An appropriated state? Moldova’s uncertain prospects for modernisation. OSW COMMENTARY 168, 22.04.2015,

From the Introduction. There have been several significant changes on Moldova’s domestic political scene in the wake of the November 2014 parliamentary elections there. Negotiations lasted nearly two months and resulted in the formation of a minority coalition composed of two groupings: the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM). New coalition received unofficial support from the Communist Party (PCRM), which had previously been considered an opposition party. Contrary to their initial announcements, PDLM and PDM did not admit the Liberal Party led by Mihai Ghimpu to power. Moreover, they blocked the nomination for prime minister of the incumbent, Iurie Leancă. Leancă has been perceived by many as an honest politician and a guarantor of reforms. This situation resulted in the political model present in Moldova since 2009 being preserved. In this model the state’s institutions are subordinated to two main oligarch politicians: Vlad Filat (the leader of PLDM) and Vlad Plahotniuc (a billionaire who de facto controls PDM).

A captured state? Moldova’s uncertain prospects for modernisation. OSW Commentary No. 168, 22 April 2015

There have been several significant changes on Moldova’s domestic political scene in the wake of the November 2014 parliamentary elections there. Negotiations lasted nearly two months and resulted in the formation of a minority coalition composed of two groupings: the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM). New coalition received unofficial support from the Communist Party (PCRM), which had previously been considered an opposition party. Contrary to their initial announcements, PDLM and PDM did not admit the Liberal Party led by Mihai Ghimpu to power. Moreover, they blocked the nomination for prime minister of the incumbent, Iurie Leancă. Leancă has been perceived by many as an honest politician and a guarantor of reforms. This situation resulted in the political model present in Moldova since 2009 being preserved. In this model the state’s institutions are subordinated to two main oligarch politicians: Vlad Filat (the leader of PLDM) and Vlad Plahotniuc (a billionaire who de facto controls PDM).

Flashlight Europe N°8 – October 2015; Deeper EU integration is in Poland’s interest

The Polish people have voted in favour of the political change: former prime minister Jaroslaw Kaczyński’s party Law and Justice (PiS) with its front-runner Beata Szydlo turned out strongest in the parliamentary elections on Sunday with almost 38 per cent of votes. The liberal Civic Platform (PO), headed by prime minister Ewa Kopacz, gained only 23.4 per cent. Why this shift to the right? And what will be the consequences for Polish politics? We asked Jacek Kucharczyk, President of the executive board of the Warsaw-based Institute of Public Affairs.

Dear Donald … Yours, David. CEPS Commentary, 12 November 2015

The cordial letter of November 10th from the British Prime Minister to the President of the European Council is an important document. It sets the stage for deliberations on whether the UK stays in the EU, or quits in an historic act of destructive disintegration for the EU that condemns the UK to what has fittingly been called “the spectre of geo-political irrelevance”. Overall the letter is looking like a plausible move towards settling the Brussels part of the Prime Minister’s manifest objective to keep the UK in the EU, argues Michael Emerson in this CEPS Commentary. But there is one major part of the debate that is underdeveloped so far: the clarification of the scenarios and consequences of secession. Eurosceptics have not detailed their positions on how to manage the secession, but what is becoming clearer is that all conceivable options are far more problematic than the status quo.

Odessa Oblast: Governor Saakashvili’s superficial changes. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 196|February 2016

Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, Odessa Oblast, one of Ukraine’s key regions in economic and political terms, is still strongly polarised as regards its residents’ views on the future of their country. The political circles rooted in the Party of Regions have maintained their influence to a great extent due to increasing dissatisfaction with the central government’s activity and with the economic crisis which has strongly affected the public. Politicians linked to the ancien régime remain the most important political players. Some pro-Ukrainian circles had pinned their hopes for change in the region on the nomination of the former Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, for governor of Odessa Oblast on 30 May 2015. At the beginning of his rule this politician made widely publicised promises to combat corruption, to improve the quality of the administration services, to develop infrastructure and to attract foreign capital. However, more than half a year has passed since he assumed office, and it is difficult to speak about any spectacular successes in reforming the region. Saakashvili has above all become a player on the national forum, supporting the presidential camp in their struggle with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi, among others. However, his nomination has made Odessa Oblast more important for Ukraine, above all in political and symbolic terms. This is because Odessa Oblast is the best manifestation of the condition of the Ukrainian state two years since the Revolution of Dignity – rudimentary reforms or no reforms at all, strong resistance to any changes from the administration, strong local political-business connections, the lack of consolidation among post-Maidan groups and corruption inherent in the system.

Brexit averted through EU reform? EPC Post-Summit Commentary, 22 February 2016

After some drama, the EU Summit produced the expected result: an agreement on the UK-EU relationship that broadly reflects the demands Prime Minister Cameron set out in his letter to President Tusk in November 2015. This reveals that no other EU leader wants to see the UK leave, given the political and economic costs this implies for the EU as a whole, especially in such a crises-dominated period.

