The Single Supervisory Mechanism: A Sound First Step in Europe’s Banking Union? Egmont European Affairs Paper, March 2013

The financial and economic crisis has hit Europe in its core. While the crisis may not have originated in the European Union, it has laid bare structural weaknesses in the EU’s policy framework. Both public finances and the banking sector have been heavily affected. For a long time, the EU failed to take into account sufficiently the perverse link that existed between the two. Negative evolutions in one field of the crisis often dragged along the other in its downward spiral. In June 2012, in the early hours of a yet another EU Summit, the leaders of the eurozone finally decided to address the link between the banking and sovereign debt crises. Faced with soaring public borrowing costs in Spain and Italy, they decided to allow for the direct European recapitalisation of banks when the Member State itself would no longer be in a position to do so. In exchange, supervision of the banking sector would be lifted to the European level by means of a Single Supervisory Mechanism. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, or SSM in the EU jargon, is a first step in the broader revision of policies towards banks in Europe. The eventual goal is the creation of a Banking Union, which is to carry out effective surveillance and – if needed – crisis management of the banking sector. The SSM is to rely on national supervisors and the ECB, with the ECB having final authority on the matter. The involvement of the latter made it clear that the SSM would be centred on the eurozone – while it is to remain open to other Member States willing to join. Due to the ongoing problems and the link between the creation of the SSM and the recapitalisation of banks, the SSM became one of the key legislative priorities of the EU. In December 2012, Member States reached an agreement on the design of the SSM. After discussions with the European Parliament (which were still ongoing at the time of writing), the process towards making the SSM operational can be initiated. The goal is to have the SSM fully up and running in the first half of 2014. The decisions that were taken in June 2012 are likely to have had a bigger impact than the eurozone’s Heads of State and Government could have realised at the time for two important reasons. On the one hand, creating the SSM necessitates a full Banking Union and therefore shared risk. On the other hand, the decisions improved the ECB’s perception of the willingness of governments to take far-reaching measures. This undoubtedly played a significant role in the creation of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme by the ECB, which has led to a substantial easing of the crisis in the short-term. 1 These short-term gains should now be matched with a stable long-term framework for bank supervision and crisis management. The agreement on the SSM should be the first step in the direction of this goal. This paper provides an analysis of the SSM and its role in the creation of a Banking Union. The paper starts with a reminder of why the EU decided to put in place the SSM (§1) and the state of play of the ongoing negotiations on the SSM (§2). Subsequently, the supervisory responsibilities of the SSM are detailed, including its scope and the division of labour between the national supervisors and the ECB (§3). The internal functioning of the SSM (§4) and its relation to the other supervisors are discussed afterwards (§5). As mentioned earlier, the SSM is part of a wider move towards a Banking Union. Therefore, this paper sheds light on the other building blocks of this ambitious project (§6). The transition towards the Banking Union is important and will prove to be a bumpy ride. Before formulating a number of conclusions, this Working Paper therefore provides an overview of the planned road ahead (§7).

The Treaty of Lisbon or intergovernmental temptation?

From the Introduction. This question goes to the very heart of the European project: it is fundamental for the future of the European Union and its role in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon emerged from the ashes of the European Constitution. Driven forward by Angela Merkel, as President of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso, the main advances made in the Constitution were preserved at the expense of a few concessions and symbolic sacrifices in order to make the Union more effective and more democratic.

Shifting EU Institutional Reform into High Gear. Report of the CEPS High-Level Group. CEPS Task Force Reports

To contribute to the important debate on EU institutional reform in the run-up to the European Parliament elections and the start of a new Commission, CEPS formed a High-Level Group on EU Institutional Reform under the leadership of Danuta Hübner MEP and member of the CEPS Board of Directors. The report of this distinguished group of MEPs, former and current EU institutional members and leading scholars on EU law and institutional affairs focuses on reforms that could be taken within the framework of the current treaties to build a more responsive and accountable Union. The report analyses the main inter- and intra-institutional weaknesses in terms of efficiency, democracy and differentiation and puts forward a number of recommendations addressing issues such as the reorganisation of the College of Commissioners, the promotion of strategic legislative planning, the enhancement of the role of the EP and the rotating Presidency of the Council, the improvement of the democratic accountability of the European Council and the adequate engagement of the national parliaments.

Reflections on the 26-27 June European Council Summit. EPC Commentary, 27 June 2014

In the end, the system of Spitzenkandidaten or Top Candidate has prevailed despite unease or even outright opposition from a number of Member States. This could be seen as a victory of the European Parliament, especially since it does now create expectations about the European Parliament strongly influencing future decisions. However, it is not straightforward: the Spitzenkandidaten process did not encourage higher participation, implying that the legitimacy question is far from answered. In addition, Member States unhappy with the EP gaining more and more powers might well look into how the powers of the EP can be curtailed in future, for example through greater involvement of national parliaments.

