The Governance Gap in European Security and Defence. CEPS Policy Brief No. 310, 19 December 2013

The true causes of the EU’s inertia as a security actor in its neighbourhood and beyond are not a lack of capability or even austerity measures, but the absence of a core group of states committed to driving integration forward, argues Giovanni Faleg. Member states are reluctant to set clear common strategic priorities and struggle to agree on a revision of the institutional rules. Their strategic cultures and interests differ significantly; they hold different visions of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and are unwilling to use the CSDP instruments at their disposal.

The EU’s comprehensive approach towards security: the Lisbon Treaty and “smart power”. EU Centre Singpore Policy Brief No. 6, May 2013

The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a comprehensive security actor. With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a reaction to the failure of the EU to act during the wars in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU has a wide range of instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management as well as post-crisis intervention at its disposal. Observers typically agree that “hard power” is no longer sufficient to address the complex security challenges of today’s world while the EU, often criticised for only utilising “soft power”, is now able to exercise “smart power”. Through a comprehensive approach, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can now use the various instruments at its disposal, such as diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities in a joined-up manner. This mix of tools and instruments is helping the EU to achieve the aim set out in its European Security Strategy: “a secure Europe in a better world”.

The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS. CEPS Paperbacks. February 2013

This CEPS book examines two interrelated questions: 1) How has the European External Action Service (EEAS) functioned in the EU institutional architecture in the first two years of its existence? 2) What improvements can be made through the 2013 review and the 2014 revision of the EEAS’ mandate? The study contributes to the current debate through an in-depth examination of the EEAS’ relations with the EU member states, the European Commission, the European Parliament and its Delegations. The analysis is complemented by in-depth interviews conducted with senior officials from the relevant institutions. The authors put forward specific recommendations, organised around three basic roles that the EEAS plays in the EU’s external relations: a) leader, b) coordinator and c) information hub.

Human security in Central Asia: can the EU help out? EUCAM Policy Brief No. 21, October 2011

The European Union is a security actor in Central Asia, although with less influence than other players. Russia and China have a much larger impact on Central Asian regimes’ security strategies. These limitations do not dispense with the need for the EU to provide a better security narrative, especially in light of its growing emphasis on human security, and to incorporate this into the current review of its strategy for the region. This policy brief will centre on the EU’s contribution to human security in Central Asia.

Governing Global Food Security. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/07/September 2014

Summary. Food security remains a critical issue for the international community. Although significant and positive steps have been taken towards worldwide food governance in recent years, this Policy Brief argues that more can and should be done in the coming years. Additional actions that policy-makers could consider range from enhancing understanding between different actors and improving the engagement of civil society to the extension of capacity-building efforts, regulatory stability and sufficient access to credit. When taken together in a search for strategic policy coordination, these actions offer the possibility to dramatically improve global food security.

From a European to a common security and defence policy. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2010

The Lisbon Treaty has introduced significant changes in the field of EU security and defence. On the one hand, important institutional reforms, such as the creation of a renewed High Representative, have of course a great impact on this policy field. On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced specific innovations in the security and defence of the European Union. The mutual defence clause and the new mechanisms for flexible cooperation such as the permanent structured cooperation, are only some of the key innovations. Generally, the European Security and Defence Policy receives its own section in the Treaty on European Union and is rebranded as Common Security and Defence Policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty sets the objective for a common policy in this field. However, does this reform really provide for the means for the realization of such a common policy? Furthermore, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text? These are the main questions that the present paper attempts to address through the analysis of the new institutional setting of the post-Lisbon security and defence policy, as well as through the examination of the specific innovations in this area.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine. OSW Point of View 50, May 2015

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

The European Power Hierarchy, Member State Trust, and Public Support for the Common Security and Defense Policy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 2, August 2015

Existing studies focus on overall support for European integration while less work has been done on explaining public opinion on specific policy areas, such as the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). We hypothesize that the probability of supporting a CSDP increases with greater levels of trust in the European Union member states, most notably the more powerful members. This variable is critical since integration’s development is influenced strongly by, and dependent on, the resources of the relatively more powerful European member states. Binary logistic regression analyses using pooled repeated cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted from 1992 to 1997 among individuals of 11 member states largely support these claims.

