Financial assistance to Greece: Three programmes. EPC Discussion Paper, 26 February 2016

There are a lot of myths surrounding the bailout money that was given to Greece. Many people still believe that the money never went to the Greek people, but to the Greek and European banks; that the intervention of the euro-area governments and the IMF dealt almost exclusively with the Greek debt; that very little money was used to finance Greek public expenditure; that most Greek debt was reimbursed; that no cuts were made to the stock of Greek government bonds on the market; and, finally, that so far, no cuts have been made to the debt of the Greek state towards the euro-area countries. In this Discussion Paper, Fabio Colasanti debunks some of those myths by taking stock of the numbers behind the financial support given to Greece by the countries of the euro-area and the IMF. Examining the three bailout programmes in detail, he discusses the reasons for and against a restructuring of the Greek public debt in 2010, its implementation in 2012, the degree in which the Greek debt towards the euro-area countries has already been cut, and the scope for further cuts. Finally, the paper explains how both issues were and are still dominated by internal political considerations, both in the creditor countries and in Greece.

The creation of euro area financial safety nets. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/09, July 2012

The financial crisis has exposed the need to devise stronger and broader international and regional safety nets in order to deal with economic and financial shocks and allow for countries to adjust. The euro area has developed several such mechanisms over the last couple of years through a process of trial and error and gradual enhancement and expansion. Their overall architecture remains imperfect and leaves areas of vulnerabilities. This paper provides an overview of the recent financial stability mechanisms and their various shortcomings and tries to brush the outline of a more comprehensive safety net architecture that would coherently address the banking, sovereign and external imbalances crises against both transitory and more permanent shocks. It aims to provide a roadmap for further improvements of the current mechanism and the creation of new devices including a banking resolution mechanism and amore powerfulmechanismto provide financial assistance addressing both the sovereign and external dimensions of the shocks thereby reducing the need for the ECB to fill the current void.

EU-IMF assistance to euro area countries: an early assessment. Bruegel Blueprint [No. 19?], 16 May 2013

Three years ago, in May 2010, Greece became the first euro-area country to receive financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in exchange for implementing an economic programme designed by the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. Within a year, Ireland and Portugal went down the same path. This study provides an early evaluation of these assistance programmes implemented by the Troika in these three countries. The study assesses the economic impact of the programmes and the consequences of their particular institutional set-up.

The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism

Economic Partnership Agreements in the EU's post-Lome trade regime: negotiations with West Africa. ZEI Discussion Paper C214, 2012

Trade is a key element of the development policy of the European Union (EU). As the most important trading partner of developing countries, the EU attempts to facilitate the participation of developing countries in global trade and contribute to economic growth through providing market access and financial assistance. For twenty-five years, the commitment of the EU was largely focused on its former colonies, more specifically in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). The developing world, in terms of the EU’s trade policy, was therefore divided between ACP states with special provisions under the Lomé Conventions and all other developing countries. With the new millennium, this special relationship came to an end. Pressure from several member states1 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) led to an overhaul of the EU’s trade regime vis-à-vis developing countries and to the loss of the privileged position of ACP countries. The result of this overhaul is still pending. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) – to be negotiated between the EU and several ACP regions – have only been realized in the Caribbean. This article will to examine the negotiations between the EU and West Africa and discuss the interests involved on the African side. Following the introduction, the second part of this article is dedicated to the Lomé Conventions with a focus on the change occurring from the third to the fourth revision in order to understand the current situation. The third part is going to take a look at the Cotonou agreement and the trade regime of the EU in general before turning to the negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and West Africa. The conclusion summarizes the main findings.

Preventing the rise of sovereign borrowing costs in the Eurozone: what can the ESM and the ECB achieve? Egmont Paper No. 56, November 2012

This paper focuses on the possible instruments for ‘ex-ante’/’preventive’/’precautionary’ interventions which can be deployed by the ESM and the ECB in order to prevent a debt crisis in a eurozone country. The potential of Eurobonds will also be discussed in this crisis management perspective. The first part of this paper traces the underlying trends of the evolution of interest rates in eurozone countries over the last decades. The second part discusses the principles of a preventive intervention in sovereign bond markets for the purpose of lowering borrowing costs of countries facing refinancing constraints; the limits and main issues of an ex-ante intervention will be underlined. In the third part, the properties of the ESM’s precautionary financial assistance and secondary market support facility will be discussed in details. The ECB preemptive intervention policies and, in particular, the OMT will be analyzed in the fourth part of the paper. The most likely course of action – a combined intervention by the ESM and the ECB – will be discussed in the fifth part. Finally, I will point out the core challenges of introducing Eurobonds as additional instruments to mitigate the rise of borrowing costs in the short term.

The European Central Bank in the age of banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/13, 1 October 2013

During the crisis the European Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended beyond its price stability mandate. In addition to the primary objective of price stability and the secondary objective of supporting EU economic policies, we identify ten new tasks related to monetary policy and financial stability. We argue that there are three main constraints on monetary policy: fiscal dominance, financial repercussions and regional divergences. By assessing the ECB’s tasks in light of these constraints, we highlight a number of synergies between these tasks and the ECB’s primary mandate of price stability. But we highlight major conflicts of interest related to the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes. We also underline that the ECB’s government bond purchasing programmes have introduced the concept of ‘monetary policy under conditionality’, which involves major dilemmas. A solution would be a major change towards a US-style system, in which state public debts are small, there are no federal bail-outs for states, the central bank does not purchase state debt and banks do not hold state debt. Such a change is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.