trade policy and EU strategy to boost its energy independence and international climate policy, the potential of civil society collaboration in this partnership has remained rather unexploited. Based on major civil society initiatives in the RE field that have been developed in recent years, this policy brief argues that civil society dialogue between China and EU could be an important driving force in deepening EU-China cooperation on RE and a bridge towards a more sustainable future.

EU Foreign Policy Between the Revolution and the Status Quo. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/09/November 2014

Summary. When a new High Representative takes office, an opportunity presents itself to take a look at existing EU external policies and assess whether these are still sufficient to safeguard Europe’s interests in light of recent events. New strategic priorities have to be defined where necessary, not on each and every topic of foreign policy, but on those big issues that European nations can only deal with collectively, through the EU. How to pursue these strategic priorities is an equally important question. Looking for the right balance between a far-reaching reform agenda and a status quo policy, both of which can be detrimental to its interests, the EU can opt for pragmatic idealism as the new strategic concept for its foreign policy.

The European Semester in Belgium: A state of play. European Policy Brief No. 32, October 2014

After four rounds of the European Semester process of EU economic coordination, Belgium has done relatively little to comply with EU recommendations. This brief substantiates and confirms this claim after clarifying the meaning of these recommendations. While the challenges underlined by the European Commission still lie ahead, Belgium’s ownership of the recommendations for reforms has been low. Not only do coordination processes remain bureaucratic and technocratic, but many of the recommendations’ concerns – external competitiveness, social security reforms, market reforms – are not traditionally defended by the political left in Belgium. The controversy surrounding the recommendations for national structural reforms owes much to their supply-side orientation, which contrasts with the inability of the EU to pursue demand-side policies. But despite this disequilibrium, the recommendations highlight relevant issues that ought to be addressed, and indicate where scope for national debate exists.

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

Hybrid Hysteria. Security Policy Brief No. 64, June 2015

Is “hybrid” about to replace “comprehensive” as the favourite container notion of the Brussels foreign policy community? They might not be so different, in fact. Both a hybrid and a comprehensive approach mean the integrated use of a broad range of instruments of external action towards the achievement of a foreign policy objective. It’s just that the hybrid approach put into practice by Russia today seeks to achieve rather less friendly aims than the EU’s own comprehensive approach. The hybrid approach is the comprehensive approach gone over to the dark side of the force.

The harsh reality of Ukraine's fiscal arithmetic. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/07, June 2015

Ukraine is struggling with both external aggression and the dramatically poor shape of its economy. The pace of political and institutional change has so far been too slow to prevent the deepening of the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises, while business confidence continues to be undermined. • Unfortunately, the 2015 International Monetary Fund Extended Fund Facility programme repeats many weaknesses of the 2014 IMF Stand-by Arrangement: slow pace of fiscal adjustment especially in the two key areas of energy prices and pension entitlements, lack of a comprehensive structural and institutional reform vision, and insufficient external financing to close the expected balance-of-payments gap and allow Ukraine to return to debt sustainability in the long term. • The reform process in Ukraine must be accelerated and better managed. A frontloaded fiscal adjustment is necessary to stabilise public finances and the balance-of-payments, and to bring inflation down. The international community, especially the European Union, should offer sufficient financial aid backed by strong conditionality, technical assistance and support to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.

Effective Regional Energy Policy Cooperation in South East Europe: A Proposal. CEPS Background Briefing Paper, 2 July 2015

Key Points. The implementation of regional energy policy cooperation initiatives is a priority of both the Energy Union and the so-called 2030 Energy and Climate Framework. The Energy Union proposal has singled out south east Europe as one area in which to act. This report identifies the seven key elements that need to be addressed to bring existing and planned regional energy policy cooperation initiatives in south east Europe to life: i) a sound geographical definition, ii) a governance structure, iii) voluntary participation, iv) exchange of information and best practice, v) the development of an external dimension, vi) regional infrastructure planning and development and vii) streamlining the financing instruments across the region. The study finds that significant progress has been made in many areas, and makes concrete proposals to unlock the full potential of coordination in those areas where there is limited progress. These proposals have been tested in discussions in the region.

Can the new refugee relocation system work? Perils in the Dublin logic and flawed reception conditions in the EU. CEPS Policy Brief No. 332, October 2015 Thursday, 1 October 2015

This Policy Brief argues that the newly adopted EU temporary relocation (quota) system constitutes a welcome yet timid step forward in addressing a number of central controversies of the current refugee debate in Europe. Two main challenges affect the effective operability of the new EU relocation model. First, EU member states’ asylum systems show profound (on-the-ground) weaknesses in reception conditions and judicial/administrative capacities. These prevent a fair and humane processing of asylum applications. EU states are not implementing the common standards enshrined in the EU reception conditions Directive 2013/33. Second, the new relocation system constitutes a move away from the much-criticised Dublin system, but it is still anchored to its premises. The Dublin system is driven by an unfair and unsustainable rule according to which the first EU state of entry is responsible for assessing asylum applications. It does not properly consider the personal, private and family circumstances or the preferences of asylum-seekers. Policy Recommendations In order to respond to these challenges, the Policy Brief offers the following policy recommendations: The EU should strengthen and better enforce member states’ reception capacities, abolish the current Dublin system rule of allocation of responsibility and expand the new relocation distribution criteria to include in the assessment (as far as possible) asylum-seekers’ preferences and personal/family links to EU member states. EU member countries should give priority to boosting their current and forward-looking administrative and judicial capacities to deal and welcome asylum applications. The EU should establish a permanent common European border and asylum service focused on ensuring the highest standards through stable operational support, institutional solidarity across all EU external borders and the practical implementation of new distribution relocation criteria.

Joining up or falling apart: towards a networked communications model for EU foreign policy. EPC Policy Brief, 1 October 2015

Communication is a key element of diplomatic activity. In the 21st century, the shift from the traditional model of state diplomacy to a post-Westphalian, multi-stakeholder diplomacy has also had an impact on communication within diplomatic systems. In this Policy Brief, Juliane Schmidt (EPC Programme Assistant) argues that the EU should work on developing a more networked communications model so that the European External Action Service (EEAS) can communicate more effectively with all stakeholders of EU external action. Only then can the EEAS shape comprehensive foreign policy strategies and unlock its true potential as a central coordinator for EU external action.

Achieving European Policy Objectives through Financial Technology. ECRI Commentary No. 17, 16 November 2015

Alistair Milne argues in this ECRI Commentary that ‘FinTech’ (newly emerging Financial Technologies) can play a crucial role in achieving European policy objectives in the area of financial markets. These notably include increasing access by smaller firms to trade credit and other forms of external finance and completing the banking and capital markets unions. He points out, however, that accomplishing these objectives will require a coordinated European policy response, focused especially on promoting common business processes and the adoption of shared technology and data standards.

The Commissioners’ Group on External Action – Key political facilitator. CEPS Special Report No. 125/December 2015

The reactivation of the Commissioners’ Group on External Action (CGEA) is one of the most important institutional initiatives in EU foreign policy-making since the merger of the position of the High Representative for CFSP with that of Vice-President of the Commission and the creation of the European External Action Service. In this report the authors examine the mandate and organisation of the CGEA and note that, in its first year of activity, the Group has injected much-needed political pragmatism into the way the Commission contributes to EU external action, thereby facilitating inter-service cooperation both within the Commission and with the EEAS. They argue that the CGEA has in fact become the logical counterpart to the Foreign Affairs Council, which allows the HRVP to deliver on her duty to assist the Council and the Commission in ensuring a comprehensive approach to EU external action, as indeed consistency in its implementation.