New ICT sectors: platforms for European growth? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/14, August 2012

Europe's failure to specialise in new ICT sectors and firms is likely to hold back Europe’s post-crisis recovery. Europe lacks in particular leading platform providers, who are capturing most of the value in the new ICT ecosystem. • In-depth analysis of some specific new emerging ICT sectors shows that the problem in Europe appears not to be so much in the generation of new ideas, but rather in bringing ideas successfully to market. Among the barriers are the lack of a single digital market, fragmented intellectual property regimes, lack of an entrepreneurial culture, limited access to risk capital and an absence of ICT clusters. • The EU policy framework, particularly the Innovation Union and Digital Agenda EU 2020 Flagships, could better leverage the growth power for Europe of new ICT markets. The emphasis should move beyond providing support for infrastructure and research, to funding programmes for pre-commercial projects. But perhaps most important is dealing with the fragmentation in European digital markets.

Beyond retrenchment over Iran: can the EU offer a framework for regional security? CEPS Commentary, 3 September 2012

A new and far-reaching round of sanctions imposed recently on Iran by the EU is starting to hurt the country, its economy and its citizens. Yet Iran’s leadership seems deaf to demands for international weapons inspectors to be allowed unhindered access to its nuclear enrichment facilities. With a regime that is not likely to sway to international and domestic pressure, and in view of the shifting strategic landscape in the Middle East, the question is whether the twin-track approach of sanctions and diplomacy should be kept up, or whether it should make way for an alternative set of policies that could preserve the fragile stability in the wider Middle East and turn a vicious circle into a virtuous one. In this new Commentary, CEPS Senior Research Fellow Steven Blockmans argues that the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, supported by the European External Action Service, is in a good position to offer a negotiated way out of this seemingly intractable situation.

The UK-Canada Agreement on mutual support of missions abroad: loyalty compromised? CEPS Commentary, 18 October 2012

The UK and Canada recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at allowing the two countries to optimise their respective diplomatic resources by sharing embassy and consulate sites, the joint acquisition, supply and use of services, as well as collaboration on crisis response, consular services, security, diplomatic mail, information management and IT. This CEPS Commentary argues that the MoU on Mutual Support of Missions Abroad runs counter to the spirit of loyal cooperation, in particular in the realm of EU foreign policy. It also raises challenges to coherence, consistency and effectiveness of EU action in policy areas concerning visas, trade and consular protection. Moreover, the agreement may throw a spanner in the works of EU solidarity and the creation of a stronger EU identity, both internally and externally

The European Union-an expanding security community? EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2012, August 2012

This paper investigates why and how the geographical scope of the security community centered around the European Union (EU) is expanding. It starts from the assumption that the EU itself is a ‘tightly-coupled mature pluralistic security community’. The analysis of the expansion of this peaceful area is based on the theoretical framework first designed by Karl Deutsch and later developed by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. Contrary to the logic of the adage ‘si vis pacem para bellum’, I argue that the security community is expanding because the EU’s own origins and self-perception are driven by an ambition to create lasting peace. The key mechanisms I explore are the EU’s enlargement and neighborhood policies, which are best understood when analyzed against the concept of concentric circles: the regional EU-centered security community is a multi-speed security community, stronger at its core and weaker as it spreads towards its margins.

Brazilian perspectives on the changing global order and security challenges. CEPS Working Document No. 376, February 2013

This study analyses the current picture and prospects for EU–Brazil relations in the political and security arenas. As actors experiencing relevant changes, albeit in different directions in their respective international status quo, the EU and Brazil have found some common ground for convergence at the macro level on some structural issues, such as the normative framework of a changing global order, the striving for a multipolar world and the relevance and desirability of multilateralism. At the same time, it is argued that they differ significantly as to the strategies pursued in the attainment of those shared interests, resulting in competing, or eventually divergent, policy preferences when addressing specific issues and developments at the international level, limiting the prospects for a deep mutual commitment and engagement in political and security dynamics at the global level.

Russia and the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice. CEPS Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 54, 25 February 2013

EU-Russia cooperation in the framework of the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, launched almost a decade ago in 2003, has borne fruit more in the security aspects than the justice and liberty-related policy areas. This study assesses the uneven cooperation on justice and home affairs between the EU and Russia, while delving into the intersection between cooperation on justice, liberty and security and the promotion of human rights, democracy and rule of law in EU-Russia relations. The study concludes by proposing a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament for playing a more active role in this important field of cooperation between the EU and Russia.