Hostages to Moscow, clients of Beijing. Security in Central Asia as the role of the West diminishes. OSW Study 10/2014

The goal of this publication is to attempt to assess the thirteen years (2001- -2014) of the West’s military presence in the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia, closely associated with the ISAF and OEF-A (Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan) missions in Afghanistan. There will also be an analysis of the actual challenges for the region’s stability after 2014. The current and future security architecture in Central Asia will also be looked at closely, as will the actual capabilities to counteract the most serious threats within its framework. The need to separately handle the security system in Central Asia and security as such is dictated by the particularities of political situation in the region, the key mechanism of which is geopolitics understood as global superpower rivalry for influence with a secondary or even instrumental role of the five regional states, while ignoring their internal problems. Such an approach is especially present in Russia’s perception of Central Asia, as it views security issues in geopolitical categories. Because of this, security analysis in the Central Asian region requires a broader geopolitical context, which was taken into account in this publication. The first part investigates the impact of the Western (primarily US) military and political presence on the region’s geopolitical architecture between 2001 and 2014. The second chapter is an attempt to take an objective look at the real challenges to regional security after the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan, while the third chapter is dedicated to analysing the probable course of events in the security dimension following 2014. The accuracy of predictions time-wise included in the below publication does not exceed three to five years due to the dynamic developments in Central Asia and its immediate vicinity (the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran), and because of the large degree of unpredictability of policies of one of the key regional actors – Russia (both in the terms of its activity on the international arena, and its internal developments).

A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia. OSW Commentary No. 143, 29.07.2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.

Making the impossible possible: the prospects for visa-free movement between the EU and its eastern partners. OSW Point of View Number 27, May 2012

To make the abolition of visas in relations between the EU and the Eastern European countries possible, the ”spell cast” must be broken on this issue. With the present levels of mobility and people-to-people, business and political contacts the introduction of a visa-free regime will be a natural consequence of the liberalisation processes which have been at work for years.Moreover, the decision to lift the visa requirement is unlikely to significantly stimulate an increase in migration pressure from Eastern European countries but could reduce the operating costs of expanded Schengen consular network. Lifting the visa requirement for Eastern European citizens can be temporary and conditional and allow for actual implementation of an increased conditionality rule. In political terms, making visa liberalisation a key issue would fundamentally change the partners’ approach to the Eastern Partnership and would provide a link to the Partnership for Modernisation targeted at Russia.

Unity stronger than divisions. Ukraine's internal diversity. OSW Point of View Number 40, March 2014

Ukraine is deeply divided internally, although as a result of the changes that have taken place since its independence, the country’s internal divisions now have less and less to do with territorial divides, and the split into historical ‘sub-Ukraines’ has become less pronounced, especially for the younger generation. Ukraine is not a country of two competing regional identities, one in the west, the other in the east. The western identity, in which the unity of Ukraine is a key value, coexists with the multiple and diverse local patriotisms of the different regions in the east and the south of the country. The present protest movement has consolidated the country’s sense of unity. Its opponents have also been championing the indivisibility of Ukraine, even while they demanded a thorough decentralisation of the country, which was often mistaken for separatism. Russia has been stirring up separatist tendencies in Ukraine, but with little success. Crimea is an exception here, because in most respects it has remained unaffected by the dynamics of the social processes transforming mainland Ukraine – separatist tendencies are indeed deeply rooted in the peninsula.

Security of Russian gas supplies to the EU - the question of infrastrucutral connections. OSW Point of View, February 2005

The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas. The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.

