129 resultados para Middle East
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EU diplomats are still struggling to keep abreast of events in Egypt. A reconstruction of the police state bankrolled by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE is the exact opposite of what the EU tried to achieve under the Presidency of Mohamed Morsi, namely long-term stability based on respect for democracy and the rule of law. It is therefore perhaps surprising that the EU has so far not imposed any sanctions against members of the military regime led by General al-Sisi. Instead, it is trying to build an inclusive political dialogue to restore a democratic process. Is this what the EU should do? The answer is, quite plainly, Yes at least for the moment.
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This Policy Brief attempts to draw lessons from the combination of the global financial crisis and the Arab uprisings focusing on the domains related to fiscal, monetary and financial policies. It does so by answering the following questions: What has been the impact of the crisis and the uprisings on the fiscal, monetary and financial policies of the SEMCs? What have been the crisis management actions? And what policy lessons can be drawn for crisis management in the future? And how can the EU contribute to this within the Euro-Med Partnership?
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No abstract.
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The European Union (EU) has traditionally taken a rather nuanced view of the activities of Hezbollah. Despite historic links to violent activity, Europe always remained reluctant to place the Lebanese militant group on its list of terrorist organisations. Internal divergences among member states, as well as the strategic-realist goals of the EU in both Lebanon and the Middle East more generally meant that such a listing never materialised. This remained the case even in the initial turmoil following the Arab uprisings, when Hezbollahs relatively moderating objectives were viewed as a force for stability. However, the EU shifted policy in July 2013 by listing the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist entity. This paper will investigate the reasons behind this decision, as well as the likely implications and effectiveness of the new policy. Two principal catalysts were behind the decision. The first was a Hezbollah-linked bombing in Bulgaria which provided the focal point around which a consensus of the EU member states could emerge in the Council. Secondly, the escalation both of the Syrian conflict and Hezbollahs role in it provided a more political and strategic impetus for the decision. This paper maintains that although a change in policy was somewhat necessary, it is questionable whether the artificial separation of Hezbollahs political and military wings and the symbolic proscription of the latter is the most propitious choice to achieve European objectives.
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Notwithstanding the failure on February 15th of the second round of the Geneva II talks on Syria, Luigi Scazzieri and Steven Blockmans take note in this CEPS commentary of several welcome signs that the international community as a whole is starting to move in a more coordinated manner on the Syrian peace process.
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On January 20th, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had been implementing its commitments as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed with the so-called E3+3 in Geneva (also known as P5+1) on 24 November 2013. The forging of this interim deal, the successful start to its implementation and the temporary sanctions relief represent resounding success for international diplomacy but they should not be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. Reaching agreement on the JPA was achieved at the cost of clarity over what is to follow and it was decided to eschew a structured agreement in favour of a two-step process. The stated aim of the negotiating parties remains that of starting the implementation of a comprehensive solution by November 2014. If agreement is not reached on a comprehensive solution by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the action plan can be renewed by mutual consent. The latter might well be the likeliest outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. Apart from the large gap between the E3+3 and Iranian positions on the substance of a final deal, several domestic policy constraints will likely define the parameters of what is achievable in the future. This CEPS Policy Brief argues that the best hope for success lies in continued engagement and consistent incremental progress in the negotiations, with structured concessions on both sides. This should occur, however, not in a two- but a three-step framework based on lengthening Irans breakout period while re-engaging with the country both politically and economically. The EU is in a unique position to lead this process. Having greater flexibility than either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be that of maintaining the negotiating momentum and broadening dialogue with Iran.
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Democratic values and basic rights in Turkey are hanging by a thread. Over the past eighteen months the rule of law, civil liberties and freedoms have been eroded which has left many Turks anxious over the direction in which their country is heading. With Turkeys accession negotiations de facto frozen, the EU finds itself with little leverage over Ankara. Calls of concern have fallen on deaf ears as Turkeys leadership has become increasingly belligerent, with its EU related narrative overflowing with resentment. Because Turkeys accession negotiations are irreversibly intertwined with Turkey-EU cooperation in other areas, this has had a negative impact on the broader relationship between both sides. Recent examples include the issue of foreign fighters traveling from Europe to Syria via Turkey. Each side has accused the other of not doing enough to stem the flow. Likewise, following the decision of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to ban the import of agricultural goods from countries that have placed sanctions on Moscow, the EU asked Turkey to demonstrate solidarity, as a candidate country, and not to increase exports of agricultural products to Russia. Turkey rejected this request and is reportedly working on strengthening trade ties with Moscow. Turkey remains an important partner in a number of key areas including trade, energy, foreign and security policy and migration. At a time when the EU faces crises in both its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, a reliable and predictable Turkey, with which it can cooperate in the Black Sea and Middle East neighbourhoods is crucial. Hence the vision and plans of the EUs new leadership, in particular new Foreign Policy Chief, Federica Mogherini, and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, how to shape relations with Ankara is particularly significant. The Unions current policy is counterproductive and is further eroding trust and cooperation rather than enhancing it. It needs to be turned around.
