116 resultados para global financial crisis
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This Policy Contribution...discusses how Europe's financial system could and should be reshaped. It starts from two basic points: First, the banking system needs to be credibly de-linked from the sovereigns and banks should operate across borders. Europe needs fewer national champions. Second, other forms of financial intermediation need to be developed. Both steps require a significant stepping up of the policy system, including a single resolution mechanism. Together, this will render Europe’s financial system more stable, more efficient and more conducive to growth.
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Given the size of the financial markets on both sides of the Atlantic and the symmetry in the follow-up of the G-20 standards, Karel Lannoo argues in this Policy Brief that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) provides a good opportunity to put in place a more institutionalised framework. He finds that both blocs have reacted in similar ways to the financial crisis in strengthening their regulatory and supervisory frameworks and incorporating the G-20 recommendations into federal law. He also notes that consumer protection has been reinforced, certainly in the US, with the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. And on the EU side, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) will radically change banking supervision. In his view, inclusion of financial services could also be an opportunity to strengthen prudential rules and consumer protection provisions on both sides. Rather than leading to a reduction of consumer protection, as had been feared in the post-crisis environment, it could lead to an examination, exchange and recognition of best practices in regulation and enforcement. Finally, he concludes that inclusion of financial services would make it part of the permanent regulatory dialogue that will be established as a result of a successful TTIP.
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This paper sketches the main features and issues related to recent market developments in global transaction banking (GTB), particularly in trade finance, cash management and correspondent banking. It describes the basic functioning of the GTB, its interaction with global financial markets and related implications of global regulatory developments such as Basel III. The interest in GTB has recently increased, since its low-risk profile, tendency to follow growth rates worldwide and relative independence from other financial instruments became an interesting diversification opportunity both for banks’ business models and for investors. Transaction banking has been a resilient business during the crisis, despite the reduction in world trade figures. In the post crisis period, GTB must cope with new challenges related to increased local and global regulation and the risk of inconsistency in regulatory approaches, which could negatively impact the global network and increased competition by new market entrants. Increased sophistication of corporate clients, as well as the pressure to develop and adopt technological innovations more quickly than other areas of banking continues to impact the business. The future of the industry closely depends on its ability to adjust to complex regulatory developments while at the same time being able to operate a global and efficient network.
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At present, the market is severely mispricing Greece’s sovereign risk relative to the country’s fundamentals. As a result of the mispricing, financial intermediation in Greece has become dysfunctional and the privatisation of state-owned assets has stalled. This mispricing is partially due to an illiquid and fragmented government yield curve. A well-designed public liability management exercise can lead to a more efficient pricing of Greece’s government bonds and thereby help restore stable and affordable financing for the country’s private sector, which is imperative in order to overcome Greece’s deep recession. This paper proposes three measures to enhance the functioning of the Greek government debt market: i) Greece should issue a new five-year bond, ii) it should consolidate the 20 individual series of government bonds into four liquid securities and iii) it should offer investors a swap of these newly created bonds into dollar-denominated securities. Each of these measures would be beneficial to the Hellenic Republic, since the government would be able to reduce the face value and the net present value of its debt stock. Furthermore, this exercise would facilitate the resumption of market access, which is a necessary condition for continuous multilateral disbursements to Greece.
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To ward off the threat of a worldwide depression that loomed at the end of the 2000s, governments opted to run up substantial fiscal deficits. In doing so, they sowed the seeds of the sovereign debt crisis. Saddled with often high debt burdens and modest growth prospects, developed countries’ governments must now rebalance their budgets. Doing so too rapidly, however, will choke growth. Faced with this dilemma, Japan and the United States have pursued growth policies while the euro area members are quickly trying to rebalance their budgets. This book explores the respective risks associated with these two strategies. It further investigates the consequences for the international monetary and financial system of developing countries’ public debts ceasing to be risk-free.
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Countries can make a clean exit from financial assistance, or enter a new programme or a precautionary programme, depending on the sustainability of their public debt and their vulnerability to shocks. Ireland made a clean exit in December 2013, supported by significant budgetary and current-account adjustment and signs of economic recovery. But Irish debt sustainability is not guaranteed and prudence will be needed to avoid future difficulties. A clean exit for Portugal is not recommended when its programme ends in May 2014, because compared to Ireland it faces higher interest rates, has poorer growth prospects and has probably less ability to generate a consistently high primary surplus. A precautionary arrangement would be advisable. In case debt sustainability proves difficult to achieve later, some form of debt restructuring may prove necessary. It is unlikely that Greece will be able to exit its programme in December 2014. A third programme should be put in place to take Greece out of the market until 2030, accompanied by enhanced budgetary and structural reform commitments by Greece, a European boost to economic growth in the euro-area periphery and willingness on the part of lenders to reduce loan charges below their borrowing costs, should public debt levels prove unsustainable despite Greece meeting the loan conditions. Even assuming all goes well, the three countries will be subject to enhanced post-pro-gramme surveillance for decades. Managing such long-term relationships will be a key challenge.
