‘Optimal’ versus ‘Maximal’ Public Access to Documents: a Brief Note on EU Case Law. European Policy Brief No. 4, September 2011

With the legislative reform of Regulation No 1049/2001 on Public Access to Documents stuck in a political deadlock for the last 3-4 years, this policy brief reflects on the main trends in the sizeable - not uncontroversial - body of case law by which the Court of Justice of the European Union has shaped to an important extent the right of public access to documents within the Union. Indeed, when policy-makers eventually manage to move beyond the current political stalemate, they will simply be obliged to take into account and respond to these jurisprudential interpretations. Hence, this policy brief aims to raise policy-makers’ awareness of the different issues at stake in this dossier and pleads in favour of ‘optimal’ as

Information Guide: The EU Referendum, 23 June 2016. The United Kingdom and the European Union. A guide to information sources July 2016

A guide to information sources on the 'Brexit Debate' in the United Kingdom - the decision to hold a referendum in the United Kingdom on the 23 June 2016 as to whether the country should remain or leave the European Union. The guide is a structured listing of information sources from the EU, the UK government, UK Parliament, the main campaigning groups, think tanks, news sources and other sources on this important topic. Note that the images within the guide are all hyperlinks to the full text of the sources. The guides is being constantly updated during 2016.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.