Does Europe Need a Common Foreign & Security Policy? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 06.1, 15 September, 1996

CFSP's performance is widely regarded as weak. Why did Europe's stance in world politics not improve with the Treaty of Maastricht? The article analyses the present policy approach and the institutionalist and militarystrategic reform proposals. It is argued that policy and proposals suffer from drawbacks leading to an uncomprehensive formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both do not provide CFSP with a necessary strategy but instead largely duplicate existing organizations. Furthermore, they propose concepts that are not viable because member states do not agree on a common defense policy. In addition, they fail to offer answers adequate to today's challenges, which are not primarily military in nature. Instead, a socioeconomic security policy appears to be a more realistic option. It is necessary because no other organization provides it sufficiently; it is viable because member states could agree on iti and it is adequate because the stabilization of countries in Eastern Europe is best achieved by social and economic policy-and not by military deterrence.

Flashlight Europe N°6–June 2015. Waiting for the Five Presidents’ Report on the Future of the Monetary Union: What do we need to know?

At the European Summit on 25-26 June Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, will be presenting a report on the future of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It has been drawn up by the presidents of the EU Commission, the European Council, the European Central Bank, the European Parliament, and the Eurogroup, and is a sequel to the “Four Presidents’ Report” on the same topic that was compiled without the participation of the President of the European Parliament and presented in 2012. In this Flashlight we provide answers to key questions about the forthcoming report.

The EU Blue Card - is there a need for a more comprehensive approach? IES Policy Brief Issue 2015/3 June 2015

This Policy Brief reviews the implementation of the EU Blue Card (BC) Directive in Member States and offers some suggestions on how to improve its potential. Firstly, it traces back the origin of the current partitioned approach in labour migration and the objectives that an EU labour migration policy should achieve according to the Commission. Secondly, it reports on the content of the directive and its implementation in Member States. Thirdly, there is an analysis of the weaknesses of the directive in terms of numbers of BCs issued and harmonization achieved. Finally, recommendations are put forward on how to improve EU labour migration policy.

No need for walls to equitably distribute the refugees. CEPS Commentary, 25 September 2015

While acknowledging that the recently implemented EU Temporary Relocation System might not be the panacea for addressing the refugee crisis in Europe today, Sergio Carrera and Daniel Gros find in this commentary that it nevertheless constitutes a movement towards the urgent need to go beyond the current EU Dublin regime and ensure more equitable sharing of legal responsibility across all member states.

Five things we need to know about the on-demand economy. CEPS Essay No. 21/8 January 2016

The last few years have witnessed the exponential growth of platforms like Uber and Airbnb and the creation of countless other less well-known examples. The expansion of the on-demand economy puts huge pressure on regulators to adapt it to the existing frameworks for labour and taxation. The rapid growth of the sector also divides experts: it is seen by many as threat for working conditions, and by others as an incredible opportunity. The purpose of this essay is to take a balanced perspective on what we know about the on-demand economy and what needs further investigation. More research is needed on the individual cases before one can draw conclusions on how this new sector works. The political economy of the sector is made even more interesting by the fact that the technology is developing faster than the regulation. Yet, our plea to policy-makers is to refrain from legislating too early and to take the time to understand how the supply and the demand of these services behave and their equilibrium.

Measuring ageing and the need for longer working lives in the EU. CEPS Working Document No. 417/February 2016 Wednesday, 24 February 2016

This study considers different ways of measuring the ageing of societies and their implications for public policy. The first part characterises the ongoing ageing of the population in the EU28 by relating it to past and future longer-term demographic trends for broad groups of countries. It goes beyond traditional chronological measures to include recently suggested prospective measures of ageing. The second part of the study is concerned with economic dependency ratios; a more relevant measure for summarising the economic challenges related to ageing. Three main findings emerge: first, prospective indicators of ageing reveal the challenge of population ageing to be less onerous than traditional chronological measures would suggest. Their relevance, however, will depend on the degree to which policy changes can respond to the changing age structure of the population. Second, substantial increases in the length of working lives are necessary to maintain current economic dependency ratios. Taking a year-2000 perspective view of the economic challenges of ageing shows that substantial progress has been made. Third, looking towards 2050, education will have limited direct impact on the scale of the ageing challenge.

Is there a need for additional monetary stimulus? Insights from the original Taylor Rule. CEPS Policy Brief No. 342, April 2016

Central banks in the developed world are being misled into fighting the perceived dangers of a ‘deflationary spiral’ because they are looking at only one indicator: consumer prices. This Policy Brief finds that while consumer prices are flat, broader price indices do not show any sign of impending deflation: the GDP deflator is increasing in the US, Japan and the euro area by about 1.2-1.5%. Nor is the real economy sending any deflationary signals either: unemployment is at record lows in the US and Japan, and is declining in the euro area while GDP growth is at, or above potential. Thus, the overall macroeconomic situation does not give any indication of an imminent deflationary spiral. In today’s high-debt environment, the authors argue that central banks should be looking at the GDP deflator and the growth of nominal GDP, instead of CPI inflation. Nominal GDP growth, as forecasted by the major official institutions, remains robust and is in excess of nominal interest rates. They conclude that if the ECB were to set the interest rate according to the standard rules of thumb for monetary policy, which take into account both the real economy and price developments of broader price indicators, it would start normalising its policy now, instead of pondering over additional measures to fight deflation, which does not exist. In short, economic conditions are slowly normalising; so should monetary policy.

An Italian job: the need for collective wage bargaining reform. Bruegel Policy Brief ISSUE 2016/11 - JULY 2016

Highlights: Since the mid-1990s, Italy has been characterised by a lack of labour productivity growth, combinedwith a 60 percent growth in labour costs, 20 percentage points above euro-area average consumer price growth. As a consequence, Italy has become less competitive compared to its euro-area partners, the profitability of its firms has dropped and real GDP-per-capita has flatlined. • At the root of the substantial discrepancy between wages and productivity is Italy’s system of centralised wage bargaining which, in many ways, is designed without regard for the underlying industrial structure and geographical heterogeneity of the Italian economy.This has fostered perverse incentives and imbalances within Italy. • Collective wage bargaining, and in particular the determination of base salaries, should be moved from the national to the regional level for all contracts, in the public and private sectors.The Mezzogiorno,which might superficially be seen as losing out from this policy, would actually gain the most in competitiveness terms. • Furthermore, measures should be taken so that, in the long run, the Italian industrial structure evolves into a less fragmented small-company-based economy. This firm consolidation would likely expand the use of firm-level agreements and performance payments, and would improve Italy’s productivity and competitiveness overall.

The need to re-engage Europe's youth. EPC Commentary, 18 July 2016

In the immediate aftermath of the UK EU referendum, the breakdown of results sparked talks of a generational conflict, with young people – who voted overwhelmingly to remain - being blamed for having brought Brexit on themselves with their dismally low 36% turnout. New data compiled by the London School of Economics reduces the grounds for these accusations, suggesting a 64% turnout for 18-24 year olds. While this is certainly positive, the problem of youth disengagement lingers as the 64% turnout of those aged 18-24 has to be weighed against a 90% turnout of those aged 65+. This should not come as a surprise as Britain generally has the lowest youth turnout in Europe and the last referendum confirmed a trend that is not at all new, neither in Britain nor in other European countries.