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Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the Moroccan democratic model was a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the democratic exceptionalism2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a third way compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du dveloppement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a democratic model or a third way. After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model [] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society [] France fully supports this exemplary process. Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a democratic model or a third way. After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model [] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society [] France fully supports this exemplary process. Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Moroccos Advanced Status with the EU.7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: All Hail the (Democratic) King. Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.
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Introduction. In 2003, Iraq was invaded by the US coalition forces that ousted Saddam Husseins regime from power before occupying the whole country. The intension, declared by the then American George W. Bush, was to build a decent and democratic society at the centre of the Middle East that will become a place of progress and peace.1 In 2014, three years after the withdrawal of the last American soldier, however, it is difficult to overestimate or exaggerate what is at stake. National unity and territorial integrity have never been so seriously threatened since the country is experiencing the internal fighting in its modern history. Many parts of Iraq, including the northern oil city of Kirkuk, long claimed as an integral part of the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, are out of the control of the central government. Large areas in the north including the strategic city of Mosul were seized by the fighters of the Islamic State, an Al-Qaeda offshoot, formerly known as ISIS, who threatened to invade the Kurdistan region before being attacked by airstrikes by the US. They proclaimed a caliphate on both sides of the border with Syria, where they also control vast territory.
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The Joint Plan of Action agreed upon with Iran on 24 November 2013 gave negotiators one year to forge a comprehensive agreement that restricts the countrys ability to militarise its nuclear programme. That deadline will lapse in the next few days and diplomats involved in the talks have been trying to rein in expectations that a deal will be struck on time. Satisfying domestic constituencies in Iran and the US is what makes the politics of dealing with the nuclear file so much harder than the physics of slowing down the nuclear programme. Any future deal will have to stand on its own merits, enabling Iran and the EU3+3 to cooperate on the other geopolitical challenges they face. Both parties should therefore balance their demands with what they can realistically offer and make concessions to reach a compromise. The author of this CEPS Commentary argues that if no deal is reached on November 24th, then diplomacy should be allowed to keep on spinning for a few more months.
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The conflict in Syria, which has lasted since 2011, has become the most significant test of the efficiency of Turkeys foreign policy and the biggest challenge to Turkeys security in recent decades. The lack of a clear prospect of an end to the war does not allow us to come to a final conclusion regarding the Syrian civil wars importance for Turkey. However, it can be said today that with the exception of the initial phase of the conflict, Ankaras influence over the course of events in Syria has been limited, and the war itself is evolving in a direction that is unfavourable for Turkey: the hostile regime of Bashar al-Assad is still in power, the opposition has proved to be an unreliable or even a dangerous ally, and in northern Syria militant jihadist groups and Kurds are gaining importance. It is also quite unlikely that the West will take any greater responsibility for stabilising the situation in the region. In response to such an unfortunate situation, and out of fear of risking deeper involvement in the conflict, during the past year Turkeys policy towards Syria has been restrained, reactive and focused mainly on defending Turkeys territory. However, this policy offers no security guarantees and does not prevent the countrys regional position from weakening, especially in the context of the reinforcement of the jihadist militants and the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The arguments for Turkey continuing its defensive policy are strong: the country fears the possible results of an open confrontation with Assads forces; most probably it could not count on support for such actions from within its own society or its Western allies. It also does not have enough acceptance within the anti-Assad opposition circles. On the other hand, though, the risk of uncontrolled development of events is still present; the risk of confrontations with armed jihadist militants is growing; and the potential operation of Turkish forces, either against the jihadists or against Assads army, could be considered as a method of diverting attention from the political problems with which the AKP government has been struggling at home.
