Special Education and the Risk of Becoming Less Educated in Germany and the United States. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.1, 13 December, 2004

Over the twentieth century, a growing group of students has been transferred into considerably expanded special education systems. These programs serve children with diagnosed impairments and disabilities and students with a variety of learning difficulties. Children and youth “with special educational needs” constitute a heterogeneous group with social, ethnic, linguistic, and physical disadvantages. An increasingly large percentage of those students at risk of leaving school without credentials participate in special education, a highly legitimated low status (and stigmatizing) school form. While most countries commit themselves to school integration or inclusive education to replace segregated schools and separate classes, cross-national and regional comparisons of special education’s diverse student bodies show considerable disparities in their (1) rates of classification, (2) provided learning opportunities, and (3) educational attainments. Analyzing special education demographics and organizational structures indicates which children and youth are most likely to grow up less educated and how educational systems distribute educational success and failure. Findings from a German-American comparison show that which students bear the greatest risk of becoming less educated depends largely on definitions of “special educational needs” and the institutionalization of special education systems.

The Drivers of Current Account Surplus in Germany and the Politics of Rebalancing in the Eurozone. EU Centre, Singapore Working Paper No. 24, April 2015

Current account deficits have caught the public’s attention as they have contributed to the European debt crisis. However, surpluses also constitute an issue as a deficit in any country must be financed through a surplus in another country. In 2013, Germany, now the world’s largest surplus economy, registered a record high US$273 billion surplus. This paper looks at what accounts for Germany’s surplus, revealing that the major driving factors include strong global demand for quality German exports, domestic wage restraint, an undervalued single currency, high domestic savings rate and interest rate convergence in the euro area. This paper echoes the US Treasury’s view that a persistent German surplus makes it harder for the eurozone as a whole and the southern peripheral economies in particular to recover from the current financial crisis by imposing a Europe-wide “deflationary bias” through pushing up the exchange rate of the euro, exporting feeble German inflation and projecting its ultra-tight macroeconomic policies onto crisis economies. This paper contends that Germany’s trade surplus is likely to endure as Germany and other eurozone countries uphold diverging views on the nature of the surplus engage in a blame-game amidst a sluggish rebalancing process. Prizing the surplus as a reflection of hard work and economic competitiveness, German authorities urge their southern eurozone colleagues to undertake bold structural reforms to correct the imbalance, while the hand-tied governments in crisis-stricken economies call on Germany to do its “homework” by boosting German demands for European goods and services.

Development co-operation made in Germany. OSW REPORT 2015-07-29

For years, development policy has attracted the attention of public opinion in Germany and been strongly supported by the public. It takes the form of an agreement between equal partners who draw mutual benefits from this co-operation. German development policy is structured to support the German economy. This policy and the state’s significant share in development projects reduces the investment risk incurred by German entrepreneurs who engage their assets in developing countries. Furthermore, bilateral co-operation successfully builds the made in Germany brand as regards both development policy and further economic co-operation, making the beneficiaries of development co-operation indirectly dependent on German goods and services. Development co-operation, along with diplomacy and defence policy, is the third pillar of German foreign policy. In this context it plays above all a preventive function in the case of international conflicts. Investing funds as part of development projects in areas affected by military conflicts or facing a high risk of military conflict is viewed by Germany as its contribution to overcoming crises or removing their causes. This goes hand in hand with the conviction that international conflicts, wherever they appear, adversely affect the German economy, which heavily relies on exports.

The uncertain future of the coal energy industry in Germany. OSW COMMENTARY #188, 2015-10-20

Germany’s current energy strategy, known as the “energy transition”, or Energiewende, involves an accelerated withdrawal from the use of nuclear power plants and the development of renewable energy sources (RES). According to the government’s plans, the share of RES in electricity production will gradually increase from its present rate of 26% to 80% in 2050. Greenhouse gas emissions are expected to fall by 80–95% by 2050 when compared to 1990 levels. However, coal power plants still predominate in Germany’s energy mix – they produced 44% of electricity in 2014 (26% from lignite and 18% from hard coal). This makes it difficult to meet the emission reduction objectives, lignite combustion causes the highest levels of greenhouse gas emissions. In order to reach the emission reduction goals, the government launched the process of accelerating the reduction of coal consumption. On 2 July, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy published a plan to reform the German energy market which will be implemented during the present term of government. Emission reduction from coal power plants is the most important issue. This problem has been extensively discussed over the past year and has transformed into a conflict between the government and the coal lobby. The dispute reached its peak when lignite miners took to the streets in Berlin. As the government admits, in order to reach the long-term emission reduction objectives, it is necessary to completely liquidate the coal energy industry in Germany. This is expected to take place within 25 to 30 years. However, since the decision to decommission nuclear power plants was passed, the German ecological movement and the Green Party have shifted their attention to coal power plants, demanding that these be decommissioned by 2030 at the latest.

Going Global, Going West! Chinese Direct Investment in Germany. Asia Policy Brief 2014/03, May 2014

Chinese investors are welcome! Germany’s Federal Minister of Economy, Sigmar Gabriel, made this clear at the opening ceremony of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Berlin in January 2014. His words were not only meant as an invitation to Chinese companies, but also as a piece of advice for Germany’s business community and broader public. Chinese investors are often perceived to be going on a “global shopping spree” with a “political checkbook”, not only in Germany but everywhere in Europe. Some observers even suggest stricter controls for investors from specific countries, such as China. The German government is right to pursue the principle of a free trade and investment regime, while insisting that China’s government should level the playing field for foreign companies, too.

Federal States, Industries and Education Level – Effects of TTIP in Germany. Policy Brief #2013/05

A purely microeconomic perspective shows that all major industries and states would benefit from a transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP). The greatest manufacturing and employment effects would be seen in the electronics industry as well as metal processing. Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia would benefit most from this. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that new jobs would be created for all education groups – even for relatively unskilled workers. Their real income could increase even more than that of highly qualified workers.

Wage inequality in Germany – What role does global trade play? Policy Brief #2015/03

Wage inequality in Germany has increased significantly since the mid-1990s. The intensification of international trade relations is a frequently cited cause for this issue. However, an empirical study revealed that global trade can only directly explain around 15 percent of the increase in wage inequality in Germany. Primarily, the growing heterogeneity among companies in Germany plays a greater role – especially within industries. The decline in collective bargaining is the primary company-specific driver of wage inequality. Nevertheless, protectionist measures would not be effective for achieving greater wage equality.