Legitimising EU Policymaking: What Role for National Parliaments? EPC Discussion Paper, 28 January 2014

The ‘euro crisis’ has sparked a renewed interest in how national parliaments can help to improve the democratic nature of European decision making. According to various treaties, assemblies in the Member States are now guaranteed a full spectrum of rights including access to information, participation and the ability to object to EU legislation. The authors of this Discussion Paper argue that there is still room to refine and promote a more responsible use of existing instruments. Moreover, the possibility of adding new mechanisms to the available toolkit is part of the discussion on the topic but the authors warn that any proposals must be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis, especially in the context of the European economic governance reform process. Ultimately, according to the authors, the most straightforward and effective way for national parliaments to strengthen their direct involvement in EU policy formulation is to focus on building capacity to perform their two key domestic responsibilities: to hold their own governments to account, also on EU affairs, and to maintain the link with voters, including by communicating and debating ‘Europe’ at ‘home’.

EU Democratic Legitimacy and National Parliaments. CEPS Essay No. 7, 25 November 2013

The role of national parliaments in the EU has been at the centre of a long debate. Since the Maastricht treaty, new powers to the EU level have been accompanied not only by an increasing role of the European Parliament (EP) in the legislative process, but also by a number of declarations and protocols to ensure that national parliaments received the information and documents required to effectively monitor their governments in EU affairs. The Lisbon Treaty extended the guarantees and also included new modes of direct participation. The proper use of the mechanisms in place, namely, the subsidiarity checks, the political dialogue with the Commission and the inter-parliamentary cooperation with the European Parliament, has become of vital importance in view of recent developments in EU economic policy and beyond. The choice for increasing inter-governmentalism in decision-making and the centralisation of the implementing and supervisory powers in the Commission and the Central Bank have raised questions about political accountability and the appropriate involvement of parliaments. However, the extent to which national parliaments should be more involved is also rather controversial. This essay examines the difficulty of defining and addressing the question of the democratic legitimacy in the EU. It examines the role of the national parliaments in the treaties and explores ways in which they can contribute to improving that legitimacy.

Defying the Treaty: The Influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies on the Development of the Eastern Partnership. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 6, October 2014

Many scholars now argue that the Treaty of Lisbon has removed the role and influence of the rotating Council Presidency in the domain of the European Union’s foreign affairs. This paper will, however, go beyond a superficial, treaty-based analysis of the influence of the post-Lisbon rotating Council Presidency and instead look at two primary, residual, informal Presidential roles, namely agenda-shaping and brokering. It will examine the extent to which these informal roles allowed the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies of July to December 2011 and 2013 respectively to influence the development of the bilateral, multilateral and internal tracks of the Eastern Partnership. The paper will argue that the considerable influence of these rotating Presidencies defied the logic of the Lisbon Treaty, suggesting that the ‘golden age’ of this six-month position, whereby individual Member States pursue foreign policy issues of significant domestic interest at the European level, has not yet passed.

A Strong Europe in a Globalized World: From the Hungarian to the Polish presidency of the Council of the European Union. ACES Working Papers, 2011

On June 17, 2011, the Center for Transatlantic Relations – together with the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, and the Embassies of Hungary and Poland – hosted authors writing on the theme “A Strong Europe in a Globalized World,” and who offered in-depth, substantive reflections about how the United States and Europe can work together more closely in meeting global challenges. Drawing on the agendas of the outgoing and incoming EU Presidencies of the Council of the European Union – Hungary and Poland respectively – authors focused on the importance of a strong US-EU partnership in the face of mounting global challenges, from the current financial and economic crisis through the insecurities of energy markets and the promise of the Arab Spring. Authors explored in depth four key areas of shared interests: A Global Perspective (Transatlantic Partnership in a Globalized World); Achievements and Deliverables of Eastern Partnership; Euro-Atlantic Perspectives for the Balkans; and Common Challenges of Energy Security. Senior Hungarian and Polish government officials, subject matter experts, private sector actors, and think tank scholars participated.

The Belgian parliaments and EU affairs: the reasons behind their limited involvement. European Policy Brief No. 28, March 2014

Given their limited involvement in EU affairs, the Belgian parliaments at the different levels of the Belgian federation barely contribute to the legitimation process of the EU’s actions. In order to strengthen their role, not only should governmental communication towards parliaments be improved but parliamentary activities should also adapt to the confederal features of Belgium. The latter poses a unique challenge in Europe.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

Critical Tasks Facing Western Europe and the United States in a Period of Change and Transition. Address by Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Department of State Bulletin, 441.2 (103). 7 June, 1971

No abstract.