Constitution for a new Hungary - the domestic and regional implications. OSW Commentary No. 60, 2011-07-29

The new constitution will come into force in Hungary on 1 January 20121. Its adoption is part of the state reform which the Fidesz party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been implementing since it won the election in April 2010. Fidesz, along with the Christian Democrats which support it, has a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes in parliament and may introduce solutions to facilitate its rule without support from other groupings and it is taking advantage of this opportunity. One example of this has been the amendment of the constitution ten times followed by a speedy adoption of a new constitution. The next step will be passing dozens of constitutional laws which regulate essential areas of the functioning of the state over the next few months. Both the way and the scope in which the changes have been made have raised controversies both at home and abroad. The regulations reinforce the position of the ruling camp on the Hungarian political scene, assisting it in passing the test of the next elections. Slovakia, which has criticised the practice of granting Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in other countries, is opposing the promise of also granting them electoral rights. The constitutional reinforcement of the state’s ‘responsibility’ for the diaspora linked with the collective concept of national minority rights fostered by Hungary has already led to tensions in the region.

The Regulatory Framework of Export Restrictions in WTO Law and Regional Free Trade Agreements. IES WORKING PAPER 8/2013

The use of export restrictions has become more and more common in recent years, evidencing the substantial loopholes existing in the WTO regulation on the matter. As a result of this deficient legal framework, the WTO membership experiences important losses of welfare and increasing political tensions. The multilateral negotiations for an updated discipline on export restrictions, in the context of the Doha Development Round, are blocked. Consequently, members have established a set of preferential bilateral and multilateral agreements to relieve the negative effects of these measures. Likewise, some recent WTO members have committed to stricter regulations as part of their Accession Protocols. Nevertheless, these methods have evidenced some important flaws, and the multilateral scene remains the optimum forum to address export restrictions. This Working Paper proposes a number of measures to improve the legal framework of the quantitative export restrictions and export duties, as well as their notification procedures.