The European Union’s Regionalism Diplomacy in Africa: An English School Approach. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers [BRIGG] #2.2015

This paper proposes an innovative analytical approach to regionalism promotion by the European Union (EU) in Africa. The approach pursues the dual aim of accommodating African approaches to regionalism in EU foreign policy analysis and of expounding the centrality of diplomacy in negotiating a renewed EU-African Union relationship. The concept of ‘regionalism diplomacy’ brings the negotiated and contentious nature of EU regionalism promotion to the fore. The paper espouses contemporary English School thinking about ‘international society’ and argues that EU regionalism promotion cannot just remain the expansion of European regional international society onto Africa. Instead, EU regionalism diplomacy should acknowledge and incorporate the anticolonial pan-African roots of African regionalism. Overall, the EU should seek a more diplomacy-focused, negotiated Africa-Europe interregional relationship. The paper concludes with an outline of a pan-African approach to regionalism diplomacy and avenues for future research.

Achieving European Policy Objectives through Financial Technology. ECRI Commentary No. 17, 16 November 2015

Alistair Milne argues in this ECRI Commentary that ‘FinTech’ (newly emerging Financial Technologies) can play a crucial role in achieving European policy objectives in the area of financial markets. These notably include increasing access by smaller firms to trade credit and other forms of external finance and completing the banking and capital markets unions. He points out, however, that accomplishing these objectives will require a coordinated European policy response, focused especially on promoting common business processes and the adoption of shared technology and data standards.

European Bank Resolution: Making it work! Interim report of the CEPS Task Force on Implementing Financial Sector Resolution. CEPS Task Force Report, January 2016

From the start of 2016, new rules for bank resolution are in place – as spelled out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) – across the EU, and a new authority (the Single Resolution Board, or SRB) is fully operational for resolving all banks in the eurozone. The implementation issues of the new regime are enormous. Banks need to develop recovery plans, and authorities need to create resolution plans as well as set the minimum required amount of own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for each bank. But given the diversity in bank structures and instruments at EU and global level, this will be a formidable challenge, above all with respect to internationally active banks. In order to explore ways in which the authorities and banks can meet this challenge, CEPS formed a Task Force composed of senior experts on banking sector reform and chaired by Thomas Huertas, Partner and Chair, EY Global Regulatory Network. This report contains its policy recommendations.

Challenges for the European Union in times of crisis: reactions

Since the beginning of its existence in the form of communities, this entity faced a lot of challenges that could had been stopped the European dream without the fast, prompt and appropriate reaction of the decision makers. There were a lot of difficult times in its history of more than 60 years but the ambition and need of going forward on the way of integration prevailed and today we can talk about European Union as one of the most important global players, having one of the most complex and fascinating political systems. The tenacity and the willing to succeed off the decision makers made this possible. Moments like “The Empty Chair Crisis“, changes with regards to the decision- making process, convenient for ones but inconvenient for the others, lack of consensus with regards to the new accessions, the big changes that Europe went through in the late 80s etc. showed that the decision makers can have an appropriate response whatever the problem would be and that we must stay together and go on dreaming to a united nation in the form of a federation. Nowadays we are facing maybe the most difficult moment in European Union history. Many of the member states were and still are on the edge. A lot of immediate and prompt actions were taken since the start of financial crisis, either political or economic, drove by the need of going on. We are too much into the integration process, too much dependent one of each other so that we cannot stop and simply go back only to the concept of national state.

Why Moldova’s European integration is failing. CEPS Commentary, 3 March 2016

As anti-government demonstrations continued in Chisinau, EU foreign ministers reaffirmed their support for Moldova’s political association and economic integration with the EU in the Council conclusions of 15 February 2016. The ministers also confirmed that all 28 EU member states have ratified the Association Agreement between Moldova and the EU. Despite this progress, Moldova’s European integration project is in tatters. According to an authoritative survey commissioned by the National Democratic Institute in November 2015, only 40% Moldovans support European integration; 44% are in favour of Eurasian integration, however. [1] As Russia steps up the pressure on Moldova, these trends are worrying for the EU.

La Banque centrale européenne et la nouvelle gouvernance économique européenne: le défi de l’intégration différenciée = The European Central Bank and the new European economic governance: the challenge of differential integration. Research Paper in Law 01/2015

No abstract.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

20 years of the European single market: growth effects of EU integration. Policy Brief #2014/02

The ongoing European integration has increased the economic growth of participating national economies. Calculating the cumulative gains in the real gross domestic product per capita resulting from the integration of Europe between 1992 and 2012, every national economy under consideration realized income gains from the European integration. Denmark and Germany saw the greatest gains per resident. If the values from only 1992 and 2012 are compared, every country except for Greece has been able to achieve a higher per capita income due to the European integration.