The New Silk Road: a versatile instrument in China’s policy. OSW Commentary No. 161, February 10 2015

Introduction. The Chinese leader Xi Jinping presented the concept of the New Silk Road – a collection of land and maritime routes – in autumn 2013. Initially, it envisaged the creation of a network of infrastructural connections, mainly transport corridors, between China and its most important economic partner – Europe. The concept grew in importance throughout 2014 to become the key instrument of China’s foreign policy, especially in the areas of public diplomacy and soft power. Towards the end of 2014, the Chinese government announced it would establish a Silk Road Fund worth US$40 billion. The New Silk Road idea is a flexible formula used by China in its dialogue with many other countries. Its inclusive nature helps contribute to diluting the negative impression caused by China’s rapid economic expansion and assertiveness in foreign policy, especially with regard to its neighbours. The process of implementing the New Silk Road concept will allow China to expand its influence within its neighbourhood: in Central and South-Eastern Asia. The New Silk Road will be an alternative point of reference to the US dominance and Russian integration projects in these regions. The concept will legitimise and facilitate the growth of China’s influence in the transit countries on the route to Western Europe, i.e. in the Middle East (Arab countries, Israel and Turkey, the Horn of Africa and Central Europe (the Balkans and the Visegrad Group countries). This concept is also essential for China’s domestic policy. It has become one of Xi Jinping’s main political projects. It will boost the development of China’s central and western provinces. The fact that the concept is open and not fully defined means that it will be a success regardless of the extent to which it will be implemented in practice. Its flexible nature allows China to continue investments already initiated bilaterally and to present them as components of the New Silk Road concept.

EU labour migration policy by other means? The potential impact of EU economic governance reforms on labour migration policymaking. EPC Policy Brief, 13 February 2015

Over the last 15 years, Member States have been quite reluctant to address labour migration issues at EU level. Will the forthcoming years reverse the tide and lead to the developement of ambitious and common actions in this policy field? There are currently no strong signs of such a move towards a greater management of labour migration policy at EU level. However, Yves Pascouau argues in this FIERI Working paper that the deadlock may be broken with the development of new policy tools taking place in the field of economic governance. More precisely, he underlines that recipes adopted to overcome the so-called ‘euro crisis’ may well have an impact on labour migration issues.As a consequence, this could initiate a coordination process which was not called for by home affairs decision-makers.

Some reflections on the results and the working methods of the Belgian EU-Presidency in 2010. European Policy Brief No. 11, June 2012

In this Policy Brief, Belgian diplomat Willem Van de Voorde offers his hands-on view on the Belgian EU-Presidency in 2010; including the key lessons of this post-Lisbon Treaty “new style” rotating presidency. He argues that despite the major implications of the Lisbon Treaty, notably the new permanent President of the European Council, the rotating presidency can still play a central role in the EU decision-making process.

The Belgian parliaments and EU affairs: the reasons behind their limited involvement. European Policy Brief No. 28, March 2014

Given their limited involvement in EU affairs, the Belgian parliaments at the different levels of the Belgian federation barely contribute to the legitimation process of the EU’s actions. In order to strengthen their role, not only should governmental communication towards parliaments be improved but parliamentary activities should also adapt to the confederal features of Belgium. The latter poses a unique challenge in Europe.

The European Semester in Belgium: A state of play. European Policy Brief No. 32, October 2014

After four rounds of the European Semester process of EU economic coordination, Belgium has done relatively little to comply with EU recommendations. This brief substantiates and confirms this claim after clarifying the meaning of these recommendations. While the challenges underlined by the European Commission still lie ahead, Belgium’s ownership of the recommendations for reforms has been low. Not only do coordination processes remain bureaucratic and technocratic, but many of the recommendations’ concerns – external competitiveness, social security reforms, market reforms – are not traditionally defended by the political left in Belgium. The controversy surrounding the recommendations for national structural reforms owes much to their supply-side orientation, which contrasts with the inability of the EU to pursue demand-side policies. But despite this disequilibrium, the recommendations highlight relevant issues that ought to be addressed, and indicate where scope for national debate exists.

European elections: from ‘second-order’ elections to ‘first-order supranational’ elections, How can a ‘first-order supranational’ European election be created? European Policy Brief No. 34, April 2014

Starting from the idea that European elections cannot be considered as purely second order elections, the author gathers some proposals in order to encourage a more effective electoral process. According to the author, if political leaders adopt these reforms, it could transform gradually the European elections into genuine ‘first-order supranational elections’.

Syria: A Roadmap for a Sustainable Political Settlement. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 52, January 2014

On the eve of the Geneva II conference and amid continued fighting on the ground, this short paper seeks to draw up a roadmap, indicating the different stages and steps on the way to a sustainable political settlement of the conflict in Syria. A longer term perspective is put forward, adopting a broad-based and inclusive approach, focused on a Syrian-led transition process under international supervision with the assistance of key third countries, thus preparing the way for a multi-party democratic post-Baath future.

Beyond Russia’s ‘Versailles syndrome’. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 58, November 2014

Russia alleges that at the end of the Cold War it underwent a soft version of a Versailles Treaty, pushing it into the periphery of global politics and cutting it out of European decision-making. The crisis in Ukraine is about the survival of Putin’s regime and the dismantling of the post-Cold War settlement. We should not accept the fallacious narrative of victimhood propagated by the Kremlin’s Versailles syndrome. Even so, it is time to explore practical ways of coexisting with Russia. The Helsinki Process and the disarmament and arms control agreements of the Cold War could serve as a model for a mutually acceptable security architecture.