Eastern Policy of the EU: the Visegrad Countries' Perspective. OSW Point of View, February 2003

1. After its enlargement, scheduled for 2004, the European Union will face a completely new situation at its eastern borders. This new situation calls for a new concept of the EU eastern activities, i.e. for development of the new Eastern Policy of the EU. 2. Due to a number of specific features such as geographical location, closeness of ties, direct risk factors etc., the Visegrad countries will and should be particularly interested in the process of formulating the new EU Eastern Policy. Consequently, they should be the co-makers of this policy. 3. The new EU Eastern Policy should differ fundamentally from the Union's traditional eastern relations. Firstly, its scope should not cover the entire CIS area: instead, the policy should focus on some of the European successor states of the former Soviet Union, namely Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, following the accession of Romania. It does not seem advisable to exclude the Russian Federation from this policy and to develop and implement a separate policy towards it. The new Eastern Policy should be an autonomous component and one of the most important elements in the overall foreign policy of the EU. 4. Secondly, the new Eastern Policy should be founded on the following two pillars: a region-oriented strategy, which could be called the Eastern Dimension, and reshaped strategies for individual countries. The Eastern Dimension should set up a universal framework of co-operation, defining its basic mechanisms and objectives. These should include: the adaptation assistance programme, JHA, transborder co-operation, social dialogue and transport infrastructures. The approach, however, should be kept flexible, taking into account the specific situation of each country. This purpose should be served by keeping in place the existing bilateral institutional contacts between the EU and each of its eastern neighbours, and by developing a national strategy for each neighbour.

Greater Europe. Putin's vision of European (dis)integration. OSW Study 46/2013

On several occasions since 2001 Vladimir Putin has raised the concept of ‘Greater Europe’, a partly-integrated common space comprising mainly Russia and the European Union. This concept has never been recast into a detailed political programme. While it has been championed as‘a Europe without dividing lines’, the concept would in practice permanently split Europe into two geopolitical blocs – the Western bloc of the European Union, with Germany in the dominant role, and the Eastern bloc, consisting of the emerging Eurasian Union, with Russia in a hegemonic position. In recent years Russia has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at implementing some elements of the concept. However, most of these have failed to become reality. In this context, we should expect Russia’s policy to focus on implementing its priority project of Eurasian integration, based on the structures of the Customs Union/the Eurasian Union. The Greater Europe project, on the other hand, will be postponed until the time when, as Moscow believes, a weakened EU will be ready to accept Russian proposals.

Eurasian integration. Russia's attempt at the economic unification of the post-Soviet area. OSW Study 44/2013

In 2009, Vladimir Putin, the then Russian prime minister, gave impetus to the establishment of closer relations within what was then a still narrow group of three countries: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Russia was determined in embarking on the implementation of the principles of the Customs Union among these three states and, since 2012, within the Common Economic Space as well. This process of integration is intended to bring about the introduction of ‘four freedoms’ in this area: the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. From Moscow’s point of view, building up such integration structures is especially necessary in order to counteract the economic expansion of the European Union and China. It also feels it is important to take measures against the loosening of the bonds between the CIS countries and Russia. At the same time, close co-operation is expected to guarantee for Russia that the strong politico-economic influences in this area will be maintained. Despite the numerous limitations of the integration process, such as the small number of the participating states or limited progress in implementing the CES, this is still the most advanced integration programme in the region seen since the collapse of the USSR. Progress in putting the rules of the Customs Union into practice can be seen as a success for Moscow. In turn, the formation of the CES is still at an early stage, and it is difficult to determine at this point to what extent the three countries will harmonise their markets.

Ever further from Moscow. Russia's stance on Central Asia. OSW Study 48/2014

The post-Soviet countries of Central Asia are important for Moscow as a potential source of danger; as a site of its relationships with China, the West and the Islamic world; and not least as a space covered by Russia’s integration initiatives. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russian influence in this region has undergone a far-reaching erosion. The Kremlin’s consistent actions to build up the Eurasian Union, as well as the threat of destabilisation in region after the ISAF operation in Afghanistan winds up in 2014, have slowed down this process, although it is unlikely to be reversed. The current ‘state of possession’ (i.e. the instruments and assets which Russia possesses) still ensures Moscow a minimum level of control over the region, which means that the activity of other global players is limited. This situation may change in tandem with a rise in their ambitions, especially with the possible involvement of China in the field of ‘hard’ security.