Modi's Reform Agenda: Change You Can Believe In? Asia Policy Brief 2015/04, November 2015

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi entered office with a historic political mandate. For the first time in thirty years, a single party won a majority of seats in the lower house of Parliament (Lok Sabha). However, Modi faces skyhigh expectations to fulfill his campaign promises of getting India’s economy back on track. Eighteen months into his government’s term and in the wake of electoral defeats in the states of Delhi and Bihar, questions are being raised about its economic performance. While the Modi government has stabilized India’s macroeconomy and announced a series of incremental economic reforms, more sweeping changes have fallen victim to India’s nettlesome domestic politics, including roadblocks within the ruling alliance.

Moldova: from oligarchic pluralism to Plahotniuc’s hegemony. OSW Commentary Number 208/07.04.2016

Moldova’s political system took shape due to the six-year rule of the Alliance for European Integration coalition but it has undergone a major transformation over the past six months. Resorting to skilful political manoeuvring and capitalising on his control over the Moldovan judiciary system, Vlad Plahotniuc, one of the leaders of the nominally pro-European Democratic Party and the richest person in the country, was able to bring about the arrest of his main political competitor, the former prime minister Vlad Filat, in October 2015. Then he pushed through the nomination of his trusted aide, Pavel Filip, for prime minister. In effect, Plahotniuc has concentrated political and business influence in his own hands on a scale unseen so far in Moldova’s history since 1991. All this indicates that he already not only controls the judiciary, the anti-corruption institutions, the Constitutional Court and the economic structures, but has also subordinated the greater part of parliament and is rapidly tightening his grip on the section of the state apparatus which until recently was influenced by Filat.

Vučić’s plebiscite almost slipped on arithmetics. EPC Commentary, 29 April 2016

As largely anticipated, the incumbent Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, secured another four years in power at the snap elections that took place on 24 April. However, the results suggest that Vučić has overplayed his hand with this personal plebiscite: simple arithmetics unmasked his exaggerated hope to wipe out the opposition and consolidate political dominance. This might bode well for political pluralism but voters’ preferences and the affixed party options caution against taking Serbia’s commitment to European integration for granted.

A historic reminder, an ever-present dilemma? - Assessing Brexit’s potential consequences for European security. EPC Commentary, 18 May 2016

On 9 May 2016, in a further attempt to discourage the British public opinion from opting for their country’s abandonment of the European Union (EU) in the ‘in/out’ referendum on 23 June, Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the UK has regretted "turning its back" on Europe in the past, and that the EU had "helped reconcile" countries and maintain peace on the Old Continent.

Brexit - A last testament. CEPS Commentary, 23 May 2016

One month to go now, before the fateful decision will be made on 23 June 2016, to Remain or to Leave, that is the question – after four years of thinking about it by Prime Minister Cameron’s government.

Exit from Brexit? Not likely but uncertainty prevails. EPC Commentary, 12 July 2016

Theresa May, who is set to become UK Prime Minister on Wednesday, has made it clear that “Brexit means Brexit”. Stating this so bluntly has become necessary as a number of voices have speculated that there may be a way back from the brink, claiming that the result of the referendum is not very decisive and that citizens have been misled by the lies of the Brexit campaign, not realising the magnitude of the decision. There certainly seems a wish in the Chancellery in Berlin and in some other capitals that Britain can be kept in, accompanied by a willingness to table compromises to smooth the process.

Ukraine and Russia: a hindered rapprochement. OSW Commentary No. 44, 2010-12-15

The policy of rapprochement with Russia that President Victor Yanukovych and his entourage had been actively promoting in the first months of his presidency has slowed down notably. One of the reasons for this lowered pace is that current talks between Russia and Ukraine concern the spheres in which Kyiv is not ready to make concessions to Russia. Despite numerous top-level meetings, recent months have failed to bring a breakthrough in energy issues of key importance. First of all, no compromise was reached in gas issues where the divergence of interests is particularly large and where Ukraine has adopted a tough stance to negotiate the best conditions possible. Even though some agreements were signed during the October session of the inter-governmental committee presided over by the prime ministers (the agreement on linking the two states’ aircraft production and on the joint construction of a nuclear fuel production plant), these resulted from prior agreements. Economic negotiations will continue in the coming months but the observed deadlock is not likely to be broken any time soon. The results of these talks are likely to reflect the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, as well as the competition among Ukrainian business groups, some of which opt for closer cooperation with their Eastern neighbour. Ukraine’s consent to send oil to Belarus along the Odessa-Brody pipeline shows that the government in Kyiv is ready to engage in projects they consider profitable, even those that run counter to Russian interests. Ukraine’s adoption of this stance may trigger irritation in Moscow and lead to a cooling in bilateral relations.