69 resultados para Oil, Gas, and Energy
Resumo:
Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Karim Massimov, once referred to energy cooperation as the ‘core’ of relations between his country and the European Union (EU). Indeed, there is great mutual interest in this area. Six percent of the EU’s crude oil imports and 16 percent of its uranium imports come from Kazakhstan. And around 80 percent of the latter’s oil exports go towards Europe. For Kazakhstani producers, access to European lucrative and reliable markets is of utmost importance. Over the last several years, the thrust of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy was aimed at increasing the capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) that pumps Kazakhstani oil to Europe. Moreover, Kazmunaigaz’s (KMG) – the national oil and gas company – major external investment was in the Romanian oil company Rompetrol.
Resumo:
Despite their initial interest in shale gas exploration, over the past year Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania have become increasingly sceptical about the development of unconventional gas resources. In January of this year Bulgaria introduced an indefinite ban on the exploration and production of shale gas and Romania followed suit in May by introducing a six-month moratorium on exploration work, which it plans to extend by another two years following the country’s parliamentary elections scheduled for December. Similar measures are being planned by the government in Prague. The aim of this report is to explore the reasons why countries which claim to want to improve their energy security have been showing increasing scepticism towards shale gas.
Resumo:
1. The priority of Ankara's energy policy is to make Turkey an important transit corridor for energy resources transported to the EU. Turkey wishes to play an active role in the distribution and sale of gas and oil flowing across its territory. 2. Transit and sale of energy resources, and gas in particular, are expected to provide a major source of income for Turkey and a tool by which Ankara will be able to build its position in the region and in Europe. 3. Since Turkey is an EU candidate country, Brussels will probably welcome Turkey's role as a transit corridor as much as Ankara will. 4. The success of Ankara's energy strategy hinges on developments in Turkey's internal energy market. 5. It also depends on a number of external factors including: - Export policies and internal situation in producer countries. Most importantly, it depends on: a. Russia and its energy policy priorities b. Stability in the Middle East. - Policies of consumer countries, including the EU in particular. - Policies of world powers present in the region (USA).
Resumo:
As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.
Resumo:
This report aims to identify, explain and detail the links and interactions in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) between energy supply and demand and socio-economic development, as well as the potential role of energy supply and demand policies on both. Another related aim is to identify and analyse, in a quantitative and qualitative way, the changing role of energy (both demand and supply) in southern Mediterranean economies, focusing on its positive and negative impact on socio-economic development. This report investigates in particular: o The most important channels through which resource wealth can contribute to or hamper economic and social development in the analysed region; o Mechanisms and channels of relations between energy supply and demand policies and economic and social development. The burdens of energy subsidies and ‘oil syndrome’ are of particular relevance for the region. An integrated socio-economic development and energy policy scenario approach showing the potential benefits and synergies within countries and the region is developed in the final part of the report.
Resumo:
A decade-long period of a steadily rising oil prices (and that of other raw materials) has given Russia a feeling of strength, bordering on invulnerability, which has made the country more assertive, and ready to use any opportunity to deploy its military power. Based on his analysis of Russian behaviour over the past 50 years, Daniel Gros finds that the abrupt reversal of this trend since the summer of 2014 portends a much less aggressive Russian stance as long as the price of oil remains at present levels.
Resumo:
European Union energy policy calls for nothing less than a profound transformation of the EU's energy system: by 2050 decarbonised electricity generation with 80-95% fewer greenhouse gas emissions, increased use of renewables, more energy efficiency, a functioning energy market and increased security of supply are to be achieved. Different EU policies (e.g., EU climate and energy package for 2020) are intended to create the political and regulatory framework for this transformation. The sectorial dynamics resulting from these EU policies already affect the systems of electricity generation, transportation and storage in Europe, and the more effective the implementation of new measures the more the structure of Europe's power system will change in the years to come. Recent initiatives such as the 2030 climate/energy package and the Energy Union are supposed to keep this dynamic up. Setting new EU targets, however, is not necessarily the same as meeting them. The impact of EU energy policy is likely to have considerable geo-economic implications for individual member states: with increasing market integration come new competitors; coal and gas power plants face new renewable challengers domestically and abroad; and diversification towards new suppliers will result in new trade routes, entry points and infrastructure. Where these implications are at odds with powerful national interests, any member state may point to Article 194, 2 of the Lisbon Treaty and argue that the EU's energy policy agenda interferes with its given right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, the choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. The implementation of new policy initiatives therefore involves intense negotiations to conciliate contradicting interests, something that traditionally has been far from easy to achieve. In areas where this process runs into difficulties, the transfer of sovereignty to the European level is usually to be found amongst the suggested solutions. Pooling sovereignty on a new level, however, does not automatically result in a consensus, i.e., conciliate contradicting interests. Rather than focussing on the right level of decision making, European policy makers need to face the (inconvenient truth of) geo-economical frictions within the Union that make it difficult to come to an arrangement. The reminder of this text explains these latter, more structural and sector-related challenges for European energy policy in more detail, and develops some concrete steps towards a political and regulatory framework necessary to overcome them.