The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine: a useful but flawed OSCE tool. EPC Policy Brief, 23 April 2015

The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine functions as the eyes and ears of the international community in Eastern Ukraine; it monitors, impartially, the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and observes whether or not both parties comply with the Minsk II Agreement. The success, or failure, of this Mission will not only be of crucial importance for the situation in Eastern Ukraine, but will also determine the OSCE’s entire future and ability to operate in conflict regions. Although the SMM is a flawed tool, Dennis Sammut and Joseph D’Urso argue that its deployment and the subsequent reinvigoration of OSCE is the perfect opportunity for the EU to rethink its relation to and position in the organisation, and to assume a bigger and more decisive role.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). CEPS Special Report No. 109/May 2015

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

Balancing realism and vision - The prospects of EU-Israel relations in times of change and uncertainty. European Policy Brief, 28 May 2015

In this joint EPC-FSD Policy Brief, Andrea Frontini and Eran Etzion assess the state of play and the future prospects of EU-Israel relations in the light of recent domestic and regional political developments. They argue that, despite frequent cacophony and recurring stalemates, the EU-Israel partnership still has the potential to pursue shared strategic objectives. The two sides have to realign their relations, taking into account new realities and common challenges in the Middle East and Northern Africa region, and the current state of the Middle East Peace Process. More careful differentiation and stronger prioritisation of the policy dossiers at stake are urgently needed. An autonomous but joined up review of the overall relationship, guided by courage, pragmatism and stronger strategic direction, is crucial in order to move ahead.

The harsh reality of Ukraine's fiscal arithmetic. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/07, June 2015

Ukraine is struggling with both external aggression and the dramatically poor shape of its economy. The pace of political and institutional change has so far been too slow to prevent the deepening of the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises, while business confidence continues to be undermined. • Unfortunately, the 2015 International Monetary Fund Extended Fund Facility programme repeats many weaknesses of the 2014 IMF Stand-by Arrangement: slow pace of fiscal adjustment especially in the two key areas of energy prices and pension entitlements, lack of a comprehensive structural and institutional reform vision, and insufficient external financing to close the expected balance-of-payments gap and allow Ukraine to return to debt sustainability in the long term. • The reform process in Ukraine must be accelerated and better managed. A frontloaded fiscal adjustment is necessary to stabilise public finances and the balance-of-payments, and to bring inflation down. The international community, especially the European Union, should offer sufficient financial aid backed by strong conditionality, technical assistance and support to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.

Consensus, contradiction, and conciliation of interests: the geo-economics of the Energy Union. EPC Policy Brief, 8 July 2015

European Union energy policy calls for nothing less than a profound transformation of the EU's energy system: by 2050 decarbonised electricity generation with 80-95% fewer greenhouse gas emissions, increased use of renewables, more energy efficiency, a functioning energy market and increased security of supply are to be achieved. Different EU policies (e.g., EU climate and energy package for 2020) are intended to create the political and regulatory framework for this transformation. The sectorial dynamics resulting from these EU policies already affect the systems of electricity generation, transportation and storage in Europe, and the more effective the implementation of new measures the more the structure of Europe's power system will change in the years to come. Recent initiatives such as the 2030 climate/energy package and the Energy Union are supposed to keep this dynamic up. Setting new EU targets, however, is not necessarily the same as meeting them. The impact of EU energy policy is likely to have considerable geo-economic implications for individual member states: with increasing market integration come new competitors; coal and gas power plants face new renewable challengers domestically and abroad; and diversification towards new suppliers will result in new trade routes, entry points and infrastructure. Where these implications are at odds with powerful national interests, any member state may point to Article 194, 2 of the Lisbon Treaty and argue that the EU's energy policy agenda interferes with its given right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, the choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. The implementation of new policy initiatives therefore involves intense negotiations to conciliate contradicting interests, something that traditionally has been far from easy to achieve. In areas where this process runs into difficulties, the transfer of sovereignty to the European level is usually to be found amongst the suggested solutions. Pooling sovereignty on a new level, however, does not automatically result in a consensus, i.e., conciliate contradicting interests. Rather than focussing on the right level of decision making, European policy makers need to face the (inconvenient truth of) geo-economical frictions within the Union that make it difficult to come to an arrangement. The reminder of this text explains these latter, more structural and sector-related challenges for European energy policy in more detail, and develops some concrete steps towards a political and regulatory framework necessary to overcome them.

The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: An Imperfect Storm. CEPS Paperback, 17 August 2015

After five years of debates, consultations and negotiations, the European institutions reached an agreement in 2013 on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the 2014-2020 period. The outcome has major implications for the EU’s budget and farmers’ incomes but also for Europe’s environment, its contribution to global climate change and to food security in the EU and in the world. It was decided to spend more than €400 billion during the rest of the decade on the CAP.The official claims are that the new CAP will take better account of society's expectations and lead to far-reaching changes by making subsidies fairer and ‘greener’ and making the CAP more efficient. It is also asserted that the CAP will play a key part in achieving the overall objective of promoting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. However, there is significant scepticism about these claims and disappointment with the outcome of the decision-making, the first in which the European Parliament was involved under the co-decision procedure. In contrast to earlier reforms where more substantive changes were made to the CAP, the factors that induced the policy discussions in 2008-13 and those that influenced the decision-making did not reinforce each other. On the contrary, they sometimes counteracted one another, yielding an ‘imperfect storm’ as it were, resulting in more status quo and fewer changes. This book discusses the outcome of the decision-making and the factors that influenced the policy choices and decisions. It brings together contributions from leading academics from various disciplines and policy-makers, and key participants in the process from the European Commission and the European Parliament.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings (BEEP) 35/2015.

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.