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The EMS crisis of the 1990s illustrated the importance of a lack of confidence in price or exchange rate stability, whereas the present crisis illustrates the importance of a lack of confidence in fiscal sustainability. Theoretically the difference between the two should be minor since, in terms of the real return to an investor, the loss of purchasing power can be the same when inflation is unexpectedly high, or when the nominal value of government debt is cut in a formal default. Experience has shown, however, that expropriation via a formal default is much more disruptive than via inflation. The paper starts by providing a brief review of the EMS crisis, emphasising that the most interesting period might be the ‘post-EMS’ crisis of 1993-95. It then reviews in section 2 the crisis factors, comparing the EMS crisis to today’s euro crisis. Section 3 outlines the main analytical issue, namely the potential instability of high public debt within and outside a monetary union. Section 4 then compares the pressure on public finance coming from the crises for the case of Italy. Section 5 uses data on ‘foreign currency’ debt to disentangle expectations of devaluation/inflation from expectations of default. Section 6 concludes.
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Despite the emergence of a critical debate against the EU-imposed austerity measures both at the level of the political elites and on the street, this EPIN Commentary by two Spanish political scientists based in Barcelona finds no sign that the upcoming European elections will have a more European focus than any of the previous ones. While there is no anti-European discourse among the Spanish mainstream political parties, they report that public trust in the European institutions is plummeting and Spanish turnout in European elections has been dropping in the last few years. In the authors’ view, the main reason for this is the low level of awareness of the functioning of the European Parliament but some responsibility also lies with the Spanish political parties and the way they deal with the electoral campaign to mobilise the discontented voters, who consider unemployment and the economic situation as the two most important issues that the country is facing at the moment.
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The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.
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In the last few years, Europe has been forced to re-think its socio-economic model. Social indicators speak for themselves. Real household income declined significantly between 2008 and 2012, employment rates are lower and the number of people in poverty saw a steady rise with a growing divergence between EU countries. In the eurozone, cuts in public spending and internal devaluation have been the main tools to aim at a correction of unsustainable fiscal positions and a strengthening of competitiveness. It has carried a heavy social price tag. Outside of the eurozone, austerity has also been the prevailing policy, seen as inevitable to avoid economic instability. The crisis has not hit everyone equally. The general losses have been high, but there have also been some quite important redistributive effects. With all the difficulties of defining and measuring 'fairness', it is clear that the adjustment has not been equitable. Apart from issues of market failure, there have been direct increases of inequality within each of the member states. Higher poverty rates have been observed, rises in inequalities between higher and lower income earners as well as intergenerational inequalities between age groups. Long-term consequences are only beginning to surface in the public debate as the most immediate pressures of the crisis are slowly overcome. In this report, the authors first of all look at the results of the survey we have carried out in seven European countries and review perceptions of the socio-economic model. Subsequently, they assess the importance of the social dimension in the broader context of the European growth model. The authors discuss the impact of the structural challenges of globalisation, demography and technological change. They then review the EU’s performance in the crisis. Finally, the authors make a number of recommendations on how to bridge the gap between Europeans‘ expectations and reality.
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During the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 was hastily elevated to ‘global economic steering committee’. In the early stages of the crisis, the G20 was an effective forum for crisis containment. As the crisis has eased, however, the G20 has lost both direction and momentum. Governments and policymakers have felt less need to act in unison and have rather refocused on their national agendas, as is their duty and primary function. However, effective global governance is needed permanently, not just in crisis times. It is desirable to have more representative and effective global governance that, among other things, is equipped to prevent crises rather than just react to them. In an environment of rapid change in global patterns of trade and wealth creation, a new revamped (but highly representative) grouping should be created within the G20, to provide leadership on key economic policy matters. Euro-area members should give up their individual seats in this G7+, allowing room for China and other large emerging economies. Without euro-area countries taking such a step, it would be impossible to reconcile effectiveness and representation in this new G7+, which would take charge of decision making on global economic imbalances, financial and monetary issues. All existing G20 countries, including individual euro-area countries, would however remain in the G20, which could potentially expand and would remain the prime forum for discussion on all remaining matters at global level.
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The costs of the crisis in Southern European countries have not been only economic but political. Economic crises tend to lead to government instability and termination while political challengers are expected to exploit this contingent window of opportunity to gain an advantage over incumbents in national elections. The current crisis seems to make no exception, looking at the results of the general elections recently held in Southern Europe. However, this did not always lead to a clear victory of the main opposition parties. In most of the elections, in fact, the incumbent parties’ loss did not coincide with the official opposition’s gain. The extreme case is represented by Italy, where both the outgoing government coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi – setting aside for the moment the technocratic phase – and its main challenger, the centre left coalition, ended up losing millions of voters and a new political force, the Five Star Movement, obtained about 25 per cent of votes. On the opposite side there is Portugal. Only in Portugal did the vote increase for the centre right PSD, in fact, exceed the incumbent socialists’ loss. The present work aims at exploring the factors which might account for this significant divergence between the two cases.
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Over the four years since its launch, the Eastern Partnership initiative has created frameworks and mechanisms for the integration of Eastern Partnership countries with the European Union. Despite this, the partner countries have so far made little meaningful progress in modernisation, implementation of reforms or integration with the EU.Since the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched in 2004, the situation in areas of key importance for the EU, such as democratisation, free-market transformations, European integration, political stability and regional security, has not improved significantly. In this context, it is legitimate to ask questions about the extent to which the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership have brought the Union closer to achieving its declared objectives in the relations with eastern neighbours. What is the underlying cause of the dwindling involvement and declining interest in achieving real progress in integration? How may the events that have been dominating the political agenda – i.e. the EU’s financial crisis, the debate on the future of the Union, but also the political processes taking place within the partner countries – affect the future of mutual relations?