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

Rok Putina. Obwod kaliningradzki w kontekscie rozszerzenia Unii Europejskiej. Prace OSW 2/2001. = Putin's Year. The Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of EU enlargement. OSW Study 2/2001

Last year Kaliningrad became the subject of an international debate involving first of all the European Union, Russia, the USA, and the countries bordering the enclave, Poland and Lithuania. Such keen interest in a small region of less than a million inhabitants was mainly due to the fact that Kaliningrad has found itself in the very centre of two processes which are of paramount importance for Europe: EU and NATO enlargement. If Lithuania becomes a member of those units and Poland joins the EU, this Russian enclave will become an island surrounded on all land borders by a totally different, political, economic and military entity. In the course of the debate many questions were raised about the situation in the Oblast and how it affects neighbouring countries, the real interests and intentions of the parties involved in the debate, and the future of the region. The authors of this publication are attempting to answer these questions. The first part of this analysis is devoted to presenting the most important internal problems of the enclave, considering their influence on the surrounding world and the consequences of adopting the acquis communautaire in Poland and Lithuania. The second part characterises Moscow's policies towards Kaliningrad on the one hand, and those of Western countries on the other. Finally, the authors discuss the probable ways in which the situation in the enclave will develop.

Wschodnia granica zewnetrzna rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej. Wspolpraca transgraniczna na nowej granicy wshodniej Unii Europejskiej. Rosyjskojezyczni na Lotwie i w Estonii. Prace OSW 14/2004. The Eastern external border of the enlarge European Union. Cross-border co-operation at the new Eastern border of the European Union. Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia. OSW Study 14/2004

Russians or so-called Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia pose a significant problem for both countries. Russian-speakers are a numerous minority in Latvia and Estonia, which causes deep division in these countries from the ethnical point of view. The problem of highest importance in the legal aspect is the unregulated status of the Russian-speakers. Though they are permanent residents of Latvia and Estonia many of them still do not have these countries' citizenship. The complex naturalisation procedure introduced by Latvia and Estonia soon after restoring independence in 1991 is considered to be main responsible for this.

Rosja wobec Unii Europejskiej: kryzys „strategicznego partnerstwa.” Prace OSW 22/2006. = Russia vs. the European Union: a “strategic partnership” crisis. OSW Study 22/2006

Contrary to both parties' declarations on the development of their "strategic partnership", relations between Russia and the European Union have over recent years been in a state which could be called one of crisis. However, this does not mean that there have been no achievements in EU-Russian relations. The key problem is that Russia and the European Union have essentially different perceptions, aspirations and interests, which causes mistrust and disillusionment. This crisis is manifested in mutual criticism by the two sides, regularly recurring tensions and cooling of relations ("minicrises"), and especially by the "virtualisation of co-operation", i.e. concealing a lack of substantive content in many key areas under increasingly rich layers of dialogue and co-operation.

Trudny "Sojusznik" Bialorus w polityce Rosji. Prace OSW 2008. = Difficult "ally." Belarus in Russia's foreign policy. OSW Study 28/2008

Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.

Bosniacki chaos. Zrodla kryzysu politycznego we wspolczesnej Bosni i Hercegowinie. Prace OSW 31/2009. = Bosnia's chaos. Causes of the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. OSW Study 31/2009

A new form of 'transformational crisis' has been observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina since at least 2005. Politicians representing the three major ethno-political communities (Bosnians, Croats and Serbs) have successively been raising disputes and have employed various political tools to preserve the conflicts instead of resolving them. As a result, the central state institutions and organisations have been weakened and attempts to replace them with narrower ethnic structures have been made. This is increasingly paralysing the state, thus impeding its everyday operation and preventing its structures and legislation from being modernised; had this been achieved, it would have resulted in a real acceleration of the process of Bosnia's integration with the EU and NATO. The present crisis is also an effect of the disagreement between the key international players - the European Union, the United States and Russia - over the 'plan for Bosnia' and the role and duties of the Office of the High Representative, who acts on behalf of the international community in the country.