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The Centre for Eastern Studies has decided to embark on the project entitled 'Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation' for two major reasons: the start of the accession negotiations between Ankara and the European Union in October 2005, and the significant part which Turkey plays in western Eurasia (the Caucasus, the countries in the basins of the Black and Caspian Seas, the Middle East and the Balkans) which We wish to present our readers our second report discussing Turkey's relations with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia, the aspect of Turkish foreign policy regarding the Black Sea, and the role of Turkey as a transit country for oil and gas from the Middle East and the Caspian regions. The evaluation of Turkey's standpoint and potential regarding the aforementioned issues is especially important, considering the tensions existing in Turkey's relations with the EU and the USA, as well as the West's increasing engagement in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Black Sea regions. In this process, Ankara may play the role of a significant ally for the West. However, it may just as readily play the role of its rival, who could co-operate with other countries and may seriously frustrate the implementation of the EU and US' goals. The Report was developed between autumn 2006 and autumn 2007, over which time the project participants searched for publicly available documents in Poland, Turkey, EU countries and the USA, and went on five research trips to Central Asia, Russia, Turkey and Caucasus, where they met local analysts, officials and researchers.
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1. The priority of Ankara's energy policy is to make Turkey an important transit corridor for energy resources transported to the EU. Turkey wishes to play an active role in the distribution and sale of gas and oil flowing across its territory. 2. Transit and sale of energy resources, and gas in particular, are expected to provide a major source of income for Turkey and a tool by which Ankara will be able to build its position in the region and in Europe. 3. Since Turkey is an EU candidate country, Brussels will probably welcome Turkey's role as a transit corridor as much as Ankara will. 4. The success of Ankara's energy strategy hinges on developments in Turkey's internal energy market. 5. It also depends on a number of external factors including: - Export policies and internal situation in producer countries. Most importantly, it depends on: a. Russia and its energy policy priorities b. Stability in the Middle East. - Policies of consumer countries, including the EU in particular. - Policies of world powers present in the region (USA).
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The start of accession negotiations between Ankara and the EU is vital for the future of both Turkey and the Union, including Poland as its member state, as well as for the geopolitical situation in Eurasia (the Black Sea region, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East). Appreciating the significance of these issues, the Centre for Eastern Studies in early 2005 decided to launch a project entitled "Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation". The goal of this project is to present, within the context of accession negotiations, Turkey's greatest internal challenges as well as Ankara's relations with its neighbour regions, the EU and the USA. This Report is the first of three which will be published as part of the project. The Report includes texts on Turkish-US relations since 2003, major political and social challenges on Turkey's path towards the EU and the current condition of the Turkish economy. The Report was developed between July 2005 and November 2006, over which time CES workers and associates searched for publicly available materials in Poland, Turkey and EU countries, and went on three research trips to Turkey, where they met local researchers, analysts, politicians and officials. The authors of the Report would like to express their gratitude to everyone who have shared their opinions with them, and to the Polish Embassy in Ankara, especially to Ambassador Grzegorz Michalski and Minister Andrzej Ananicz for their expert support and assistance in the authors' work on this Report. This Report does not present the official stance of the Polish government on the issues discussed therein; instead it reflects the personal views of its authors, who have made their best efforts to ensure that their work is reliable.
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From 1990 to 2010, the 11 countries of the south-eastern Mediterranean region (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, hereafter SMCs) recorded the highest growth rates in inbound world tourism. In the same period, domestic tourism in these countries also increased rapidly, which is astonishing given the security risks, natural disasters, oil prices rises and economic uncertainties in the region. Even the 2008 financial crisis had no severe impact on this growth, confirming the resilience of tourism and the huge potential of the SMCs in this sector. The Arab Spring brought this trend to an abrupt halt in early 2011, but it may resume after 2014 with the gradual democratisation process, despite the economic slowdown of the European Union its main market. This paper looks at whether this trend will continue up to 2030, and provides four different possible scenarios for the development of the tourism sector in SMCs for 2030: i) reference scenario, ii) common (cooperation) sustainable development scenario, iii) polarised (regional) development scenario and iv) failed development decline and conflict scenario. In all cases, international and domestic tourist arrivals will increase. However, three main factors will strongly influence the development of the tourism sector in the SMCs: security, competitiveness linked to the efficient use of ICT, and adjustment to climate change.
